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MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT
This research describes the objective measurement of CEO narcissism and its impact on
organizational outcomes. Narcissism forms an essential element for effective leadership
and is as such an important personal characteristic for CEOs.
CEO narcissism can be measured by investigating five determinants of CEO behavior,
comprising media exposure, compensation, power, growth and perquisites. The CEO
narcissism score is based on these five determinants by a massive data collection of fifteen
objective variables for 953 S&P500 CEOs. The composed CEO narcissism score reflects the
psycho logically validated factor solution of narcissism. CEOs who have been identified as
narcissists by leading psychologists have a top score in this research.
The results of the first empirical impact study show an intricate relationship between
CEO narcissism and financial accounting performance measures which can be visualized by
a concave parabola. This relationship confirms the view that narcissism is an essential
element for effective CEO leadership, but is however not without its pitfalls for either too
low or too high levels of narcissism.
The results of the second empirical impact study indicate a negative relationship
between CEO narcissism and countervailing power of the board. High narcissistic CEOs do
not tolerate contradiction and surround themselves with followers.
The third impact study examines the relationship between CEO narcissism and fraud
propensity as alleged in AAERs by the SEC. The results show that high narcissistic CEOs are
more inclined to commit managerial fraud to keep up appearances and retain their status.
The empirical results theoretically contribute to the psychological perspective of narcissism
as a double edged sword and provide an indication to expand the upper echelon theory
with the CEOs narcissistic personality.
The practical contribution of this research enables stakeholders to monitor CEO narcissism
by applying objective measures and trying to retain productive CEO narcissism levels.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Executive directors are responsible for the organizational strategy of a company, which is 
related to the organizational performance. Existing empirical research provides evidence that 
the chief executive officer (CEO) plays a central role within the top executive team. CEOs 
can have disproportionate and sometimes dominating influences. The personal characteristics 
of CEOs help to determine the extent of the CEO influence within the top executive team. The 
narcissistic personality dimension is an important personal characteristic of CEOs because of 
its inherent capability to exercise power and to manipulate others. There is a wide variation 
among CEOs concerning their narcissistic tendencies. Narcissism is a necessary requirement 
for effective leadership and can have productive influences, but also forms a potential threat. 
The central research question concerns the objective measurement of the CEOs narcissistic 
personality dimension and its impact on organizational outcomes.  
This chapter describes the research objectives (1.1) and the research structure (1.2).   
 
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
This research has three primary objectives. The first objective is to develop a framework of 
the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism. Narcissism is not a stable construct but 
rather a dynamic personality dimension that is nourished by the environment and the 
situation. The narcissistic personality has the potential to grow in the absence of 
countervailing power and self-reflection. The framework, which will be presented on page 56, 
visualizes the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism and the vicious circle in which 
CEOs end up in the absence of self-reflection and countervailing power.  
 
The second objective is to document the CEOs narcissistic personality with objective 
variables. The empirical analysis of this research is based on a sample which consists of all 
S&P500 CEOs from 1992 to 2008 with tenures of more than three years. The narcissism 
construct is measured using a massive dataset regarding the CEOs media exposure, 
compensation, power, growth and perquisites. This data collection reflects the four factor 
solution of narcissism, being authority/leadership (I like to be the center of attention), 
superiority/arrogance (I am better than others), self-admiration (I am preoccupied with how 
extraordinary and special I am) and entitlement (I insist upon getting the respect that is due to 
2 
 
me). The final dataset consists of 15 variables for 953 S&P500 CEOs, which provides the 
opportunity to score all CEOs according to their narcissistic personality dimension. The 
methodology consists of a principal components analysis over the 15 variables which captures 
the CEOs narcissistic personality. The principal components analysis avoids the problem of 
multicollinearity and reduces the dimensionality. The four extracted principal components 
have an interpretation conform Emmons’ four factor solution of narcissism. The factor 
loadings are used to score the 953 S&P500 CEOs on the four dimensions. The four scores are 
normalized and summed in order to obtain one narcissism score for each individual CEO. 
This CEO narcissism score shows the varying narcissistic personalities of CEOs. CEOs with a 
high narcissism score in this empirical research have already been identified as narcissists by 
leading psychologists, which forms some evidence for the construct validity. 
 
The third objective is to examine the impact of CEO narcissism. The narcissistic personality 
dimension determines the individual CEO-effects, which are defined as the proportion of 
variance in organizational outcomes which can be attributed to the CEO. The CEO narcissism 
score is subsequently used to investigate the individual CEO-effects on three organizational 
outcomes. 
 
The first impact study looks at the relationship between CEO narcissism and the financial 
performance of a company. The CEO narcissism score is used as an explanatory variable for 
the accounting based measure (the Return On Assets) and the market based measure (the 
Tobin’s Q) in order to investigate the relationship between CEO narcissism and financial 
performance. The main finding is the existence of a curvilinear relation between CEO 
narcissism and financial accounting performance measures. This empirical research confirms 
the psychological perspective that some level of narcissism is required for effective 
leadership, while high levels of narcissism result into destructive behavior.  
 
The second impact study investigates whether high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing 
power of the board of directors. The countervailing power is measured using two proxies: the 
size of the board and the number of board changes. A large board size is easier to control by 
the CEO and individual board members are less likely to be held accountable. The 
countervailing power reduces as the board size increases. The number of board changes 
determines the interdependency of board members. The interdependent board members are 
less likely to monitor the CEO due to their reciprocity feelings and the time needed to get 
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acquainted with the board and the company. A large board size and many board changes will 
reduce the countervailing power. The main findings show a statistically significant positive 
relation between CEO narcissism and the board size as well as a statistically significant 
positive relation between CEO narcissism and the number of board changes. This empirical 
research shows that high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing power.  
 
The third impact study examines the relationship between the CEO narcissism and the fraud 
propensity. Fraud is measured by investigating the Accounting and Audit Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) of the SEC. The AAERs give detailed information about the fraud, the 
executives involved and the period in which the fraud took place. This detailed information 
provides the necessary elements to collect specific information regarding the executives’ 
intention and involvement. The binary dependent variable model shows that high narcissistic 
CEOs are more likely to commit fraud.  These results are statistically significant as well. 
 
These three empirical studies confirm the framework which describes the causes and 
consequences of CEO narcissism and also elucidate that corporate governance research 
should be extended with the CEO narcissism aspect. 
 
 
1.2 Research Structure 
 
This research is organized in eight chapters and the research structure is visualized in figure 
1.1 on page 5. After this chapter 1, the introduction, chapter 2 includes an overview of the 
corporate governance literature. The existing corporate governance theories are described as 
well as their practical limited applicability which is due to the assumption of the rational 
economic man. The literature overview elucidates that the separation between ownership and 
control causes persisting corporate governance problems. In order to understand the problems 
associated with the separation between ownership and control, the corporate governance view 
is extended with behavioral economics which is more capable of explaining human behavior. 
The behavioral economics incorporate rational as well as irrational human behavior. Personal 
characteristics influence the individual variances in non-standard preferences, non-standard 
belief and non-standard decision making. Extending the narrow economic rational view with 
the irrationality of human behavior, results into a better understanding of the actions carried 
out by executives and shareholders.  
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Chapter 3 documents the unique position of the CEO within corporate governance and the 
relevance of studying CEO narcissism. Narcissism is a complicated construct, because of its 
inherent positive as well as negative aspects. Leading psychologists have distinguished 
productive narcissism from the pathological destructive counterpart. The CEOs narcissistic 
personality affects organizational outcomes, which will potentially reinforce the narcissistic 
tendencies in the absence of self-reflection and countervailing power. This chapter presents 
the framework that visualizes the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism. This 
framework elucidates that high narcissistic CEOs end up in a vicious circle from which it is 
difficult to escape without losing face.  
Chapter 4 documents all the narcissism indicators, the data collection, the descriptive statistics 
and the scale development based on an exploratory principal components analysis. This 
chapter ends with the CEO narcissism score, which is used in the subsequent three chapters to 
investigate the impact of CEO narcissism.  
Chapter 5 explores the intricate relationship between CEO narcissism and financial 
performance by testing the hypothesis whether moderate levels of CEO narcissism induce 
higher financial performance while very low or very high levels of CEO narcissism cause 
lower financial performance.  
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between CEO narcissism and countervailing power and 
tests the hypothesis whether high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing power.  
Chapter 7 investigates the relationship between CEO narcissism and fraud propensity and 
tests the hypothesis if high narcissistic CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud.  
Chapter 8 concludes by highlighting the results of the empirical studies, which confirm the 
framework of CEO narcissism and demonstrate the struggles within corporate governance. 
This last chapter also documents the research implications and provides suggestions for future 
research.  
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Figure 1.1 Research Structure 
 
Chapter 2. 
Corporate Governance
Literature Overview
Chapter 3.
Framework for CEO
Narcissism
Chapter 5.
CEO Narcissism & 
Financial Performance
Chapter 6.
CEO Narcissism & 
Countervailing Power
Chapter 7.
CEO Narcissism & 
Fraud Propensity
Chapter 1. 
Introduction
Chapter 4. 
Development CEO
Narcissism Scale
Chapter 8.
Discussion & 
Conclusion  
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Chapter 2  Corporate Governance Literature Review 
 
The separation between ownership and control causes fundamental organizational problems. 
Corporate governance systems have been developed in order to solve these problems and to 
facilitate managers to pursue the objectives which are in the interest of shareholders. This 
chapter includes a literature overview of corporate governance in modern corporations. The 
mechanisms to align the managerial interests with the shareholders’ interest are reviewed as 
well as the main corporate governance theories. The aligning mechanisms and the corporate 
governance theories are based on rationality. Irrationality should be incorporated into 
corporate governance, because of the fact that the individuals within the organization are 
fallible human beings. A corporate governance based solely on rational decision making fails 
to explain the human behavior. This chapter includes an overview of the behavioral economic 
theories.  
  
 
2.1 Ownership and Control 
 
The owner-managers with sole proprietorship maximize their own welfare by trading-off 
activities that do not contribute to the company’s wealth like leisure against personal wealth. 
The owner-manager experiences an optimal mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits in 
case the marginal utility obtained from an additional dollar of expenditure is equal to the 
marginal utility obtained from an additional dollar purchasing wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Selling a portion of the 100% ownership to one or more outside investors raises a 
potential conflict of interest, because the costs and benefits will be divided between the 
former 100% owner-manager and the outside shareholders. The former owner-manager has 
become more of a manager who might prefer more leisure and less work resulting into 
decreasing shareholders’ wealth. In this new situation a conflict between the manager with 
self-interested behavior and the outside shareholders causes fundamental organizational 
problems.  
 
In 1602, the first publicly held company, the VOC, was born by introducing the format of 
shareholdings. The shareholders delegated the responsibility of controlling the organization to 
the managers. The management of this company, the Heeren XVII, refused to pay dividend to 
shareholders year after year. The shareholders formed a group, the “Dolerende Participanten”, 
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who demanded more transparency and control and even went to court. This first publicly held 
company is the first in showing that problems arise when ownership and control are separated. 
 
The corporate form exists for more than four hundred years. One might argue that the 
governance issues should have been settled some time ago. Adam Smith (Smith, 1937) 
already wrote: “the directors of such companies, however being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same vigilance with which the partners in a private copartner frequently watch over 
their own…….negligence and profusion therefore must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such companies”.   
Although corporate governance systems have been developed, the citation of Adam Smith is 
still applicable. Complaints and struggles concerning corporate governance still exist. 
 
 
The Modern Corporation 
 
The first study regarding the modern organization was undertaken by Berle and Means (Berle 
& Means, 1932). In the paper “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, they discuss 
three different types of ownership structures. The first structure is a majority control in which 
a large percentage of the common stock is owned by the men ultimately responsible for 
running the corporation and a small percentage of the common stock is largely diffused. There 
is a minority control in the second structure in which a shareholder holds about 10 to 20% of 
the common stock while the rest of the common stock is widely dispersed. The third structure 
is characterized by management control in which the separation of ownership and control 
becomes almost complete when the common stock is totally dispersed and the largest 
shareholder holds only a percentage of the common stock. The modern public corporation in 
the US is structured according to this last form. 
 
 
Corporate Governance and the Modern Corporation 
 
The modern corporation with its board, management, employees and shareholders has to be 
controlled and governed. Corporate governance provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining these objectives and the way in 
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which the monitoring is determined. Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) argue that 
the company’s objectives are based upon the shareholders’ interest. In their view, corporate 
governance systems facilitate the board and management to pursue the objectives that are in 
the interest of its shareholders. They define corporate governance as “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, page 737) and simply quote: “we want to know how investors get 
the managers to give them back their money” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, page 739).  
Also Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1970) is very clear when he writes the article: ”the social 
responsibility of business is to increase profits”. Looking after other stakeholders’ interest is 
the same as committing fraud, according to Friedman.  
The quote “accountable to many is accountable to none” from Michael Jensen shows that 
Jensen favored pursuing shareholders’ interest as well, instead of pursuing many stakeholders.  
 
Corporate governance in the US is mainly concerned about assuring shareholders’ interest. 
Other interest groups such as debt holders (banks and bondholders), employees, suppliers and 
consumers are of less importance, because their contracts have been settled. Banks receive 
interest and are paid off eventually, employees receive their salary, suppliers receive a fixed 
price for delivered goods or services and consumers get their product or service. All these 
compensations are more or less specified and settled. Shareholders on the contrary remain in 
uncertainty whether they will get their money back. This insecure position forms the basis of 
corporate governance. 
 
 
Insider Continental versus Outsider Anglo-Saxon Systems 
 
Regarding the interests of shareholders versus the interests of stakeholders, two corporate 
governance models can be distinguished: an insider Continental versus an outsider Anglo-
Saxon system. Corporate governance in the Netherlands is characterized by the insider 
system, a Continental model, in which the board has to consider all stakeholders’ interests. 
Corporate governance in the US and the UK on the contrary is characterized by an Anglo-
American outsider system in which the board has to consider shareholders’ interests. 
However, one may argue that other stakeholders in the Anglo-American outsider system are 
important as well. The Hampel committee (1998) quoted this view as follows: “The board is 
responsible for relations with stakeholders; but they are accountable to shareholders”. 
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One tier versus two tier systems 
 
The board of directors exists of executive directors and non-executive directors and is the 
formal link between the shareholders of an organization and the managers entrusted with the 
day-to-day functioning of the organization (Mintzberg, 1983).   
Executive directors are responsible for setting out the organizational strategy. The non-
executive directors primarily have the task of controlling and advising the executive directors. 
For their task, non-executive directors receive a fixed payment, dependent on the firms’ size. 
The non-executive directors are primarily active or retired professionals who are supposed to 
be independent of the company. 
 
In case executive directors and non-executive directors operate within two separate boards, 
the board structure is two tier. In an one tier board system, the executive directors and non-
executive directors operate within one board. The one tier board structure is common in the 
UK, the US, Germany, Japan and other countries in Asia. In the Netherlands, a two tier board 
structure is more common, although several listed companies have a one tier board structure 
(Shell, Unilever, LogicaCMG and ArcelorMittal).  
 
 
Dispersed versus Concentrated Ownership 
 
In the US, the UK and the Netherlands, the common stock is held by a large number of 
shareholders. In this dispersed ownership model, all shareholders hold relatively small 
positions. In fact, no shareholder holds such a large stake in the company that they are 
structurally involved in the control of the company. In this environment, ownership and 
control are truly separated. The widely dispersed shareholdings give individual shareholders 
the opportunity to diversify their portfolio, but will also lead to free riding problems. 
Individual shareholders will not be willing to bear the costs to actively interfere with 
management, since they each make a cost-benefit analysis of the intervening costs versus a 
higher share price which will in turn benefit all shareholders. Free riding shareholders will 
benefit from higher share prices as well without bearing any costs of intervening. These free 
riding problems make small shareholders rationally apathetic to engage in controlling 
activities. 
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Law and Codes 
 
The legal protection of shareholders also varies across countries. The control rights are the 
most important rights. With these rights to control, shareholders have the opportunity to 
influence important corporate decisions, such as takeovers, acquisitions, mergers, but also 
electing the board of directors. Investors are willing to finance corporations because of the 
presence of legal protection. In the Netherlands, the legal protection of shareholders is not so 
extensive compared to the US, for example because more takeover defenses are allowed. 
Shareholders in the US have the legal right to sue the corporation in case shareholders suspect 
that the directors of the corporation expropriate. Shareholders in the Netherlands do not have 
these rights.  
The corporate governance code in the US is rule based, while the Dutch corporate governance 
code is “comply or explain” based. The “comply or explain rule” provides management an 
increased propensity to expropriate.  
 
There are at least two reasons for regulatory intervention (Becht, Bolton, Röell, & Roosevelt, 
2003). First of all, the shareholders are not able to write efficient rules which involve all 
parties concerned in comprehensive negotiations. The parties that are not present on the 
negotiation table will not be heard and their rights will not be incorporated. Shareholders will 
pursue their own interests, for example by introducing anti-takeover defenses. Secondly, 
shareholders may want to break or alter the rules in a later phase. In this case, problems will 
arise because organizations do not have the power to commit not to change or break the rules 
down the road afterwards.  
 
The costs for implementing corporate governance law and codes are substantial. These costs 
are estimated at about 450,000 Euros a year for an average Dutch publicly held company 
(calculated by Ernst and Young). The costs for implementing SOX are much higher and 
estimated at 3 to 8 million dollars in annual compliance costs for Fortune 500 companies 
(calculated by the Johnson group), mainly because of the regulatory detailed internal control 
system (Cools, 2005). The SOX compliance costs for US medium size listed companies are 
estimated at 2,5 million dollars per year. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) argue that legal protection and some form of 
concentrated ownership are essential elements for a good corporate governance system. The 
11 
 
legislative and regulatory changes have to improve corporate governance, but the greatest risk 
for financial markets systems now is that of overregulation (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003). 
 
Codes and regulation define markers for correct behavior and moral justice but are not 
sufficient to prevent problems and scandals. In fact, economists have not been able to find any 
convincing correlation between the quality of a firm’s corporate governance system and the 
risk of fraud or the company’s profitability. A CEO: “There is nothing wrong with the codes, 
but they won’t solve anything”. The separation between ownership and control and the 
inherent problems remain.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks about the Separation between Ownership and Control 
 
The modern corporation is characterized by a separation of ownership and control. Corporate 
governance systems have emerged in order to facilitate the board and management to pursue 
the objectives which are in the interests of its shareholders. Certain corporate governance 
systems may be more appropriate in specific countries than in others. The reason why 
corporate governance systems vary can be found in the culture, in the efficiency of capital 
markets, in national law and in corporate governance codes.  
 
 
2.2 Mechanisms Aligning Managerial and Shareholders’ Interest  
 
Ever since the separation of ownership and control, efforts have been made to align the 
managerial interest with shareholders’ interest. Managers are especially able to operate in 
their own self interest for three reasons.  
The first reason is that managers have more information than outside shareholders. This 
situation is called asymmetric information. 
The second reason is the uncertainty, which enables managers to expropriate because 
shareholders are unable to link the managerial actions to the organizational outcomes. Various 
factors contribute to the organizational outcomes and the direct link between the managerial 
actions and the organizational outcomes may not be evident for outside shareholders. 
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Third, the shareholders’ wealth in the US is widely dispersed with many shareholders holding 
only a small portion of the common capital. The individual shareholders are often too small to 
exercise their control rights.  
These situations result into significant managerial control rights over shareholders’ wealth.  
Managers can expropriate outside shareholders by pursuing their own interest and staying on 
the job even if they are no longer competent or qualified to manage the firm (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
 
There are five different mechanisms which can prevent managers from expropriating 
shareholders’ wealth. These five mechanisms with accompanying criticisms are described 
below and summarized in table 2.1 on page 17. 
 
 
1 Performance based incentive plans  
 
Jensen and Meckling raise the question why investors don’t try to bribe the manager with cash 
to undertake a project that is in the interest of the shareholder. Such threats would violate the 
managers’ legal “duty of loyalty” to shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Granting 
managers a highly contingent long term incentive contracts ex ante in order to align the 
interests of the managers with the interests of the shareholders is a better solution. Such 
incentive based performance plans will encourage managers to take actions which increase 
shareholders’ wealth.  
 
People do react on financial incentives, especially for one-dimensional tasks as piece-wage. A 
famous example is the study of Lazear (Lazear, 2000) who finds that the introduction of 
piece-wage leads to an increase in production of 44%, while the incomes of the workers 
increase only by 10%. Half of the output increase is due to a productivity increase. Piece-
wage labor is however something totally different from managing. Managers are able to 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth because shareholders do not observe all individual 
managerial actions. In the case shareholders do observe the individual managerial actions, 
they are often not able to understand the causal relation between the managerial action and the 
organizational outcomes. Myriad factors can contribute to the organizational outcomes. In 
order to make an incentive contract feasible, some measure of performance that is highly 
correlated with the quality of the managers’ actions is required. The optimal incentive 
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contract is therefore difficult to determine. It depends on the managers’ risk aversion, the 
importance of managers’ decision and the ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Hölmstrom, 1979; Mirrlees, 1999; Ross, 1973).  
There are several criteria that must be fulfilled in order for incentives to work effectively.  
Milgrom and Roberts (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) sum up four criteria. First, the additional 
effort creates incremental shareholders’ wealth. Second, the managerial activities can be 
quantified precisely. Third, the manager has a risk tolerance. Fourth, the manager is 
responsive to the incentives. In practice it will be practically impossible to fulfill all these 
criteria.  
 
Performance incentives have been empirically tested by various researchers and they conclude 
that performance incentives do not lead to better performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 2000).  
Yermack (Yermack, 1997) concludes that managers receive stock option grants short before 
good news is announced and delay stock option grants after bad news announcements. 
Options are more often a covert mechanism of self-dealing instead of an incentive device. 
Yermack states that he cannot conclude that managers do not care about performance at all, 
but he can conclude that incentive contracts are not able to completely solve the conflict of 
interests between the managers and the shareholders.  
 
Pay for performance can even be dysfunctional in three cases. First, people may only perform 
the tasks that result into a bonus. This behavior damages the organization. Financial 
incentives are normally not related to the quality of the work, but are merely quantitative and 
related to measurable output. In “The folly of paying for A while hoping for B, or getting 
what you pay for”, Kerr (Kerr, 1975) documents the dysfunctional effects of performance 
incentives. Second, performances may be manipulated by creative bookkeeping, like booking 
revenues sooner and costs later. Third, performance related pay will increase extrinsic 
motivation but will destroy a part of the intrinsic motivation at the same time. This motivation 
crowding theory implies that performance incentives narrow the motivation to work to a pure 
economic view, destroying the intrinsic pleasures related to work.  
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2 Direct interventions by (large) shareholders 
 
In countries like Germany, France and countries in Asia, the ownership structure is very 
concentrated. In Asia there are many family controlled organizations in which the owner is 
often also the manager or is able and willing to monitor and discipline management 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Claessens, 2006). These large shareholders are most 
likely to intervene in case managers take actions which do not increase shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Ownership is however very distributed in the UK, the US, Australia and also in the 
Netherlands. The numerous shareholders have virtually no control over managerial actions. 
The dispersed ownership structure will lead to free riding problems among shareholders. 
Shareholders with a very small percentage of the common stock have little incentive to 
intervene in case managers do not take actions which increase shareholders’ wealth. The 
numerous shareholders individually make a cost-benefit analysis comparing the cost to 
intervene with the benefit of a little increase in their relatively small stock value. Mostly, the 
individual shareholders will not intervene and will rely on other shareholders hoping that the 
others will take action and will bear the cost of intervening. In case all shareholders act like 
this, nothing will happen. The intervention mechanism is not likely to occur in large publicly 
held organizations with numerous stockholders.  
 
Large shareholders are however not diversified and hence bear risk. The fact that ownership is 
so concentrated in many organizations around the world suggests that the lack of 
diversification is not as great a private cost for large investors to bear as relinquishing control 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Diversification and bearing less risk is an important reason to hold 
only a small percentage of common stock.  
There are two other reasons for dispersed ownership besides the diversification/risk argument 
(Becht et al., 2003).  
First, the individual investors’ wealth may be too small relative to the size of the common 
stock, so that a large stake in the company is not feasible.  
Second, there will be a reduced liquidity in the secondary market, because large stakes are 
harder to sell. The efficiency in which capital markets differ among countries will lead to 
differences in international corporate ownership. The US, the UK and the Netherlands have 
large efficient capital markets and no restrictions on cross-border capital flows. The 
diversification costs in order to cut down risk are lower in efficient capital markets. 
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Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies have in many countries 
significant shareholdings in the companies in which they invest (Mallin, 2008). If the 
institutional investors have a large enough share in the common stock, they may be able to 
influence the selection of managers and influence the firms’ policy due to their large voting 
rights. Large shareholders are basically able to influence managerial decisions because of 
their powerful voice. Their tools of governance include one to one meetings, voting lists and 
rating systems. In practice however, large shareholders do not use these rights frequently (De 
Jong, Mertens, & Roosenboom, 2006). 
 
Becht en Röell (Becht et al., 2003) state that this mechanism of partially concentrated 
ownership and control is among the five mechanisms the most favored one, but also notice the 
potential collusion of large shareholders with management against smaller investors. Large 
shareholders represent their own interest which need not coincide with the interests of the 
other investors in the firm or with the interests of employees and managers.  
 
 
3 Board of directors 
 
The board of directors, in particular the non-executive directors, have the task to monitor the 
executive directors. Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983) considers the board of directors as the 
formal link between the shareholders of the organization and the managers entrusted with the 
day-to-day functioning of the organization. Fama and Jensen (Fama & Jensen, 1983) describe 
the board of directors as “the apex of the firms’ decision control system” (Fama & Jensen, 
1983, page 311). The board of directors takes strategic decisions but is not involved in 
carrying out the day-to-day activities resulting from their strategic decisions. The nature of the 
boards’ output is cognitive. The board of directors is vulnerable to process losses due to their 
size, the various backgrounds of board members and their interdependence (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). The structure (one tier board structure versus the two tier board structure), 
composition and exact role of boards vary between organizations.  
 
An obstructing factor for board monitoring is the independence paradox (Bezemer, Peij, 
Maassen, & van Halder, 2010; Hooghiemstra, Van Manen, & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2004). The independence paradox implies that the non-executive directors need information 
to monitor the executive directors while in the mean time the non-executive directors depend 
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on executive directors to give them the necessary information, resulting into information 
asymmetry. 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) state that the independence of the 
supervisory board tends to diminish as the firm performs better and the power of the CEO 
increases. The longer the CEOs are on the job, the less closely they are monitored by the 
supervisory board. The effectiveness of the boards will erode over time and the researchers 
conclude that boards of directors are weak and ineffective monitors of managers (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998). Becht (Becht et al., 2003)  argues as well that boards are widely perceived 
to be ineffective. An example of an ineffective board is Enron, which is documented by 
Coffee (Coffee Jr, 2001). Coffee’s paper ”Understanding Enron: it’s about the gatekeepers 
stupid” describes the ineffectiveness Enron’s board. His vision about boards is best explained 
by quoting him: “why did the watchdogs not bark in the night when it now appears in 
hindsight that a massive fraud took place?” (Coffee Jr, 2001, page 11).  
 
 
4 The threat of firing 
 
The threat of firing may withhold managers to act in their own self interest. Shareholders can 
take a direct approach by threatening managers with dismissal in case managers put their own 
self interest above maximizing shareholders’ wealth. In practice, managers are not often 
replaced. Poor managers who are not being replaced might be one of the costliest 
manifestations of governance problems (Jensen, Ruback, Field, & Park, 1983).  
 
 
5 The threat of (hostile) takeover  
 
Takeovers are most likely to occur in case the stock of the firm is undervalued. Hostile 
takeovers are powerful mechanisms because they bypass the current management and take 
over the control of the organization. Managers will be disciplined to take actions that 
maximize shareholders’ wealth because of this threat of a (hostile) takeover.  
Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)  document important reasons why takeovers 
fail as a governance mechanism. First, takeovers are expensive because acquirers have to pay 
for the expected increase in profits to target firms’ shareholders. Shareholders will otherwise  
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Table 2.1 Mechanisms Aligning Managerial and Shareholders’ Interests 
Mechanism Benefit Drawback Remarks 
Performance 
incentives 
people do react on 
financial incentives 
 
shareholders often do not 
observe individual 
managerial actions 
 
shareholders are often not 
able to understand the 
causal relation between 
managerial actions and 
outcomes 
 
myriad factors can 
contribute to organizational 
outcomes 
performance 
incentives can be 
dysfunctional if: 
(i) people only 
perform tasks that 
result into a bonus 
(ii) performances 
may be manipulated 
by creative 
bookkeeping 
(iii) performance 
incentives may 
(partly) destroy 
intrinsic motivation 
 
Large 
shareholders 
large shareholders 
have a powerful voice, 
which can influence 
managerial decisions 
 
potential collusion of large 
shareholders with 
management against small 
shareholders 
 
reduced liquidity of the 
secondary markets 
 
no risk diversification for 
large shareholders 
 
impossible if individual 
investors’ wealth is limited 
 
difficult in countries 
with dispersed 
ownership structures  
 
large shareholders do 
not use their rights 
frequently 
 
 
Board of 
directors 
the board is the formal 
link between the 
shareholders and the 
directors 
 
effectiveness of board 
monitoring depends on 
power balance 
board vigilance 
required 
Threat of 
firing 
it can withhold 
managers to act in 
their own self interest 
succession problems 
 
negative publicity 
 
seldom applied  
Threat of a 
(hostile) 
takeover 
powerful because it 
bypasses the current 
directors 
 
disciplines directors 
 
market cap not 
undervalued 
 
takeovers are expensive  
 
takeovers require a liquid 
capital market  
 
opposed by managerial 
lobbies 
unlikely to occur if 
stock price is 
overvalued 
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not tender and simply hold on to their shares which will automatically become more valuable 
if the takeover succeeds. Second, takeovers require a liquid capital market which gives 
acquirers access to amounts of capital on short notice. Third, takeovers, especially hostile 
ones, are politically an extremely vulnerable mechanism since they are opposed by 
managerial lobbies.  
 
 
Concluding remarks about ownership versus control 
 
The format of shareholdings exists nowadays for more than four hundred years without being 
able to align managerial actions with shareholders’ interests. Each of the above described five 
mechanisms is practiced but none of these mechanisms have proved to be sufficient to align 
managerial interests with shareholders’ interests. Complaints and struggles concerning 
corporate governance still exist. Without the presence of an effective and efficient 
mechanism, researchers keep on developing theories to develop improved corporate 
governance systems. These theories are documented in the following chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance Theories  
 
The issue of how an organization should be governed is central in corporate governance 
studies ever since Berle and Means (Berle & Means, 1932) identified the separation between 
ownership and control. This chapter discusses four corporate governance theories, which 
describe corporate governance from an economic, rational point of view. The first theory, the 
principal-agent theory, is probably the most well-known and the most cited corporate 
governance theory explaining the conflict between managers and shareholders. The principal-
agent theory is based upon the assumption of goal incongruence and information asymmetry. 
The second theory is transaction costs economics which suggests that economic transactions 
are associated with difficulties and problems that might favor organizational structures instead 
of markets. The third theory, the stewardship theory, criticizes the principal-agent theory on 
its main assumption of goal incongruence and explains the relationship between the manager 
and the shareholder from a totally different point of view. According to this theory, there is no 
potential source of conflict, because the managers take actions which contribute to 
shareholders’ wealth. Finally, the fourth theory, the stakeholder theory, will be described. 
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Contrary to the other three theories, stakeholder theory takes all interested parties into 
account.  
The four theories are described below and summarized in table 2.2 on page 29. Some theories 
are, due to their complexity, more extensively discussed than others.  
 
 
1. Principal-Agent Theory 
 
The principal agent theory originates from the 1970th and has influenced the development of 
corporate governance the most (Mallin, 2008). 
The agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling as: “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976, page 308). A potential goal conflict arises when both parties strive for 
maximizing their own utility. The self-interested agent will not act in the best interest of the 
principal, resulting into a principal-agent problem.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argue that these goal conflicting problems 
have at least three causes. The first cause is the separation between ownership and control. 
The second cause is the perspective that self serving managers maximize their own private 
benefits without considering the interest of anyone else. The third cause is that the minority 
shareholders have the incentive to free ride on the monitoring activities of other shareholders. 
 
The principal-agent theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts. This contractual view is 
developed by Jensen Meckling (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and Fama and Jensen (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Contracts can be designed in such a way that the agent has an incentive to act 
in a way in which the principals’ utility is maximized. Individual contracts form a major 
method of restructuring incentives. All available information about employee performance 
and the compensation for the performance must be related and defined in the individual 
contract. Prendergast (Prendergast, 1999) argues that individual contracts vary widely and 
might include differing incentives like options, bonuses, deferred compensation, promotions 
and profit sharing. The individual contracts are the result of the information availability, the 
individual tendencies of risk bearing and the individual possibilities to manipulate 
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performance evaluation. Incentive structures may also vary because of individual differences 
in psychological intrinsic satisfaction. 
 
 
The Agency costs 
 
In the absence of transparency, the separation of ownership and control will lead to moral 
hazard1. Shareholders will be faced with agency costs in order to reduce moral hazard. 
Agency costs are those costs to encourage managers not to behave in their own self-interest 
but to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency costs can be 
divided into three main categories. 
The first category includes the monitoring costs, which are the costs made for monitoring 
managerial activities, like audit costs. The costs spend to monitor the self-serving managers 
are aimed to limit their aberrant activities.  
The second category contains the bonding costs which are made to (re)structure the 
organization. The organization must be (re)structured in such a way that managers will limit 
undesirable behavior. Introducing management hierarchy and restructuring business units are 
examples of bonding managers to strive for maximizing shareholder wealth. 
The third and last category includes the opportunity costs which are incurred when 
shareholders’ wealth is not maximized. In most agency relationships the manager and the 
shareholders will incur divergences between the decisions of managers and those decisions 
that would maximize shareholders’ wealth. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in wealth 
experienced by the shareholders as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency 
relationship and is called the residual loss. 
 
Two extreme positions regarding the principal-agent conflict exist. At the one extreme, 
agency costs can become extremely high in case shareholders attempt to ensure that all 
managerial actions lead to an increase in shareholders’ wealth. At the other extreme, 
shareholders do not attempt to alter managerial action at all and a substantial amount of 
shareholders’ wealth might be lost. The principals will to some extend monitor the agents, 
implying that the agency costs will be positive. A tradeoff exists between the amount of 
                                                 
1 Moral hazard occurs when an individual insulated from risk behaves differently compared to a situation when 
an individual is fully exposed to risk.  
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agency costs and shareholders’ wealth and the optimal solution lies between the two 
extremes. 
 
If managers take actions that are in their own self interest, the value of the firm will probably 
decrease. This situation is non-optimal or inefficient compared to a situation in which the 
principal could obtain total compliance from the agent to act in the interest of the principal 
while the principal in pursuing this compliance would not incur any costs. This latter situation 
is a very hypothetical one, since principals induce costs, monitoring and bonding costs as well 
as some residual loss. These costs are an unavoidable result of the agency relation. Finding 
positive agency costs and therefore concluding that the agency relationship is not optimal or 
inefficient is characterized as the Nirvana2 form of analysis by Demsetz (Demsetz, 1969). 
 
 
The Main Assumptions of the Principal-Agent Theory 
 
The principal-agent theory is based on the assumptions of asymmetric information and goal 
incongruence between the principal and the agent. These two assumptions form “the spark 
plugs that power the theory” (Waterman & Meier, 1998, page 177). 
 
 
Goal Incongruence 
 
The goal incongruence assumption implies that the agent and the principal both have different 
goals. The principal and the agent have the tendency to act in their own self-interest which 
results into goal incongruence. Aligning the interest of the agent with the interest of the 
principal and motivating an agent to act on behalf of the principal is the core principal-agent 
problem.  
 
The assumptions of the principal-agent theory stating that managers are opportunistic and 
self-serving in nature have been argued to constitute a simplistic view of human nature (Daily, 
Dalton, & Cannella Jr, 2003). The principal-agent theory holds a very negative view over 
                                                 
2  The Nirvana fallacy is an error of comparing actual things with unrealistic idealized alternatives. The problem 
with this form of analysis is that the comparison of actual versus ideal is invalid and yields no practical 
information, because the ideal will never be available. 
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managers. There are many critics on these assumptions and alternative theories have emerged, 
notably the stewardship theory. Stewardship theory has a constraint assumption by stating that 
managers tend to be good stewards of the organization, striving to act in the best interest of 
the shareholders. This stewardship theory will be described later in this chapter.  
 
Jensen developed a Resourceful Evaluative Maximizing Model (REMM), which argues that 
managers may not always act in their own self interest. The individuals in REMM are 
“resourceful evaluative maximizers responding creatively to the opportunities the 
environment presents to them and they work to loosen constraints that prevent them from 
doing what they wish to do” (Jensen & Meckling, 1994, page 4). This REMM model 
summarizes all the positive elements from the economic, the psychological, the sociological 
and the political models. From the economic model, REMM copies that individuals are 
resourceful maximizers, but REMM rejects that individuals are only interested in money.  
From the psychological model, REMM takes the basis of Maslow’s pyramid of hierarchical 
needs into account by acknowledging demand regularities for various goods around the world. 
The pyramid of Maslow is designed in such a way that underlying needs must be met before 
higher needs can be satisfied. The hierarchical needs are: physiological, safety, social (love, 
belonging), self-esteem and self actualization.  
From the sociological model, REMM takes the view that society imposes costs on people who 
violate the norms. The sociological model considers behavior largely as acculturation in 
which individuals develop as a product of their environment.  
From the political model, REMM copies the concept that individuals are altruistically seeking 
to maximize the public interest rather than their own welfare.  
In other words, Jensen assumes that individuals will look out for their own utility, but this 
does not mean that individuals will not derive benefits from helping others. Individuals are 
willing to help others, because it increases their own utility. The pursuit of self interest in no 
way rules out or devaluates altruistic behavior. The REMM framework accepts the self-
interest of individuals as assumed by the principal-agent theory, but rejects the goal 
incongruence.  
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Information Asymmetry 
 
The assumption of information asymmetry implies that the agents have more information than 
the principals. In the case executives take actions that cannot be observed by shareholders, a 
true moral hazard problem arises. Outside shareholders in publicly traded firms are not able to 
notice all managerial actions or are just not that good informed as managers are. In these 
situations, in which there is asymmetric information and uncertainty, problems arise which 
can be characterized as moral hazard. The agent behaves differently than would have been the 
case if both, the principal and the agent, have perfect information. The outcome results into 
economic inefficiency.  
 
The manager, as the agent, has information about the actions, the outcome and random 
variables. The shareholder, as the principal, can observe the outcome X, which is a function of 
the managers’ action A and random variables O. The outcome X can be defined as X=f(A, O). 
Two cases are possible (Rees, 1985). 
In the first case, the shareholder (principal) can observe the outcome X and he can observe 
either O or A. The principal is able to extract the other ex post and further information Z is 
now redundant. The principal now chooses a payment schedule for the manager, as agent, 
which maximizes the utility of the shareholder, subject to the constraint that the manager 
receives at least some minimum expected utility, the reservation utility. This reservation 
utility is usually taken as market determined (Grossman & Hart, 1983).   
In the second case, the shareholder can neither observe the action A nor the random variables 
O and a true moral hazard problem arises. The manager will choose an action A to maximize 
his own utility while the shareholder cannot correct this action directly. The shareholder 
chooses an income Y which will determine the action A. The shareholder will incorporate any 
additional extra information Z into the contract and make the income Y contingent on it. 
These results would probably be modified if the additional information were too costly to 
acquire.  
 
Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in economics for his contribution to the importance of the 
principal-agent problem. Akerlof was awarded for his paper “The market for Lemons” 
(Akerlof, 1970) in which he uses the market for used cars to demonstrate a clear case of 
asymmetric information.  
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Akerlof divided the market for used cars in oranges and lemons, good cars and bad cars 
respectively. A buyer on the market for used cars doesn’t know whether the seller is selling an 
orange or a lemon. The buyer is willing to pay a certain price for an orange but is certainly not 
willing to pay the same amount for a lemon. The market for used cars is dominated by lemons 
since good cars are unlikely to be sold. Akerlof concludes that the information asymmetry in 
this market scenario only trades low quality goods.  
The application of the market for lemons in organizations implies that the directors will 
deliver low quality services to the shareholders. 
 
The asymmetric information and the goal incongruence are both treated as constant in the 
principal-agent theory, with little change over time or across settings. As a result, the 
principal-agent theory becomes rather static than dynamic (Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
 
The principal-agent theory argues that managers are risk averse and that the amount of risk 
aversion is also a constant. Wiseman et al. (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) introduce a 
behavioral agency model in which managers’ risk taking behaviors vary across and within 
different forms of monitoring. Principals are considered risk neutral because principals can 
diversify their shareholdings across multiple organizations. Agents on the other hand, are 
assumed to be risk averse since their income and employment security are tied to one firm. 
The principal-agent theory restricts risk taking behavior of agents as either risk averse or risk 
neutral and tends to neglect the possibility of risk seeking behavior. The risk concept in the 
principal-agent theory is too restrictive and underdeveloped (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998) and should allow for the possibility of varied risk preferences over time.  
  
 
2. Transaction Costs Theory 
 
Coase uses the transaction costs3 economics to develop a theoretical framework for predicting 
in which cases the market will perform certain economic tasks and in which cases firms will 
emerge and take over the tasks from the markets. He explains the existence of firms and 
argues that production can be carried out without any form of organization as long as the 
                                                 
3 The transaction cost theory is frequently mentioned together with the name Coase. Coase (Coase, 1937) 
discusses “the costs of using the price mechanism”.  During the 1950th the term transaction costs economics is 
first used, probably because of Williamsons’ paper “Transaction Cost Economics”.  Coase starts using the term 
transaction cost in the 1970th.  
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production can be regulated by price movements. The most obvious cost of organizing the 
production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.  
Firms will expand as long as the costs of organizing an extra transaction become equal to the 
costs of carrying out this extra transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the 
costs of organizing in another firm (Coase, 1937). This implies that someone can organize a 
transaction on the open market if the transaction costs are below the costs of market 
exchange. Transaction costs economics explains both the existence of firms and their optimal 
size. 
 
The mainstream literature before the 1930th treats firms as entities that compete in the market 
without having an “inside” look. The firms are black boxes with inputs and outputs and are 
assumed to have complete information and efficient production. The only governance issue is 
maximizing profit. This view does not explain why individuals are organized in business 
structures rather than making their own contracts and remaining independent.  
Coase introduces the transaction costs economics and puts emphasis on the inside 
relationships within the firm by emphasizing multi-person hierarchy. The very nature of the 
firm lies in the employment contract between employee and employer. The savings in 
transaction costs is the only reason why employees choose to work under the authority of 
employers.  
Transaction costs economics views companies as a sum of contracts in order to organize and 
regulate transactions.  The output of an employee working in a team may be difficult to 
observe which can lead to shirking behavior.  
Firms carry out effective and efficient economic transactions within a given governance 
structure which are tailored beforehand in order to carry out the economic transactions. Firms 
and markets are just alternative governance modes. Firms are only seen as substitutes or as 
alternative coordination mechanisms for the market. The choice between the firm and the 
market as a coordination mechanism depends on the efficiency of both (Coase, 1937).  
 
 
3. Stewardship theory 
 
The third theory explaining ownership structures is the stewardship theory. This theory is 
developed during the 1970th and regards managers as good stewards of the company’s assets. 
The stewardship theory is contrary to the principal-agent theory by criticizing the assumption 
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of goal conflict between the shareholder and the manager. The managers are not assumed to 
be self interested opportunistic shirkers, but are rather seen as trustworthy stewards of the 
resources trusted to them.  
The interests of the managers are aligned with that of the corporation and owner (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Managers perceive that serving shareholders’ interests is 
also in their own interest, making the problem of executive motivations non-existing in the 
stewardship theory.  
 
The main corporate governance issue in the stewardship theory is designing an organizational 
structure with effective coordination (Donaldson, 1990).  
Donaldson and Davis (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) argue that facilitative authority structures 
will benefit shareholders’ returns. In the principal-agent theory the organizational structure 
emphasizes control of managerial opportunism by separating the CEO and the board chair 
positions and by using incentives to bind the CEOs interests to those of the shareholders.  
Donaldson and Davis examined the effects of CEO duality on shareholders returns and they 
find a positive relationship between CEO duality and shareholders’ wealth. The ROE is 
improved by combining the roles rather than by separating the roles. These researchers wrote: 
“the safeguarding of returns to shareholders may be along the track, not by placing 
management under greater control by owners, but by empowering managers to take 
autonomous actions” (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, page 62). The stewardship theory advocates 
CEO duality which will enhance effectiveness and will produce superior shareholder returns 
compared to separated roles of board chair and CEO. Donaldson and Davis find results that 
fail to support the principal-agent theory and find limited support for the stewardship theory 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Organizations must be structured in such a way that they 
facilitate and empower managers. Stewardship theory favors a governance structure that will 
empower managers to take autonomous actions in order to safeguard the shareholders’ return. 
Compared to the principal-agent theory, the stewardship theory takes a complete different 
point of view by pertinently not placing management under stricter control.  
The conclusion can be drawn that stewardship theory is diametrically opposed to the 
principle-agent theory. In the principal-agent theory, the managerial work is characterized by 
an organizational structure based on monitoring and controlling. In the stewardship theory, 
the managerial work is characterized by an organizational structure focusing on facilitation 
and empowerment.  
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4. Stakeholder theory  
 
The focus in the stakeholder theory is not purely based on maximizing shareholders’ wealth, 
but takes a much wider range of constituencies into account. Managers are able to take actions 
that relate to shareholders’ wealth as in the principal-agent theory and stewardship theory, but 
managers may also pursue the interests of other stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals or 
groups which are directly or indirectly involved in the organization. Direct stakeholders may 
include managers, shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and investors. Indirect 
stakeholders may include the government and local communities. In the stakeholder theory, 
managers are supposed to take actions that encourage the development and maintenance of all 
stakeholder relationships. The stakeholder theory directs managers to serve many masters, 
leading to different corporate governance structures and different monitoring mechanisms.  
In case managers consider all stakeholders, there will be no conceptual specification of how to 
make the tradeoffs among the stakeholders’ interests. 
 
To give managers a clear oversight, Kaplan and Norton (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) developed 
the “Balanced Scorecard” which can be considered as a dashboard or instrument panel with 
information on many specific facts and figures. The balanced scorecard includes the long term 
as well as the short term, financial as well as non-financial measures and the needs of various 
individuals and multiple groups. The balanced scorecard arose from the belief that pure 
financial measures are not sufficient to yield effective management decisions. Kaplan and 
Norton aimed at capturing both past performance as well as future performance into 
scorecards with multiple financial and non-financial measures.  
 
Jensen (Jensen, 2010) criticizes the balanced scorecard because it does not give a single 
dimensional objective to decision makers, which in turn will lead to managerial confusion, 
conflict and inefficiency. Without a specification what the trade offs are among the various 
measures, the balance in scorecards is absent and decision makers will not be able to make 
rational choices. The balanced scorecard can however be seen as a useful analytic tool as it is 
a mean to help decision makers understand which decision creates value.  
 
Jensen also criticizes the pure stakeholder approach by stating that the managers should take 
all stakeholders into account, while theorists refuse to define the trade-offs against the interest 
of each stakeholder (group). His quote: “Accountable to many is accountable to none” 
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summarizes his thinking. Jensen therefore advocates the Enlightened Stakeholder Theory, 
also called Enlightened Value Maximization. The enlightened stakeholder approach is based 
on the structure of the stakeholder theory but takes the maximization of shareholder value as 
the primary objective for decision makers and therefore solves the problem that arises from 
multiple objectives related to the stakeholder theory. 
 
Managers are able to destroy shareholders’ wealth, while considering other stakeholders. 
Managers “may be using stakeholder claims as a smokescreen to obscure what is really their 
inability to deliver value to the company’s shareholders” (Healey, 2003, page 24). In this way, 
the popularity of stakeholder theory can be explained because managers seek personal short 
term interest and without having any criteria of how to perform, managers cannot be 
evaluated. Managers are in the stakeholder theory able to use the firms’ resources for their 
own personal wealth without being held accountable for unnecessary or extraordinary 
expenditures. Organizations in which managers operate in stakeholder theory can 
unproductively increase their power and use the firms’ resources very inefficiently, leading to 
enormous agency costs.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks about Corporate Governance Theories 
 
This chapter reviews four corporate governance theories, comprising the principal-agent 
theory, the transaction costs economics, the stewardship theory and the stakeholder theory. 
Table 2.2 on the next page includes a summary of the characteristics of these four theories. 
These rational theories may be able to explain certain situations and may be more appropriate 
in some countries than in others. The literature on corporate governance has been dominated 
by the principal-agent theory that continues to have a profound influence on governance 
reform and governance practice (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). The corporate 
governance theories describe corporate governance from an economic, rational point of view. 
The individuals in these rational act models are self-interested utility maximizers with stable 
and consistent preferences and capable of rational decision making. The next chapter 
describes these assumptions which are subject to criticism in behavioral economics. 
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Table 2.2 Main Characteristics of Corporate Governance Theories 
 Principal-agent 
Theory 
Transaction 
Costs 
Economics 
Stewardship 
Theory 
Stakeholder 
Theory 
Main 
principle 
The shareholders 
(principals) 
delegate the control 
of the organization 
to the managers 
(agents) 
The firm itself 
forms the 
governance 
structure and 
aligns the 
interest of 
shareholders and 
managers 
The managers are 
seen as good 
stewards over the 
firms' assets 
There are many 
constituents taken 
into account 
Author(s) Fama & Jensen, 
1985; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976 
Coase, 1937 
Williamson, 
1975, 1984 
Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991 
Freeman, 1984 
Focus Ensuring a match 
between managers 
(agents) and 
shareholders 
(principals) 
Costs associated 
with 
organizational 
structure 
Facilitative 
Authority 
Structures 
Multilateral 
agreements 
between the 
organization and 
multiple 
stakeholders 
Primary role 
of the board 
 
The board has to 
control and monitor 
directors 
The board is 
concerned with 
mechanisms 
reducing costs 
The board 
provides the 
directors the 
necessary 
resources 
Control the 
multiple 
relationships that 
create and restrain 
strategic 
possibilities 
Unit of 
analysis 
Individual Transaction Coordination Stakeholders 
Limitations 
of theory 
Narrow 
assumptions 
Narrow 
assumptions 
Limited empirical 
support 
Accountable to 
many stakeholders 
 
 
 
2.4 Towards Behavioral Economics 
 
The corporate governance theories are based on the normative and classical assumption of 
perfectly optimizing behavior and rational actors. The rational actors are self-interested utility 
maximizers with stable and consistent preferences and capable of rational decision making. 
Critics argue that the rational model does not give an accurate description of the actual 
decision making process.  
 
Keynes is the first economist in recognizing the individuals’ irrational behavior. Keynes 
introduced the term “animal spirits” to indicate the irrationality of human behavior. The 
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animal spirits are the ideas and feelings of individuals and form the underlying factors of the 
thought processes. Keynes wrote: “even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is 
the instability due to the characteristics of human nature that a large proportion of our positive 
activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectation, whether 
moral or hedonistic or economic. Most probably, of our decisions to do something positive, 
the full consequences of which will be drawn out of many days to come, can only be taken as 
the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction and not as the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities” (Keynes, 1936, page 144).  
Akerlof and Shiller (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009) have recently reintroduced the term animal 
spirits and distinguish five different aspects: confidence, fairness, corruption and anti-social 
behavior, money illusion and stories. These aspects can explain economic decision making. 
Akerlof and Shiller argue that mainstream economists focus mainly on rational behavior. The 
central theme in their book is a better understanding of reality by giving more attention to the 
animal spirits. 
 
 
Prospect Theory 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) introduce the prospect theory as an 
alternative for the expected utility theory. Prospect theorists criticize the rational theories and 
argue that individuals often make irrational decisions. Rational decision making is based on 
the expected utility theory in which individuals evaluate final assets by multiplying 
quantitative benefits by quantitative probabilities. Instead, prospect theorists like Tversky and 
Kahneman argue that individuals assign value to gains and losses. The prospect theory is 
therefore psychologically more realistic. The decision models are clearly presented in the 
textbook of Wakker (Wakker, 2010). 
 
Prospect theorists separate two phases in the decision process. 
First, individuals edit and frame their choices. In this phase, individuals define gains and 
losses to final assets relative to a certain reference point. The location of this reference point 
affects whether the outcome is seen as a gain or a loss. This process can be labeled as framing 
or reference dependence. The way in which economic agents frame the outcome in their 
minds influences the expected utility.  
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Second, individuals evaluate the edited and framed choices and choose accordingly. Empirical 
research of the evaluating phase illuminates that individuals value losses heavier than gains. 
Kahneman and Tversky labeled this valuation difference as loss aversion, meaning that losses 
matter more than gains. Loss aversion implies that individuals are risk averse when faced with 
gains and risk seeking when faced with losses4.  
 
Individuals are also myopic when they evaluate projects one at a time, rather than as part of 
an overall portfolio. When the gains and losses increase in size, the marginal value that 
individuals assign to these gains and losses will diminish which is labeled “diminishing 
sensitivity” (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
 
The value function will be concave for gains, implying risk aversion and convex for losses, 
implying risk seeking. The value function is defined on reference dependency, loss aversion 
and diminishing sensitivity. Executives can have complete different reference points 
compared to shareholders, leading to different values for the incorporated gains and losses. 
 
 
Behavioral economics  
 
Behavioral economics is based upon the cognitive psychology and challenges the dominating 
assumption of a rational actor. The recent corporate governance scandals provide evidence 
that individuals are not playing their neoclassical role as rational utility maximizers.  
As Kahneman (Kahneman, 2003) wrote: “the psychological theories of intuitive thinking 
cannot match the elegance and precision of formal normative models of belief and choice, but 
this is just another way of saying that rational models are psychologically unrealistic” 
(Kahneman, 2003, page 1449). Behavioral economics therefore takes the view that behavior 
and decision making are subject to heuristics5 and cognitive biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Heuristics are useful, but can also result into systematic biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 
                                                 
4 Loss aversion implies that an individual will prefer option A (a positive outcome of 100 for certain) instead of 
option B (50% chance of getting 210 en 50% of getting nothing) while  in fact the expected value of option B 
(105 ) exceeds the expected value of option A (100). There is a reflection effect in case the outcome is negative; 
individuals will prefer option B (50% chance of losing 210 en 50% of losing nothing) instead of option A (losing 
100 for sure). 
5  A heuristic is a mental shortcut that serves as a simplifying strategy for quickly coping with complicated 
situations.  
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1974). Individuals are subjected to biases, even when the bias is understood and its operation 
demonstrated (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). 
 
 
Biases  
 
Biases are an essential part of human nature and form systematic deviations from the rational 
model. Besides the above described principles of the prospect theory, several biases have to 
be considered in order to understand economic decision making. Psychologists identified 
numerous biases, which have the potency to impact business decisions. The following biases 
impact business decisions: the certainty effect, the endowment effect, groupthink, escalation 
of commitment, sensations seeking, the isolation effect, retention of the status quo and 
diversification bias. The below described biases are not meant to be limitative, but serve for 
illustration only. 
 
The certainty effect is based on an overweighting of certainty. Executives will choose a 
certain positive outcome over an uncertain outcome, even while the uncertain outcome yields 
a  far better outcome than the certain one. Executives are risk averse and will therefore choose 
outcomes that are certain. Other choices with uncertain outcomes might be far more 
attractable for shareholders, because shareholders are not risk averse since they are able to 
diversify their portfolio.  
 
The endowment effect occurs when the utility gain associated with receiving a good or 
service is less than the utility associated with giving up the good or service. These utility 
differences are a direct consequence of loss aversion. The endowment effect implies that 
executives are not willing to sell their shares at the purchase price, because they allocate a 
higher value to their shares once their property right has been established.  
 
Janis (Janis, 1989) introduces the concept of “group think”, which refers to faulty decision 
making within groups because of group pressures. The group pressures deteriorate “the 
mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgment” (Janis 1989, page 9). For a group 
member, it is not comforting to be the sole dissentient in a group. Janus therefore argues that 
bright people can make very bad decisions once they enter a cohesive group. Janis argues that 
members of a group are not motivated to evaluate alternative courses of actions because all 
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members strive for unanimity. Staying committed to the groups’ decisions is the easiest way 
to obtain unanimity. Janis also argues that groups exhibit an illusion of invulnerability and 
collective rationalization of their decisions. If negative feedback reaches the group, the group 
may still feel invulnerable and rationalize their decisions. A group may for example still feel 
that “we can turn this thing around” and thereby collectively rationalize the decisions.  
Langevoort (Langevoort, 2001) describes how the boards’ emphasis on teamwork and conflict 
avoidance can be evidence of CEO capture, which makes the board susceptible to groupthink 
and its including (negative) consequences. Marnet states that the “very psychology of the 
board is tilted towards supporting the chief executive” (Marnet, 2008, page 13). The board is 
a group and faces the group dynamics of group thinking: feelings of invulnerability, 
commitment and unanimity. Moreover, groups make riskier decisions than the mean of 
individual decisions (Stoner, 1968). Board meetings promote consensus decisions and strive 
for unanimous majorities, while the ideal board is supposed to be skeptical, independent and 
loyal to their shareholders.  
 
Decision makers often commit themselves to a course of action and spend additional 
resources when faced with unfavorable outcomes in order to justify the previous investment 
decision (Bazerman, Giuliano, & Appelman, 1984; Staw, 1976; Staw, 1981). This 
justification is called escalation of commitment and has serious implications for financial and 
managerial decisions. Empirical research by Staw has elucidated two basic preconditions for 
escalation of commitment to occur. First of all, individuals are committed to the behavioral 
consequences which are irrevocably or not easily changed. In case it is possible to reverse 
own initial behavior, individuals tend to take this course of action to reduce or evaporate the 
negative outcomes. Second, the individual must feel personally responsible for the negative 
outcomes. In practice this means that a manager who is given negative feedback concerning 
his investment decision, will allocate additional resources to this investment if he himself, 
rather than anyone else of the organization, made the initial investment decision (Bazerman et 
al., 1984). Staw concluded that the mechanism underlying the escalation of commitment is a 
cognitive dissonance or self-justification process in which the increase in allocation following 
the negative outcome is an attempt to make previous behavior appear rational. Executives can 
become overcommitted to prior decisions, for example when they increase resources to failing 
projects. Executives set goals for the company in order to increase performance, while the 
goal setting can also lead to risk seeking behavior, escalation of commitment and might even 
result into unethical behavior. Executives can be highly committed to a course of action and 
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therefore actively committing or passively condone corporate fraud in order to reach their 
previously set goals. Executives do acquiesce to corporate fraud despite the irrationality and 
the potential devastating effects on their reputation. 
 
Zuckermann (Zuckerman, 1979) introduces the concept of sensation seeking which identifies 
the need for varied, novel and complex sensations and experiences with the willingness to 
take physical and social risk for the sake of such experiences. Zuckermann develops the 
sensation seeking scale which categorizes individuals on their willingness to seek risk. 
Zuckermann finds that individuals show different levels of risk seeking behavior, whereby 
high sensation seekers are more likely to engage in risky behavior. These high sensation 
seekers also label their behavior as less risky. The sensation seeking bias has implications for 
corporate governance, because high sensation seeking executives value economic decisions as 
less risky and engage in risk seeking behavior that might be destructive for the organization.  
 
The isolation effect implies that individuals generally disregard components which are shared 
by all prospects under consideration. If a component is part of all considerations, individuals 
disregard this component. This isolation effect can be viewed as a simplification, which is 
also a common effect regarding decision making. The simplification effect implies that 
individuals clarify prospects to make their decision simpler.  
 
The retention of the status quo is another bias in economic decision making. Executives tend 
not to change an existing behavior, unless there is a compelling incentive to change. This 
behavior is the status quo bias and can be the result of loss aversion and the endowment 
effect. The status quo bias elicits that companies anchor and commit to their traditions even in 
case the related activities and behaviors become obsolete.  
 
The diversification bias occurs when there is a difference in preference. Biases occur in case 
individuals are faced with a simultaneous choice process instead of a sequential choice 
condition. In simultaneous choice conditions, individuals show much more variety in choice 
compared to cases when the choices are made sequentially. Bernatzi and Thaler (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1999) find that employees allocate their retirement funds evenly across various 
investment funds offered and indeed show more variety in choice.
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Non-Standard Preferences, Non-Standard Beliefs and Non-Standard Decisions. 
 
DellaVigna (DellaVigna, 2009) provides an overview of the literature on behavioral 
economics and clarifies why individuals deviate from the standard rational model. He 
suggests that individuals deviate from the economic rational model in three respects: 
individuals have non-standard preferences, have non-standard beliefs and make non-standard 
decisions.  
 
Regarding the non-standard preferences, DellaVigna distinguishes time, risk and social 
preferences. The time preferences imply that individuals are time-inconsistent. The risk 
preferences depend on reference points and framing and are established in the prospect theory 
by Kahneman and Tversky. Individuals define their value function by referring to a certain 
reference point. Individuals concern for the welfare of others and incorporate this form of 
social dependence into their utility function.  
 
Regarding the non-standard beliefs, DellaVigna sums up three reasons why individuals have 
systematically incorrect beliefs. First, individuals are overconfident and overestimate their 
performance leading to frequent and large acquisitions for which a substantial premium will 
be paid. Overconfident CEOs refuse to exercise their stock options which is an indication of 
the CEOs overestimation of the company’s future performance. Executives for example 
overestimate their own skills. The studies of Malmendier and Tate (Malmendier & Tate, 
2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2008) show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage in 
M&A deals, because they are convinced they can do a far better job than the CEO of the 
target company. Second, the law of small numbers reflects the tendency of individuals to 
expect small numbers to exhibit large-sample statistical properties. The gambler’s fallacy6 and 
over inference are two elucidating phenomena. The third reason why individuals have 
systematic incorrect beliefs is the projection bias, implying that individuals expect their future 
preferences to resemble the present preferences. Individuals project their current preferences 
onto the future. 
 
                                                 
6 The future probability of a random effect x is less likely to happen after event x occurred. This is an erroneous 
line of thinking because past events don’t change the future probabilities.  
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Regarding the non-standard decisions, DellaVigna argues that individuals use heuristics for 
decision making. Decision making is often very complicated and individuals therefore 
simplify the decision making process. Several heuristics help individuals in their decision 
making: framing, the under/overweighting of information due to limited attention, social 
pressure and emotions.  
 
With regard to the decision process, Kahneman (Kahneman, 2003) presents two different 
modes: intuition and reasoning. Intuition is effortless and comes spontaneously into mind 
without conscious search or computation. Reasoning on the other hand, is done deliberately 
and effortful. The intuition mode and reasoning mode are two different processes of fast 
versus slow, automatic versus controlled, effortless versus effortful, associative versus rule 
governed etc. Intuition is governed by habit and is therefore difficult to modify or control. 
Intuitions resemble perceptions but are not based on stimuli but on conceptual representation. 
While intuition might be associated with poor performance, it can also be a powerful and 
accurate tool. In case individuals are asked a difficult question, they might answer an easier 
question instead. The judgments and choices that individuals make are mostly made by 
intuition and are reasonably successful (Epstein & Knight, 2003; Klein, 1999). 
 
In general, individuals do not think intensively and most judgments are reviewed only lightly 
in the reasoning mode. Accessibility to the reasoning mode will be impaired by: time 
pressure, concurrent involvement in a cognitive task, being in a good mood and performing 
the task in the morning or evening for “evening people” respectively “morning people”. The 
overall capacity for mental effort is limited and individuals therefore cannot combine many 
reasoning tasks. People, who are busy with a demanding mental activity such as attempting to 
hold in mind several digits, are much more inclined to respond to another task by “blurting 
out whatever comes to mind” (Gilbert, 1989). 
 
Due to the limited capacity of the reasoning mode, managerial action will partly be based on 
intuition, a fast, automatic and effortless process. Basing corporate governance structures on 
the idea that decisions are made with reasoning ignores the fact that decisions are mostly 
processed using intuition. Even if there are several important decisions to be made 
simultaneously, the result might be that important decisions do not process the reasoning 
mode and will not be sufficiently thought through.  
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The economic theory describes an agent with just one single cognitive system, while 
Kahneman proposes a model of an agent with a different architecture, which can be 
characterized as consisting of a two system structure with a large role for intuition. The 
central characteristic outlined in the paper of Kahneman is that agents often act intuitively. A 
better understanding of our cognitive system will lead to improved decision making. 
 
 
Nature-Nurture 
 
Behavioral economic research focuses on the above described deviations from the rational act 
model. A thorough understanding of how individuals make their decisions is crucial for 
developing optimal corporate governance systems. Traditionally, individuals have remained 
agnostic to the origins of human preferences and usually assume their stability over time and 
context. Chen et al. (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, Santos, & Foundation, 2005) have studied 
capuchin monkeys for their sophisticated and evolutionary proximity to individuals in order to 
reveal the nature or nurture of decision making. When faced with decisions involving simple 
gain-loss frames, the capuchin monkeys show many of the biases the individuals have, 
including reference dependent choices and loss aversion. Capuchin monkeys demonstrate 
little to no social learning. The researchers therefore suggest that biases as loss aversion are an 
innate function rather than learned behavior.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks Behavioral Economics 
 
Executives all have their own non-standard beliefs, non-standard preferences and non-
standard decision making. The executives’ decisions are made in a specific context, probably 
within a group or influenced by a group. Moreover, the executives’ decisions are frequently 
processed using intuition (spontaneous and effortless) instead of reasoning (deliberately and 
effortful). In practice, executives frequently engage in suboptimal behavior which questions 
the applicability of the rational act model.  
Behavioral economics explains the human decision making by incorporating cognitive and 
judgmental shortcuts and illuminates various systematic decision making biases. The findings 
from behavioral economics undermine the assumption of individuals as rational utility 
maximizers.  
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A thorough understanding of our inner animal spirits, being the irrationality of human 
behavior, and the subsequent incorporation into corporate governance theories will lead to a 
better understanding of the actions carried out by executives and shareholders.  
 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance Research 
 
The literature review elucidates that solving the principal-agent problem is one of the key 
challenges of corporate governance. The corporate governance systems have changed during 
the past decades in order to protect the interest of shareholders. The changes in corporate 
governance include separating the CEO and board chair positions and installing independent 
board committees. The non-executive directors are pressured to exercise independent control 
over management. The changes in corporate governance also pressure non-executive directors 
to dismiss the CEO in case of underperformance and to prevent takeover defenses aimed to 
protect managerial interests. The underlying theoretical rationale for these changes are 
grounded in the agency theory of corporate governance in which boards play a central role 
controlling and monitoring management. However, the progress in making changes in 
corporate governance has stagnated (Westphal, 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 1998) and solving 
the principal-agent problem remains a key challenge.  
 
The corporate governance research focuses on finding a relation between board attributes and 
financial performance and takes the same corporate governance attributes into account, like 
the number of inside and outside board members. These corporate governance studies 
concentrate on quantitative data from regular databases of published sources. Quantitative 
research about boards has often been criticized for not addressing the most important research 
questions. As Langley et al. wrote: “decision gets studied; behavior gets lost”  (Langley, 
Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995, page 266). The data from regular 
databases simply cannot describe actual board behavior. Beside the ineffectiveness of 
corporate governance studies, researchers (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007) also suggest that the 
lack of conclusive results might be due to researchers studying the wrong corporate 
governance aspects.  
 
The main part of corporate governance research is based on input-output studies. Pettigrew 
observes that “great inferential leaps are made from input variables to output variables such as 
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board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which 
presumably link the input and output” (Pettigrew, 1992, page 171). Pettigrew argues that 
researchers should focus their future research on the actual behavior of boards and hereby 
supplementing board demography with actual board behavior.  
Board research fails to establish any clear consensus of which board attribute leads to which 
board outcome and has not provided conclusive answers (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
There is however development in the field of researchers moving away from the abstract 
input-output studies and instead showing an increasing interest in the role of leadership and 
behavioral dynamics in the boardroom (Huse, 2008). The interest in the role of leadership is 
grounded in the strategic choice perspective, stating that executives play a major role in 
shaping the organizational strategic choices and ultimately company performance (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003; Child, 1972; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Zajac, 1990). The strategic choice 
perspective includes individual CEO-effects7 and is opposite from the view that internal and 
external environmental forces constrain CEOs in their functioning. This research incorporates 
the strategic choice perspective and will respond to the increasing interest in the role of 
leadership by studying the CEO personality. 
 
The mainstream corporate governance research has studied the board attributes in detail but 
these input-output studies do not include the effect of the CEOs personal characteristics. The 
CEO has an important central position which is often neglected.  
 
There are three factors why the CEO plays a major role in the corporate governance system. 
First, the CEO plays a crucial role in the directors’ selection procedure. Second, the board 
depends on the information provided by the CEO. Third, the CEO has influence on the 
remuneration. These three factors weaken the board and elucidate the important role of the 
CEO (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). 
 
                                                 
7 The CEO-effect is defined as “the proportion of variance in a level outcome variable that is statistically 
associated with, or can be attributed to, the presence of individual CEOs” (Crossland and Hambrick 2007, page 
769 and 770). 
40 
 
The CEO and the CEO personal characteristics are therefore important corporate governance 
factors. This research first documents how to measure the personal characteristics and 
proceeds with investigating the impact of the CEO personal characteristics (the CEO-effects).  
 
 
Concluding Remarks Corporate Governance Research 
 
The mainstream corporate governance studies concentrate on quantitative data from regular 
databases and are input-output based. These abstract input-output studies examine the 
relationship between board attributes and firm performance but they have not been able to 
provide conclusive answers (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). The underlying reason for providing inconclusive results might be that 
researchers focus on board demography (Pettigrew, 1992) and are studying the wrong 
corporate governance aspects (Langley et al., 1995; Leblanc, & Schwartz, 2007).  
The central position of the CEO is an often neglected variable in corporate governance 
research (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Researchers should pay attention to actual board behavior 
(Pettigrew, 1992) and study the role of leadership (Huse, 2008).  
This research concentrates on the CEO personal characteristics, in particular the CEOs 
narcissistic personality. The focus is on investigating whether CEO narcissism is a neglected 
corporate governance variable.  
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Chapter 3 The Framework of the Causes and Consequences of CEO Narcissism 
 
Executive directors are responsible for the organizational strategy of a company, which is 
directly related to the performance. The CEO plays a central role within the top executive 
team and the CEO personality defines the extent to which the CEO is capable of exerting his 
influence within the top executive team. 
 
Chapter 3.1 first describes the literature regarding the influence of executives and the special 
role of the CEO in the top executive team. This chapter describes the upper echelon theory of 
Hambrick and Mason to elucidate the influence of executive directors on the organizational 
strategy and the organizational performance. Subsequent literature and empirical observations 
show that CEOs have disproportionate and sometimes dominating influences in the top 
management team which demonstrates the relevance to investigate CEO personal 
characteristics. Chapter 3.2 elaborates on the personal characteristics of the CEO with a focus 
on the narcissistic personality. The chapter explores why narcissism is an essential element 
for effective leadership. The framework of the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism is 
developed in chapter 3.3. 
 
 
3.1 The Influence of Executives 
 
Executives play a major role in shaping the organizational strategic choices and ultimately the 
company performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Child, 1972; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 
Zajac, 1990). The influence of the personal characteristics of executives on the organizational 
strategy and the organizational performance is grounded in the upper echelon theory of 
Hambrick and Mason (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The upper echelon theory postulates that 
the perceptions, cognitions and values of executives manifest themselves in the decision 
making process. 
 
The upper echelon theory is based on the theory of Child (Child, 1972) which in turn is based 
on the strategic choice approach by assuming that the top management decisions affect the 
organizational performance. Figure 3.1 depicts the upper echelon theory of organizations. 
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Figure 3.1 The Upper Echelon Theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
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The executives in the upper echelon theory make their decisions based on the personal 
interpretations of the situations they face. The personal interpretations are based on the 
executives’ experiences, values and personalities. The characteristics of executives filter and 
distort information in three subsequent ways. The first way is the field of vision (executives 
look and listen in a certain direction). The second way is the selective perception8 (what 
executives actually see and hear). The third way is the interpretation (the way in which 
executives attach a meaning to what they say and hear).  
 
The upper echelon theory is based on the premise of bounded rationality, which is introduced 
by Simon (Simon, 1955). Bounded rationality implies that decision makers are faced with too 
much complexity to act completely rational. The decision makers therefore decide on the 
basis of the available information and time and within the boundaries of their limited 
cognitive mind.  The decision makers in the bounded rationality model are “intended rational, 
but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1955, page 24). The upper echelon theory assumes that 
executives are fallible human beings, susceptible to cognitive biases, selfishness, boredom 
and fatigue. Top executives take decisions that are based on the past experiences, on the 
present situation and on the future aspirations (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004) and 
they focus not only on managerial self-interest, but also on personal ambition and hubris9 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Executives often act irrational on the basis of their personal 
interpretations, which are based on their personal characteristics. Personal characteristics 
influence executives’ rational and irrational beliefs and actions.   
                                                 
8 Starbuck and Milliken (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) call this “noticing”. 
9 Hubris can be defined as excessive overconfidence, arrogance and pride, resulting into overestimated abilities. 
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Upper Echelon Proxies 
 
The upper echelon theory argues that demographic variables of executives are proxies for 
executives’ perceptions, cognitions and values, which in turn influence the organizational 
strategy and organizational performance positive or negative. The influence of the executives’ 
perceptions, cognitions and values on the organizational strategy and organizational 
performance is a black box, in which there is no knowledge about the internal processes from 
inputs to outputs. The biases and propositions of top executives as the most powerful actors 
must be examined in order to understand the functioning of organizations. Hambrick and 
Mason argue that “organizations become reflections of their top executives” (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984, page 193).  
 
 
Critics Upper Echelon Proxies 
 
The demographic variables are used as a proxy for underlying constructs. The demographic 
variables are publicly available and have been widely used in research. The critics argue that 
data are entirely archival (Pettigrew, 1992) and inferences are based on unmeasured variables 
(Lawrence, 1997). Using these proxies is only a matter of methodological convenience. 
Priem, Lyon and Dess criticize the use of demographic variables and raise questions about the 
construct validity (Priem, Lyon, & Dess, 1999). Boal and Hooijberg even go a step further by 
calling “a moratorium on the use of demographic variables as surrogates for psychological 
constructs” (Boal, Hooijberg, 2001, page 523). 
 
Hambrick and Mason recognized from the start of their research the serious limitations using 
demographic variables as proxies for executives’ perceptions, cognitions and values.  
Psychological measures are potentially more direct in assessing the executives’ perception, 
cognition and values compared to an exclusive focus on demographic variables (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Personal characteristics contain less noise 
compared to pure demographic variables and are more suitable to explain the black box. This 
research therefore proceeds using personal characteristics to explain the black box. 
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The unique position of the CEO  
 
Critics also argue that the top management team concept is not well defined and that 
individual members of the top management team can contribute more or less to the groups’ 
output. The upper echelon theory considers the CEO as an average member in the group, 
while literature and empirical observations show that CEOs have disproportionate and even 
sometimes dominating influence on the groups’ output. This strategic choice perspective 
incorporates individual CEO-effects.  
 
The literature documents the individual executive effects in which the CEO is a major 
determinant shaping the organizational strategy. The top management team members serve 
the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992; Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002) and feel a strong obligation towards 
the CEO and are unwilling to challenge the CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). 
 
Various researchers state that the CEO has a unique position in the company. Daily and 
Johnson (Daily & Johnson, 1997) consider the CEO to be “THE corporate leader” who will 
impact organizational performance. Vancil (Vancil & McDonald, 1987) argues that the CEO 
is the top manager of the company and the most powerful and influential member. Other 
researchers consider the CEO as the architect of the top executive team (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002) or the figurehead (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005). 
 
Finkelstein (Finkelstein, 1992) argues that the CEO power influences the ability of a CEO to 
affect strategic choices. Finkelstein (Finkelstein, 1992) develops a methodology for 
executives’ power measurement in which it becomes clear that some executives have more 
power than other executives.  
The distribution of power in the top management team is crucial: in some teams the power 
may be dispersed and in other teams the power may reside within one key individual, mostly 
the CEO. The position, the remuneration and the titles of CEOs vary from other executives 
which reflects the power difference.  
Finkelstein points out how “power may emanate from a managers’ personality” (Finkelstein 
1992, page 523). Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2004) argue that the power variance in top 
management teams influences upper echelon relationships.  
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Other researchers elucidate that the CEO personal characteristics affect strategic actions 
(Hambrick, 2007; Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006) and influence the organizational 
performance, measured by sales growth, return on investment and return on assets (Peterson, 
Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003). 
For an autocratic or intolerant CEO, only the opinions and perspectives of one person matter, 
i.e. the CEO himself. In this case, the CEOs psychological profile, preferences and biases 
provide stronger predictions about strategic decision making compared to a team level 
analysis (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005). Leaders with a dark side personality show more 
dysfunctional performance with consequent adverse impact on followers and the organization 
(Benson & Campbell, 2007). 
 
Nohria et al. (Nohria, 2003) find that 14% of the performance’ variance is accountable to 
CEOs. Crossland and Hambrick (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007) provide evidence that 
especially US CEOs have substantial impact on company’s performance. US CEOs have 
fewer constraints than CEOs in other countries, looking at the national values of 
individualism, the prevailing ownership structure of widely dispersed well diversified 
shareholders and the governance structures.  
 
The top management team does not jointly experience the strategic issues, but meets only for 
a few hours a week and discusses questions that already have been raised (Cannella & 
Holcomb, 2005). The studies of Dutton and colleagues postulates that it is the CEO who 
identifies and defines the strategic issues as an opportunity or as a threat and who 
communicates accordingly to the other top management team members (Dutton, Fahey, & 
Narayanan, 1983; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton & Ashford, 
1993). These studies on the strategic issue diagnosis assume that the top management team 
considers the issues that have already been identified and researched by the CEO. Dutton and 
colleagues argue that this effect is strong enough to justify the selection of the CEO as their 
unit of analysis.  
 
This brief literature overview makes clear that CEOs have disproportionate and even 
sometimes dominating influences. The personal characteristics of CEOs lead to individual 
executive effects. The existence of powerful CEOs becomes relevant because CEOs are 
influential shapers of the company’s performance. Ergo, the CEO personality is a central 
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determinant influencing the upper echelon which ultimately affects organizational economic 
outcomes.  
 
Figure 3.2 Central position of the CEO 
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Upper Echelon Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), amended 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks Influence of Executives 
 
The upper echelon theory of Hambrick and Mason documents the influence of executives’ 
personalities on the organizational strategy and the organizational performance. The literature 
confirms that the CEO plays a major role within the top executive team which invalidates the 
assumption that all executives matter. The CEO is a major determinant shaping the 
organizational strategy and determining the organizational performance. The focus will be on 
psychological constructs, which are potentially more direct in assessing the executives’ 
perceptions, cognitions and values compared to demographic variables. This research is based 
on the assumption that organizations become reflections of their Chief Executive Officers.  
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3.2 Influential Personal Characteristics of CEO Leadership 
 
The literature overview of the previous chapter documents the disproportionate and 
sometimes dominating influence of the CEO. The personal characteristics of the CEO define 
the extent to which the CEO is capable of exerting influence in defining the organizational 
strategy which ultimately affects the organizational performance. This chapter first elaborates 
on the concept of CEO leadership (3.2.1) and the narcissism construct (3.2.2.) and proceeds 
with the relevance of narcissism as a requisite for effective leadership (3.2.3).   
 
 
3.2.1 CEO Personality and Leadership 
 
There are different definitions of leadership, but leadership is generally defined as a process 
of social influences in which one person can enlist another to accomplish certain tasks. 
Leaders can motivate followers to set aside their selfish pursuits and work for the groups’ 
interests (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005)  and are able to exert influence over others by motivating, 
by being an example, by inspiring or merely by exercising status and power. The power10 of 
the CEO results from formal and informal sources. The formal power of the CEO is 
associated with the rank in the organization, and the ability to award and punish the 
subordinates. The CEO holds the highest position within the organization, which implies that 
the CEO has high formal power. Informal power is associated with the individual, rather than 
the formal, official position within the organization. Reference power is a form of informal 
power and implies a desire of subordinates to be identified with the CEO. Effective leaders 
know how the Pygmalion11 effect works to get subordinates involved doing their utterly best. 
Leaders hereby impose their informal power.  
 
Kets de Vries argues that the most effective global leaders play the charismatic (informal) role 
and the instrumental (formal) role simultaneously (Kets de Vries, 1994). The informal 
charismatic role implies that the leader is able to motivate his followers merely by 
envisioning, empowering and energizing. Leaders should be able to develop, to articulate and 
to enact a vision (Kets de Vries, 1998; Nadler & Heilpern, 1998), which will affect the 
                                                 
10 Power is defined as “the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” (Finkelstein, 1992, page 506). This 
definition is consistent with the view of other researchers (Pfeffer, 1981). 
11 The Pygmalion effect, or Rosenthal effect, implies that performance improves as greater expectations are 
placed upon people. 
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decision making context of the top executive team (Gabarro, 1987; Kotter, 1990; Vancil & 
McDonald, 1987). The charisma of the CEO leads to reduced heterogeneity among top 
executives (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Waldman & Yammarino, 1999). 
The leaders must also play a formal instrumental role in which they implement processes in 
order to improve the design of the organization and the appropriate control. A leader who is 
capable of aligning the informal charismatic role with the formal instrumental role ends up 
being a great effective leader.  
 
 
The Big Five Personality Traits 
 
Peterson et al. (Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003) elucidate that the CEO 
personality impacts top management team dynamics. The individual personality cannot easily 
be described, but psychologists do agree on five influential personality traits: neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. These five genetic personality 
traits are called the “Big Five” and are observable from infancy (Maccoby, 2007). 
Peterson et al. (Peterson et al., 2003) measure the CEO personality based on these five 
personality traits and conclude that the CEO personality affects the dynamics of a top 
management team, which in turn ultimately affects organizational performance, measured by 
sales growth, return on investment and return on assets. Judge et al. also use the five 
personality traits as an organizing framework to investigate the relations between personality 
and leadership and these researchers find that extraversion is the most important trait for 
leadership (Judge, 2002). CEOs should have specific skills and personal characteristics in 
order to become an effective leader. The research of Peterson et al. and Judge et al. investigate 
the impact of behavioral traits that measure the normal personality. This research does not 
focus on these behavioral traits, but rather focuses on the psychoanalytic narcissism trait. The 
underlying reason for using a psychoanalytical trait is twofold according to Maccoby 
(Maccoby, 2003). First, personality types must be analyzed from the point of view of social 
character. The behavioral traits are innate temperaments that are neither learned nor learnable. 
Although the psychoanalytic traits may also be part of the innate personality, they are mainly 
influenced by socialization. Second, the psychoanalytic traits have proven to be useful to 
understand and predict leadership styles. The narcissism construct is relevant in the context of 
the impact of the CEO personality. This research focuses on narcissism, because of these two 
arguments and because of its inherent leadership capabilities (Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003). 
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3.2.2 The Narcissism Concept 
 
The term narcissism is widely used and its origin goes back to the 19th century when the term 
was first used by Havelock Ellis (Ellis, 1898) to describe a clinical condition of perverse self-
love. The concept had a profound influence on the work of Freud (Freud, 1914) who 
identified various specifications of narcissism. These specifications include self-admiration 
and a tendency to see others as an extension of one’s self. Freud argued that some narcissism 
is an essential part of all of us from birth.  
 
The etymological origin of the word narcissism comes from the beautiful, proud and 
unfeeling Greek Narcissus who refused the love of a nymph. Aphrodite, the goddess of love 
punishes Narcissus with self-love. Narcissus then falls in love with a reflection in a pool, not 
realizing it was his own reflection, reaches out for the beautiful reflection, bows further and 
further and drowns in his own image.  
 
Narcissism reflects the personality trait of self-love which includes a set of character traits 
like vanity, hubris, selfishness, self esteem, self confidence, egoism, dominance, ambition and 
lack of empathy. Self esteem, self confidence on the outside, because when looking at the real 
inside the opposite occurs. Narcissistic individuals usually lack self esteem and self 
confidence and try to compensate these shortcomings by presenting themselves as being more 
important than others and are constantly looking for affirmation. This is called the narcissistic 
paradox. In order to protect themselves from being criticized by others, narcissistic people 
tend to ignore the feelings, sayings and behaviors of others and therefore cultivate 
underdeveloped feelings of empathy.  
 
Narcissism can be measured on a dimensional or a categorical scale. The categorical approach 
implies that individuals are assigned in the categories normal and abnormal, assuming a 
difference exists between normality and abnormality. The dimensional scale connects the two 
categories as polar positions along a line, locating individuals along this dimension. 
Narcissism has been seen as a clinical disorder (the categorical approach) by clinicians and by 
early research up to the end of the 1980th. Later researchers (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 
1988) have shown that narcissism can be seen as a personality dimension on which 
individuals can score from low to high. This confirms Freud’s argument that narcissism is to 
some extent part in all people. 
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Narcissism can be classified according to DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders). Appendix I includes the criteria according to the APA12. According to the 
DSM IV, narcissism is "a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for 
admiration, and a lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of 
contexts" (DSM-IV, page 717). Narcissistic individuals are preoccupied with fantasies of 
unlimited success, they believe they are special and unique, have a sense of entitlement, are 
interpersonally exploitive, lack empathy and are arrogant and haughty. Narcissists hold 
unrealistic exaggerated beliefs about themselves and show a greater tendency towards self-
enhancement bias (John, & Robins, 1994).  
 
High levels of narcissism can be dysfunctional and are labeled as Narcissistic Personality 
Disorder. Approximately 0.7% to 1% of human beings score high on the narcissistic 
personality disorder as described by DSM IV. Taking the DSM as a base, Raskin and Hall 
(Raskin & Hall, 1979) have developed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), a 54 item 
forced choice scale based on 220 DSM items. 
 
Emmons (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987) has further reduced the 54 items NPI using factor 
analysis into 4 components (the factor loadings are included in appendix II) with evidence for 
construct validity and internal consistency: 
 
I  authority/leadership (I like to be the center of attention); 
II  superiority/arrogance (I am better than others); 
III  self-admiration (I am preoccupied with how extraordinary and special I am); 
IV  entitlement (I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me). 
 
The above literature on narcissism and the 4 components of Emmons form the bases for this 
research.  
 
 
                                                 
12 The APA (American Psychiatric Association) develop the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders). Narcissism is described in cluster 301.81 
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3.2.3 Narcissism as a Requisite for Effective Leadership 
 
An important personal characteristic in terms of leadership is narcissism because of its 
inherent capabilities to exercise power, to manipulate others and the drive to attain power and 
prestige (Lubit, 2002). Throughout history there have been many narcissistic business leaders, 
like Steve Jobs of Apple Incorporation, Michael Eisner of the Walt Disney company, David 
Geffen of Geffen Records and Henry Ford of Ford Motor Company. These leaders have been 
able to drive the organization towards a magnificent future because they have a great vision 
and because they are able to attract followers (Maccoby, 2003). 
 
There are several skills related to the rise and prospering of narcissistic leaders in business 
organizations. Among these skills fall their drive and enthusiasm as well as their ability to 
charm and to manipulate others. Narcissistic CEOs have an intense continuous need for 
affirmation and display highly visible (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), even bold actions (Kets 
de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002). 
 
 
Productive and Destructive Narcissism 
 
The presence of narcissistic CEOs and their subsequent fall suggests that there must be 
positive as well as negative aspects of narcissism. A literature review elucidates that 
researchers advert to these positive and negative elements of narcissism.  
 
Maccoby (Maccoby, 2003) lists characteristics of narcissistic leaders that make their 
leadership effective: they are great visionaries with charisma and they can inspire a great 
number of followers. Exaggerated beliefs about their own capabilities and achievements, 
supreme self-confidence and dominance are in a certain context needed to inspire a group of 
followers. Leaders are selected with their existing narcissistic personality traits, because their 
upside potential is enormous. According to this productive school, narcissistic CEOs will lead 
to positive organizational outcomes. Maccoby (Maccoby, 2003) draws a distinction between 
positive (productive) and negative (destructive) narcissism and argues that strategic 
intelligence makes the difference between productive narcissism and its pathological 
destructive counterpart. Strategic intelligence includes five elements: foresight, systems 
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thinking, visioning, motivating, and partnering. If the narcissistic leader lacks strategic 
intelligence, the results will be disastrous. 
 
Rosenthal and Pittinskey (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006) consider narcissism as a motivational 
mechanism driven by personal egoistical needs for power and admiration. These researchers 
document several components underlying narcissism which lead to the downside of 
narcissism: arrogance, need for recognition and superiority, hypersensitivity, anger, lack of 
empathy, amorality and paranoia.  
 
Lubit (Lubit, 2002) also documents negative and positive aspects of narcissism and 
distinguishes between a healthy versus a destructive form of narcissism. Healthy narcissism is 
based upon a secure self-esteem. Self-esteem is a necessary mechanism to cope with own 
frustrations and to relate with others. The healthy narcissist will experience some frustration if 
the desired goals are not attained, but it will not threaten the self-image of being worthwhile 
and valuable. This solid self-esteem of healthy narcissists secures the rights and wellbeing of 
others. A healthy narcissist is not obsessed with power, while a destructive narcissist is 
obsessed with power. The destructive narcissists do not respect others’ rights and wellbeing 
and are arrogant, devaluing and are interpersonally exploitative. Both the healthy and the 
destructive narcissist show self-confidence on the outside, but the destructive narcissist has a 
fragile self-esteem on the inside. This low inside self-esteem is compensated by developing a 
grandiose self-image on the outside and by devaluing others. 
 
Kets de Vries (Kets de Vries, 1994) distinguishes constructive narcissism from reactive 
narcissism. Constructive narcissists are able to use their narcissism effectively and are well-
balanced and are capable of introspection and emphatic feelings, while reactive narcissists do 
not have these capabilities. Reactive narcissists are constantly trying to patch up their sense of 
self-esteem, preoccupy themselves with negative emotions like jealousy, triumph and revenge 
and have a tendency of enormous self-importance. Reactive narcissists treat human beings as 
objects and are totally self-centered which forms the most important indicator for defective 
leadership.  
 
The above described literature documents both positive and negative aspects of narcissism. 
The positive aspects have been labeled productive (Maccoby), healthy (Lubit) or constructive 
(Kets de Vries). The upside potential of CEO narcissism is enormous, but the lack of 
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empathy, the power obsession, the interpersonal exploitativeness and the fragile self-esteem 
may lead to destructive behavior.  
 
 
CEO Narcissism 
 
The social learning theory views narcissism as a response of overvaluation in which an 
individual is treated as a special person who is perfect and lovable. The unrealistic 
overvaluation leads to self illusions which cannot be sustained. CEOs are treated as special 
persons because of the highest position they hold within the organization. A response to 
overvaluation is likely to occur. Like all other individuals, CEOs are fallible human beings 
scoring higher or lower on the narcissistic dimension. CEOs have influential and powerful 
positions which give them an inflated self-esteem (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). 
Therefore, the average CEO will score higher on the narcissism scale compared to the average 
population (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). A leader scoring high on the narcissistic scale has 
a continuous goal of external self-affirmation. The requirement of a continuous stream of self-
image reinforcement implies the need for appraisal at frequent intervals. Appraisals for the 
long run are not sufficient for the narcissistic leader (Buss & Chiodo, 1991). In order to obtain 
frequent appraisal, the CEO must undertake challenging and bold actions which the audience 
can easily observe.  
 
There is not much empirical research about narcissistic business leaders, but the few existing 
articles document the importance of CEO narcissism for organizational outcomes (Chatterjee 
& Hambrick, 2007; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984).  
Chatterjee and Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) sum up three reasons for excluding 
narcissism from research. First, narcissism has been seen as a personality disorder instead of a 
personality dimension. Second, the occurrence of narcissism has been seen as incidental. 
Third, massive data collection of CEO narcissism is problematic. The first two reasons have 
become obsolete, evidenced by recent psychological literature. The last barrier can be solved 
by measuring narcissism with objective variables. Data collection through survey research is a 
common method for obtaining data on personality traits. This method is inappropriate because 
individuals are very reluctant to engage in a survey research and the sensitive questions 
mostly yield very low response rates. Therefore, massive data collection through survey 
research for CEOs is impossible. Moreover, the answers from survey research are influenced 
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by a social desirability bias. It is possible to capture the narcissism concept for a large sample 
of CEOs using theoretically-grounded indirect measures (Raskin & Shaw, 1988). Therefore, 
this research is based on objective variables, as laid out by Webb (Webb & Weick, 1979; 
Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks Influential Personal Characteristics of CEO Leadership  
 
The personal characteristics of CEOs influence their central role within the top executive 
team. An important personal characteristic is narcissism, because of its inherent capabilities to 
exercise power, to manipulate others and the drive to attain prestige. Narcissistic individuals 
have informal power, a great vision and are able to attract followers. These properties are 
necessary elements for effective leadership and desirable for CEOs (Maccoby, 2001).  
 
The presence of narcissistic CEOs, their success and their subsequent fall demonstrate the 
positive as well as negative elements of narcissism. Narcissists experience the low inner self 
esteem as a shortcoming and will try to compensate this shortcoming by developing a 
grandiose self-image, by devaluing others and by presenting themselves as being very 
important, which results into a lack of empathy and exploitative behavior. This reactive 
narcissism can result into destructive behavior.  
 
Narcissism is a necessary element for effective leadership but also an addictive drug with the 
potential danger of a destructive overdose. The link between narcissism and effective 
leadership is intricate. 
 
Survey research as the common method for assessing personality traits is inappropriate for a 
massive CEO population because of the low response rates and the social desirability bias. 
This research therefore uses objective variables to assess the narcissistic personality 
dimension of 953 S&P500 CEOs. The data collection, presented in chapter 4, will reflect the 
four components of Emmons (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987). 
 
55 
 
3.3 Framework of the Causes and Consequences of CEO Narcissism 
 
Narcissism is related to leadership positions, but it does not predict leadership effectiveness 
(Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). The level of narcissism of a successful CEO is the real issue. 
Success leads to profit and rising stock prices but success also leads to power and status that 
both need to be monitored constantly. The success and the increasing power lead to a 
crossroad: either the CEO has a personality scoring high on the narcissistic scale and 
attributes the success to himself (internally) or the CEO has a personality scoring low on the 
narcissistic scale and attributes the success externally to the company, his team or others.  
 
The high narcissistic CEOs are continuously trying to patch up the low inner self-esteem, are 
interpersonally exploitative and lack empathy. They are incapable of self-reflection and refuse 
countervailing power. A successful CEO acquires increasing power and might begin to 
exhibit the characteristics of a Sun King13. The people around the CEO follow him blindly 
and accept and adore every word the CEO says. The high narcissistic CEO surrounds himself 
with followers and sycophants. The bold actions of the high narcissistic CEO result in 
(feelings of) success which leads to hubris and cultivates the CEO status.  
 
The greater the success, the greater the power of the high narcissistic CEO. The CEO power 
increases and the countervailing power of the most important parties decreases. 
Overconfidence, hubris, comes into being. The successful leader loses his sense of reality, 
thinks it is all about his personality instead of his function, falls in love with his own portrait 
in magazines and newspapers, flies higher and higher in the sky, just like Icarus. 
 
In the scenario of failure, the possibility still remains to hold on to the CEO status by 
committing fraud and intend that business prospers. In case the failure is acknowledged, the 
CEO falls from the thrown, just like Icarus smashed to earth. 
 
Figure 3.3 visualizes the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism.  
                                                 
13 The legendary example of a sun king is Louis XIV who reigned France from 1643 to his death in 1715. When 
he personally started governing in 1661, he gave himself  ”droit divin”, implying that God gave him his throne. 
He did not accept any countervailing power and therefore no prime minister was installed. Under his reign, 
various wars were fought and France became the leading European power. After his death in 1715, Louis XIV 
had left France with extended borders and an oversea empire, but  in a deplorable situation with a lot of 
corruption, many dept and an unfair tax system. 
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Figure 3.3: Framework of the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14  Ranking the CEOs narcissistic personality in chapter 4; Financial performance tested in chapter 5;  
Countervailing power tested in chapter 6; Fraud tested in chapter 7 
 
CEO Narcissism 
1. Authority 
2. Superiority 
3. Self-Admiration 
4. Entitlement 
 
 Self-Reflection 
Fraud 
Not 
Revealed 
Compensation 
Power 
Growth 
Perquisites 
Satisfying Financial 
Performance 
 
Countervailing Power 
Media Exposure 
Disappointing Financial 
Performance   Fraud 
Fraud 
Revealed 
AAER 
 
CEO  
Narcissism 
Score 
 
 
  Hubris 
57 
 
The upper echelon theory provides an indication of how narcissism may be translated in 
actions (Higgs, 2009): by investigating the engagement of grandiose acts and bold actions 
undertaken to attract attention. Narcissism is a multi-dimensional concept which is able to 
predict attitudes (cognitive aspect), to predict behaviors (motivational aspect) and to predict 
the way narcissistic individuals behave towards others (interpersonal aspect) (Aktas, De Bodt, 
& Roll, 2009). 
 
CEOs leave traces behind in their daily functioning. These traces can be systematically 
followed by looking at 5 determinants:  media exposure, compensation, power, growth and 
perquisites. These 5 determinants are subdivided into 15 quantitative variables and listed in 
table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 Determinants and variables of CEO narcissism 
Determinant       Variable 
Media Exposure 1. Number of Publications in Newspapers, Business magazines 
2. Number of Awards  
3. Number of lines in the Marquis who’s who entry 
4. Presence and size of the Photo in Annual Report 
Compensation  1. Cash Compensation (Salary & Bonus) 
2. Total Compensation (TDC1) 
3. Ratio Cash Compensation CEO/Second Best Paid Executive 
4. Ratio Total Compensation CEO/Second Best Paid Executive 
5. Executive Rank by Salary and Bonus 
Power 1. CEO Duality 
2. Governance Index of Gompers 
3. Number of official formal titles of the CEO 
Growth 1. Number of Acquisitions 
2. Size of Acquisitions 
Perquisites 1. Private Use of the Corporate Jet 
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The five determinants and the fifteen variables all reflect the four components of Emmons 
(Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987). The next chapter 4 gives a detailed description of the 
determinants, the variables, the data collection and the subsequent data analysis which scores 
the CEOs according to their narcissistic tendencies.  
 
Just like Icarus, high narcissistic CEOs fly higher and higher in the sky. Chapter 5 investigates 
the intricate relationship between CEO narcissism and the financial performances. The CEO 
narcissism score is offset against financial performance measures.  
 
The comparison between high narcissistic CEOs and Icarus continues: Icarus had his father 
warning him not to fly too high, but unfortunately, Icarus didn’t listen. Once ascended, Icarus 
could not hear his father anymore and had no one left to warn him. Likewise, high narcissistic 
CEOs don’t listen and refuse any countervailing power. High narcissistic CEOs surround 
themselves with followers and sycophants and have no one left to monitor. Chapter 6 tests the 
hypothesis whether high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing power.  
 
Chapter 7 investigates the fraud propensity of CEOs by collecting data about AAERs: The 
Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases. These data are necessary to test the hypothesis 
if high narcissistic CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud in order to keep up appearances.  
 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion Framework CEO Narcissism 
 
This chapter starts with describing the upper echelon theory of Hambrick and Mason which 
documents the influence of executives’ personalities on the organizational performance. The 
focus is on the CEOs narcissistic personality with its inherent productive and destructive 
elements. Narcissistic CEOs are able to drive the organization towards a magnificent future, 
because they are visionaries and attract a great number of followers. Narcissism is a 
prerequisite for effective leadership, but the bold actions of a narcissistic CEO also form a 
potential threat. The framework of the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism 
(visualized in figure 3.3 on page 56) elucidates that CEOs may end up in a vicious circle from 
which it is difficult to escape in the absence of self-reflection and countervailing power. 
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Chapter 4 Development of a CEO Narcissism Score 
 
The narcissistic personality dimension of CEOs is characterized by five determinants which 
can be quantified with fifteen variables. These variables are analyzed in order to score the 
S&P500 CEOs according to their narcissistic personality. Chapter 4.1 describes the five 
determinants and the fifteen variables which measure CEO narcissism. Chapter 4.2 documents 
the data collection process and provides the descriptive statistics for each quantitative 
variable. The data analysis and narcissistic score development is documented in chapter 4.3. 
Chapter 4.4 concludes. The subsequent chapters 5, chapter 6 and chapter 7 use the CEO 
Narcissism Score (CNS) to investigate the impact on financial performance, countervailing 
power and fraud propensity respectively. 
 
 
4.1 Description of Quantitative Determinants 
 
The high narcissistic CEO has distinctive patterns of behavior which result into different 
strategic actions. These distinctive patterns of behavior are decomposed into five groups of 
determinants which are indicators of the CEOs narcissistic personality. The five groups of 
determinants can be further decomposed into fifteen quantitative variables. The five 
determinants and fifteen variables are described in chapter 4.1.1 to 4.1.5 with the related 
literature that explains the use of each determinant and variable. The determinants and the 
fifteen variables reflect the 4 components of Emmons. 
 
 
4.1.1 Determinant Media Exposure 
 
The media provides information on organizations and their leaders with a focus on persons 
and characteristics of leaders. The media reinforces the image of strong CEOs who can act as 
saviors  (Chen & Meindl, 1991). The CEO status is enhanced through the media exposure and 
the myth of a great leader and savior continues. There are 4 variables in the category media 
exposure. The underlying reason to strive for high media exposure is the fact that the high 
narcissistic CEO constantly needs affirmation of his grandiosity.  
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The media exposure determinant reflects CEO narcissism and corresponds to the four 
components of Emmons. The media exposure determinant corresponds to specific NPI items 
(included in Appendix II) which are listed in the bottom row of table 4.1. The highest number 
of corresponding NPI items is found in the self-admiration component of Emmons. 
 
Table 4.1 Media exposure determinant, Emmons and NPI items 
         Factor 
Determinant 
Authority Superiority Self-admiration Entitlement 
Media Exposure        I have a high 
media exposure 
because I am a 
good leader 
I have a  high 
media exposure 
because I am 
better than 
others 
I have a  high 
media exposure 
because I am 
extraordinary and 
special 
I deserve a high 
media exposure 
and insists on 
the respect due 
to me 
NPI Item  12,15,44,46 9,10,32,49 7,14,21,26,42,48,54 20,28,35,52 
 
 
 
1 Publications in major newspapers and business magazines 
 
Newspapers and business publications provide facts and information about organizations and 
their leaders. Simply reporting the bear facts would not achieve a large public and the media 
therefore deepens the information. Looking at the covers of Fortune and Business week over 
the last decades shows that most CEOs in the myths have fallen from their throne. The media 
helps to create the CEO status but can also destroy these CEOs.  
Chen and Meindl (Chen & Meindl, 1991) examine image construction and subsequent 
reconstruction of Donald Burr of People Express. The image of Donald Burr in the media is 
reconstructed in such a way to account for the dramatic performance failure of the company. 
The research of Chen and Meindl demonstrates the influence of the media.  
 
Being published in major business publications and newspapers is the beginning of the end if 
CEOs believe their own press clips. It cultivates hubris and narcissism.  
There are various researchers (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, & Zang, 2008; Milbourn, 2003; 
Rajgopal, Shevlin, & Zamora, 2006) who use the number of press articles citing the CEO.  
Milbourn (Milbourn, 2003) uses the CEO publicity as a proxy for CEO reputation and 
61 
 
concludes that compensation contracts for CEOs with more media-counts exhibit greater pay-
for-performance sensitivity. Rajgopal et al. (Rajgopal et al., 2006) find that compensation for 
CEOs with more media counts is systematically subject to lower relative performance 
evaluation. Francis et al. (Francis et al., 2008) also use publicity as a proxy for CEO 
reputation and find that more reputed CEOs are associated with poorer earnings quality 
compared to less-reputed CEOs. Cools (Cools, 2005) investigates the number of publications 
of CEOs of the twenty five companies facing financial scandals. Cools counts the number of 
CEO quotes in newspapers for the five years prior to the announcement of the financial 
scandal. Cools concludes that the twenty five companies facing financial scandals all have 
CEOs with an enormous popularity and are quoted three times more than CEOs in 
comparable healthy companies. This research uses the number of publications in major news 
and business publications citing the CEO, consistent with the above mentioned research of 
Milbourn, Cools, Rajgopal et al. and Francis et al. 
 
 
2 Awards 
 
Malmendier and Tate (Malmendier & Tate, 2009) study award winning CEOs. The 
researchers look at various awards the CEOs can win and compare the award winning CEOs 
with non-award winning CEOs. These researchers hand-collected the awards data from 
various sources, like business magazines, CNN and Ernst & Young. The results of this 
research show higher executive compensation packages for award winning CEOs while the 
company is underperforming. The measures of performance, ROA and stock prices, show a 
15 –26 % decline. The award winning CEO has a substantial effect on the compensation of 
the CEO only, leaving the compensation package of other executives mainly unchanged. This 
implies that the award winning CEO is more entitled to a high compensation than other 
executives. The researchers also demonstrate that winning an award increases the likelihood 
that CEOs engage in private benefit tasks as penning a book. The chances of penning a book 
doubles in case the CEO wins an award while winning five awards makes CEOs four times 
more likely to sit on five or more outside boards. The resplendent profile has a real effect on 
CEOs. The high narcissistic CEOs with their feelings of grandiosity require the awards to 
fulfill their constant need for affirmation. 
 
 
62 
 
3 Number of Lines in the Who’s Who Entry 
 
Individuals can nominate themselves for inclusion into most who’s who volumes. Following 
the research of Chatterjee and Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), the entry into the 
who’s who content is taken as a determinant of the CEOs narcissistic personality. The content 
and length of the entry is under the control of the individual. The high narcissistic CEO 
utilizes the opportunity to appear in the who’s who volumes with a large biography. 
 
 
4 Photograph(s) in the annual report 
 
Most annual reports comprise one or more photographs of the executive and non-executive 
directors. However, the presence of a CEO photograph shows a considerable variance. On the 
one side, the CEO and the board may not be portrayed at all. On the other side, the annual 
report may contain a picture of the CEO alone, comprising a whole page of the annual report. 
Publishing a photograph in the annual report is an opportunity for the CEO to show off as the 
companies’ leader (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). CEOs are very attentive to the content of 
the annual report. Moreover, CEOs have strong opinions and control over how they must be 
portrayed in the annual report. The CEO seeks a great deal of visibility in the annual report, as 
a proof that the CEO is more important than anybody else in the company. The inflated ego of 
the high narcissistic CEO is reflected into a large photograph of the CEO alone in the annual 
report. Hence, the way in which CEOs present themselves with photographs in the annual 
reports provides an indication of the CEOs narcissistic personality. 
 
 
4.1.2 Determinant Compensation 
 
The compensation is the result of the contractual relationship between the principal and the 
agent (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The 
CEO compensation can be considered as a classical principal-agent issue which is described 
in chapter 2. Researchers have concluded that CEOs have considerable influence over their 
own compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mace, 1971). The research of Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) states that compensation can be considered as an 
important indicator of formal power and these researchers use the compensation ratio as a 
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proxy for executive dominance. Hayward and Hambrick (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) use 
compensation ratios as a proxy for self importance of the CEO and use it as an indicator of 
large acquisition premiums paid. Cools (Cools, 2005) investigates CEO compensation and 
concludes that twenty five companies facing financial scandals all have a CEO with enormous 
variable compensation.  
 
The compensation consists of five variables: cash compensation, total compensation, cash 
compensation ratio, total compensation ratio and compensation rank. These five are separately 
described and measured. The compensation determinant corresponds to specific NPI items 
(included in Appendix II) which are listed in the bottom row of table 4.2. The highest number 
corresponding NPI items is found in the entitlement component of Emmons.  
 
Table 4.2 Compensation determinant, Emmons and NPI items 
                  Factor 
Determinant 
Authority Superiority Self-
admiration 
Entitlement 
Compensation I am a born 
leader who 
deserves a high 
compensation  
I deserve a 
high 
compensation 
because I am 
better than 
others 
I deserve a 
high 
compensation 
because I am 
extraordinary 
and special 
I deserve a high 
compensation 
because I insists 
upon the respect due 
to me 
NPI Item 2,46 10,49 7,14,48,54 11,19,20,28,35,40,53 
 
 
 
1 Cash Compensation 
 
The absolute amount of CEO compensation can be divided into two categories: cash 
compensation and total compensation. This research takes both categories into account by 
calculating the absolute amount of cash and total compensation for each CEO for every tenure 
year. The absolute amount of cash compensation consists of two elements, salary and bonus, 
and is used as a measure of the CEOs narcissistic personality. 
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2 Total Compensation 
 
The absolute amount of total compensation is the sum of all compensation elements. These 
elements are: Salary, Bonus, Total Value Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock 
Options Granted, Long Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. These absolute amounts 
are calculated for each individual CEO and used as a measure of the CEOs narcissistic 
personality. 
 
 
3 Ratio CEO Cash Compensation  
 
When individuals in a social community receive the same income increase, the feeling of 
happiness resulting from the income increase, is minimal. It is like is a hedonic treadmill in 
which one walks very fast striving for increasing compensation and material consumption, but 
subjectively speaking the well-being scale remains the same, because everybody in your 
neighborhood experiences and receives the same. A high narcissistic CEO with feelings of 
superiority and grandiosity strives for a much higher compensation than the second best paid 
executive in the organization. The ratio of cash and total compensation of the CEO relative to 
the cash and total compensation of the second best paid executive is used as a measure of the 
CEOs narcissistic personality. Hambrick and D’Aveni (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) use this 
ratio as a proxy for executive dominance. Hayward and Hambrick (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997) use this determinant as a proxy for self importance of the CEO and relate it to the 
acquisition premiums paid. Because CEOs are able to set out their compensation (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2006; Mace, 1971), the ratio of CEO compensation versus the compensation of the 
second best paid executive reflects the gap between the CEOs assessment of his worth versus 
the others’ worth to the company.  
In case the CEO is the best paid executive, the compensation is related to the second best paid 
executive, resulting into a ratio greater than one. If the compensation of the CEO is not the 
first ranked, the compensation of the CEO is related to the best paid executive in the 
company. Since the Execucomp database gives information about the compensation of at least 
five top executives, the ratio of the CEO cash compensation versus the second best paid 
executive can be calculated for each CEO. This ratio is used as a measure of the CEOs 
narcissistic personality. 
 
65 
 
4 Ratio CEO Total Compensation versus Second Best Paid 
 
There are many other elements in the total compensation beside the salary and bonus 
components. High narcissistic CEOs will grant themselves the highest total compensation as 
possible. The total compensation of the CEO with elements like stock options and long term 
incentive payouts can be compared to the total compensation of the second best paid 
executive. The Execucomp database gives information about the total compensation of at least 
five top executives. The total compensation ratio is calculated for each individual CEO. The 
total compensation ratio is used as a measure of the CEOs narcissistic personality. 
 
 
5 Rank of the CEO Compensation 
 
The compensation for corporate executives can be defined according to the superstar system 
of Rosen (Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). The superstar system explains why a relative small 
amount of individuals earn huge amounts of compensation. The enormous compensation of 
CEOs can be seen as a type of tournament prize. Tournaments in executive compensation are 
based on their ordinal rank and provide incentives. In this superstar system, the income 
distribution is highly skewed which implies that few individuals earn a major part of the total 
income. The Lorenz curve for this income distribution is moving away from the line of 
perfect equality and directing towards the line of perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient as a 
measure of statistical dispersion moves towards 1 for a high narcissistic CEO. The executive 
rank by salary and bonus is used as an indication of the CEOs narcissistic personality. In case 
the CEO compensation is lower than the compensation of the best paid executive, the CEO 
has a rank scoring 2 or higher.  
 
 
4.1.3 Determinant Power 
 
The ability of a CEO to influence the strategic choices depends on the level of power15 the 
CEO possesses. The distribution of power in the top management team differs. In some teams 
the power may be dispersed and in other top management teams the power may reside with 
                                                 
15 Power is defined as “the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” (Finkelstein, 1992). This definition is 
consistent with the view of other researchers (Pfeffer, 1981). 
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one key individual. The power of the CEO results from formal and informal sources. The 
legitimate formal power of the CEO is related to the rank in the organization and the ability to 
award and punish subordinates. Informal power is related to the individual, rather than the 
formal, official position within the organization. An example of informal power is the referent 
power of the CEO, implying the subordinates’ desire to be identified with the CEO. 
 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (Bebchuk, Cremers, & Peyer, 2010) decompose the power of 
the CEO into three components: structural power, ability-based power, and ownership-related 
power. The first component, structural power, is based on formal organizational structure and 
the hierarchical authority. The second component, ability-based power, is what Finkelstein 
(Finkelstein, 1992) calls expert and prestige power. Expert power implies the possession of 
superior expertise. Special expertise and prestige are both forms of the individuals’ ability to 
contribute to the organizational success. The third component, ownership-related power, can 
be executed through share ownership. A non-linear function exists between share ownership 
and the ownership-related power, because exerting ones voting rights effectively requires a 
minimum threshold. CEOs holding a relatively small number of shares don’t have ownership-
related power. 
 
Table 4.3 Power determinant, Emmons and NPI items  
                 Factor 
Determinant 
Authority Superiority Self-
admiration 
Entitlement 
Power 
 
I strive for high power 
that puts me in the 
middle of the attention 
because I am a born 
leader  
I deserve 
high power 
because I am 
better than 
others 
I deserve 
high power 
because I am 
extraordinary 
and special 
I deserve high 
power because I 
owe the respect 
NPI item 2,6,12,15,16,17,44,46,47, 8,9,50 14,23,48,54 11,19,20,35,38,53 
 
 
The power determinant corresponds to specific NPI items (included in Appendix II) which are 
listed in the bottom row of table 4.3. The highest number corresponding NPI items is found in 
the authority component of Emmons.  
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The power determinant consists of the three variables CEO duality, the governance index and 
the number of role titles. 
 
 
1 CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality implies that the CEO also acts as chairman of the board. The board of directors 
is the formal link between the shareholders of an organization and the managers entrusted 
with the day-to-day functioning of the organization. The CEO as “head” of the board plays an 
important role within this link. The dual role of the CEO reinforces the CEO power, 
especially if the ownership of companies is dispersed. The ownership of large US publicly 
owned organizations is widespread with numerous shareholders holding a small percentage of 
the common stock and are not able to exercise their shareholding rights. The US CEOs with a 
dual role have influential powerful positions. 
There are two extreme perspectives looking at CEO duality. At the one hand of the extreme 
stands the agency theory which argues CEO duality results into unbalanced power at the 
corporate top, because the CEOs possess excessive power. This power imbalance focuses on 
the need to secure shareholders’ value by good corporate governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
On the other site of the extreme stands the stewardship theory by emphasizing that duality 
might lead to encouraging CEOs to act in the interest of the shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). 
Irrespective of the theoretical view, CEO duality leads to increased power for the CEO which 
can be used for opportunistic behavior and pursuing their self-serving agenda. Jensen argues 
that agency problems are severe in case of high CEO power. Cyert et al. (Cyert, Kang, & 
Kumar, 2002) show that the CEO compensation is higher in case of CEO duality. The balance 
of power between the board and the CEO disappears, leaving the board with restricted 
possibilities to monitor the managerial actions. 
 
 
2 Governance Index 
 
Gompers et al. (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) use twenty-four governance provisions to 
construct a “Governance Index” as a proxy for the level of shareholder rights. Shareholder 
rights vary across companies and may look like democrats on the one extreme and 
dictatorships on the other extreme. For democratic companies, the ultimate authority rests 
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with the shareholders who can vote. These voters elect representatives (directors) who 
delegate most decisions to bureaucrats (managers). There is limited power for managers while 
shareholders are allowed to quickly and easily replace directors. The dictatorship reserves 
extensive power for management and places strong restrictions on shareholders’ ability to 
replace directors.  
 
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database follows governance provisions 
that are beneficial to management. The governance index is constructed using twenty-four 
governance rules which can be divided into five thematic groups. 
The first is the “Delay” group and includes four provisions designed to discourage a (hostile) 
takeover bidder. Examples are special meetings (requirement to call a special meeting beyond 
that specified by state law, adding extra time to proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the 
regularly scheduled annual meeting) and classified boards (only part of the board can be 
replaced each year so that an outsider who gains control of a corporation may have to wait a 
few years before being able to gain total control of the board). These provisions are crucial 
weapons during takeover battles.  
The second is the “Voting” group which contains six provisions, all related to shareholders’ 
rights in elections. For example supermajority requirements for approval of mergers, requiring 
a higher threshold than the state law, like 75 percent, and often exceed attendance at the 
annual meeting.  
The third is the “Protection” group containing six provisions designed to insure officers and 
directors against job-related liability or to compensate them following a termination. Golden 
parachutes are examples of protection agreements that provide compensation to senior 
executives upon an event such as termination following a change in control. They do not 
require shareholder approval.  
The fourth group is “Other” and includes the six remaining company-level provisions, like 
anti-greenmail which prevents shareholders to sell the stock back to the company, usually at a 
premium, in exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company for a specified 
period of time.   
The fifth and last dimension is the “State” which includes state laws like control-share 
acquisition which require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on whether a newly 
qualifying large shareholder should have voting rights. A complete description of all twenty-
four variables can be found in Gompers et al. (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) and the 
definitions of the provisions are included in Appendix III. 
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The broad governance index consists thus of twenty-four IRRC provisions with equal weight 
to each provision. A high governance index represents weak shareholder rights and strong 
managerial rights and vice versa. The governance index is negatively related to performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q, as well as stockholder returns during the decade of the 1990th  
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).  
 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (Bebchuk et al., 2009) questioned whether all the twenty-four 
IRRC provisions contributed to the negative relation between the twenty-four provisions and 
the Tobin’s Q, as well as the stock returns in the 1990th. Some provisions might be more or 
less relevant. These researchers find that six provisions fully drive the correlation between the 
twenty-four provisions and company valuation and stock returns as documented by the 
research of Gompers et al. (2003). Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) call this the 
entrenchment index or E-index. Although these six provisions account for the negative 
correlation with company valuation and stock returns, the 24 provisions are indicative for 
corporate governance. In this research, the governance index is more relevant, because the 
primary interest is in managerial power.  
 
A high narcissistic CEO does not tolerate countervailing power and therefore strives for a 
dictatorship. In this dictatorship structure, the shareholder rights are minimized while the 
CEO holds extensive power and places strong restrictions on shareholders’ rights and abilities 
to act. This research uses the governance index of Gompers as a proxy for the CEOs 
narcissistic personality. High narcissistic CEOs will have a high governance index. 
 
 
3 Number of Formal Titles 
 
CEOs differ in the number of titles. Several CEOs simply call themselves “CEO”, while other 
CEOs call themselves “CEO, Chairman, President and Principal Executive”. The CEO may 
enhance one’s power in case the CEO holds multiple titles (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Harrison, 
Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). Hambrick refers to CEOs holding multiple titles as the Idi Amin 
phenomenon, referring to the former Ugandan leader who assigned himself a dozen formal 
titles. Hambrick quotes that the multiple titles of the CEO "tends to be a sign of power 
accumulation and power hoarding" (Fortune, 1991, p. 13).  
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An example of a CEO with role title inflation is the CEO of Vivendi, Jean Marie Messier, 
who has been identified by psychologists as highly narcissistic. Messier signed his emails 
with “J6M”, which is an abbreviation of Jean Marie Messier Moi-Même Maitre du Monde. 
The number of role titles is an indication of the feelings of authority, superiority, self-
admiration and entitlement. 
 
 
4.1.4 Determinant Growth  
 
A high growth target is a sign of hubris. Just like Icarus believed he could fly to the sun, so 
will high narcissistic CEOs believe the company can grow with 15% per year. The high 
growth percentages can be achieved through acquisitions. The implemented strategy might 
work for some time, but ongoing growth figures of 15 % per year are practically impossible.  
 
Acquisitions result into a substantial growth for an acquiring company. More than 12,000 
acquisitions took place in the US during the past 20 years and shareholders’ wealth should 
have increased if CEOs would have acted in the best interest of the shareholders. Executives 
use the acquisition strategy for company growth and to increase the stock price. Executive 
directors often take the share price as an input variable for strategy determination. Taking the 
share price as an input variable inevitably leads to problems for low share prices as well as for 
high share prices (Boot, 2009). In case the share price is too low, executives have to 
determine a strategy to raise the share price. If executives fail to raise the share price, the 
organization can be a candidate for a (hostile) takeover. On the other hand, if the share price is 
too high, executive directors have to determine a strategy which increases the value of the 
organization. If not, a substantial drop in share price is to be expected. The stock price must 
remain at the same level or increase in order not to damage the reputation of the high 
narcissistic CEO.  Executives use the acquisition strategy to increase the stock price, but 
unfortunately, the opposite often occurs. 
 
The research of Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (Moeller et al., 2005) shows a loss of 240 
billion dollars in shareholder value for acquiring companies directly after the announcement 
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of acquisitions from 1998 to 200116. Hayward and Hambrick (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) 
also argue that acquisitions generally have a neutral to negative effect on shareholder value 
(acquiring and target companies).  
 
To explain the neutral to negative effect on shareholder value, Roll (Roll, 1986) developed the 
“hubris hypothesis”, which means that CEOs are mistakenly convinced of their idea that they 
can do a better job running the acquired company. Hubris leads to an overestimation that the 
acquiring companies can extract more value from takeover companies than the current target 
management. Acquiring companies are therefore willing to pay a higher premium for the 
takeover. Overconfident individuals have non-standard beliefs (as described in chapter 2) and 
deviate from the standard economic model. Hubris, overconfidence about managerial abilities, 
helps to explain the value destroying acquisitions (DellaVigna, 2009). Malmendier and Tate 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008) find that overconfident CEOs are 65% more likely to make an 
acquisition. Moreover, CEOs who are classified as overconfident tend to overestimate their 
ability to generate higher returns and therefore pay a large acquisition premium. 
 
Table 4.4 Growth determinant, Emmons and NPI items 
                  Factor 
Determinant 
Authority Superiority Self-
admiration 
Entitlement 
Growth: 
acquisitions 
I acquire, 
because I am a 
born leader 
I acquire, because I 
can do a better job 
than target CEOs 
I acquire, 
because I am a 
great person 
I am entitled to 
lead many 
companies 
NPI item 2,15,17,46,47 5,8,9,10,24,29,49,50 23,48 11,19,35,38,53 
 
 
The growth determinant corresponds to specific NPI items (included in Appendix II) which 
are listed in the bottom row of table 4.4. The highest number corresponding NPI items is 
found in the superiority component of Emmons.  
 
Even the friendliest acquisition is a contest with a winner and a loser. The high narcissistic 
CEO needs to be the winner in this contest. High narcissistic CEOs set the company targets 
                                                 
16  The total effect of the acquiring and target company may however still be positive, while the acquiring 
shareholders are on the losing end. 
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unrealistically high because they believe in their supernatural leadership. Acquisitions are 
highly visible and enhance the company size of the acquirer.  
The incentives on goals setting for high narcissistic CEOs are not merely pecuniary. High 
narcissistic CEOs are also triggered by attention and applause which enhances their self-
admiration. Acquiring target companies results into various pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
incentives for a high narcissistic CEO.   
 
The acquisitions that high narcissistic CEOs undertake differ in size (bigger) and number 
(more frequent) compared to low narcissistic leaders in order to satisfy their narcissistic 
needs. The number of acquisitions and the value of acquisitions are the two variables which 
will be described below. 
 
 
1 Number of Acquisitions 
 
The high narcissistic CEOs are looking for grandiosity, constantly need attention and strive 
for high unrealistic goals. For this reason, high narcissistic CEOs must engage in bold actions 
such as acquisitions which attract the attention. Higgs (Higgs, 2009) confirms that narcissistic 
CEOs engage in frequent acquisition activities. 
A high narcissistic CEO acquires many target companies for two reasons. First, the high 
narcissistic CEO holds unrealistic exaggerated beliefs about his own abilities, achievements 
and superiority. The high narcissistic CEO is convinced of the fact the target company will 
have a higher performance under his control. Second, the high narcissistic CEO is constantly 
looking for attention and applause. Numerous acquisitions satisfy this need for applause. The 
number of acquisitions is an indication for the CEOs narcissistic personality. 
 
 
2 Value of Acquisitions 
 
The CEO plays a pivotal role in initiating and approving large acquisitions. Large acquisitions 
are highly visible events and can materially increase the company size and ultimately the 
financial performance. The price paid for the acquisition is a top management decision, 
whereby the CEO of the acquiring company plays a major role. Acquisitions of course need 
the approval of the board of directors, but - referring back to Mace (Mace, 1971)  - boards of 
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directors rely on top management. The board cannot proceed without the personal 
commitment of the CEO. The CEO dispositions and biases are represented in the process of 
large acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Higgs (Higgs, 2009) argues that narcissistic 
CEOs engage in bold actions which attract attention and therefore undertake significant 
acquisition activities. The value of the acquisitions is an indication for the CEOs narcissistic 
personality. 
 
 
4.1.5 Determinant Perquisites 
 
The definition of perquisites is taken from the SEC: “perquisites are any other annual 
compensation not properly classified as salary or bonus”. The CEO uses perquisites to 
legitimize the status attached to the perquisites. 
 
There are various perquisites, such as golf club memberships, life insurance, relocation costs, 
health checks, car allowance and the use of the corporate jet. Perquisites enforce the 
individual status within an organization. The compensation expert Crystal wrote: “We don’t 
wear crowns in this country or carry such symbols of office as a field marshal’s baton. So it is 
hard to tell the players apart, to spot the chairman of the board in the crowd. He’s the one 
wearing the Savile Row suite, but you have to be knowledgeable about clothes to pick him 
out. You’re more certain when you see him go by in a chauffeur driven limousine” (Crystal, 
1978).  The public will easily spot the CEO when they see him using the corporate jet.  
 
Literature gives various reasons why companies provide perquisites to their executives.  
Jensen and Meckling (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) postulate that perquisite consumption can be 
viewed as a representative example of the numerous ways in which agency problems can arise 
between managers and shareholders. The stock price decreases in case the personal use of the 
corporate jet is revealed (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). 
 
Warren Buffet recognized shareholder sensitivity to excessive perquisites when Berkshire 
Hathaway’s acquired the corporate jet, called “The Indefensible”. Buffet answered: “I put it in 
our annual report in the tiniest letter type I could find. So, I kind of tip-toed into the arena” 
(The Age, 24-9-2002). 
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Companies with weak corporate governance systems give their executives more perquisites 
(Andrews, Linn, Yi, 2009). These findings are consistent with the agency argument. Yermack 
(Yermack, 2006)  adds that the perquisites might lead to a lower morale of employees when 
they are faced with the excesses of their management. 
 
Perquisites do not necessarily have to be negative. Fama (Fama, 1980) states that perquisites 
reflect an optimal equilibrium contract between the management and the shareholders. The 
management compensates a perceived shortcoming in the optimal compensation contract by 
perquisite consumption. Perquisites can be used as a reward and as a motivational tool which 
both help the CEO to perform well (Yermack, 2006).  
Perquisites can lead to higher productivity by supporting the CEO in the performance of his 
duties (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). The CEO will for example arrive fresh at a meeting after 
traveling with the corporate jet.  
 
Perquisites can reflect agency problems, but can also serve a legitimate purpose, as outlined 
by Rajan and Wulf (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). Perquisites are rational expenditures as long as the 
costs of perquisites remain lower than the benefits obtained from the perquisites. The 
expenses on perquisites are then value expanding. Rajan and Wulf (Rajan & Wulf, 2006) use 
this productivity argument by stating that perquisites save time leading to a higher 
productivity.  
 
The high narcissistic CEOs with feelings of superiority and grandiosity are looking for status 
and grandiosity. The high narcissistic CEOs perceive that they are entitled to the best rewards 
and therefore strive for a high perquisite consumption. The perquisite determinant 
corresponds to specific NPI items (included in Appendix II) which are listed in the bottom 
row of table 4.5. The highest number corresponding NPI items is found in the self-admiration 
component of Emmons.  
 
75 
 
Table 4.5 Perquisite determinant, Emmons and NPI items 
                  Factor 
Determinant 
Authority Superiority Self-admiration Entitlement 
Perquisites I use the jet 
because of my 
authority 
I use the jet 
because I am 
better than 
others 
I use the jet 
because I am 
special 
I am entitled 
using the 
corporate jet 
NPI item 12,44,46 5,49 14,21,42,48,54 28,35,52 
 
 
 
1 Private Use of the Corporate Jet 
 
This research follows the paper of Yermack (Yermack, 2006) by focusing on the personal use 
of the corporate jet, instead of examining a wide range of perquisites like country club 
memberships, life insurance, relocation costs, health checks and so on.  
 
There are two reasons for focusing on the personal jet use perquisite. The first reason is that 
the SEC reporting rules for using the corporate jet make the data for corporate jet perquisites 
more reliable than data for any other perquisites. The second reason is that the use of a 
corporate jet is cited much more often than any other perquisite by academic and shareholder 
commentators as a symbol of the agency problems within companies (Yermack, 2006). 
 
The relationship between perquisites and compensation has been researched, but the results 
are inconclusive. Rajan and Wulf (Rajan & Wulf, 2006) find a relationship between high 
paying companies and perquisites, while Yermack (Yermack, 2006) does not find a 
significant statistical relationship between perquisites and excess compensation. Furthermore, 
Yermack does not find a significant relationship between the costs of personal jet use versus 
the CEO fractional stock ownership relationship. However, Yermack does find a correlation 
between certain personal characteristics of CEOs versus the personal use of a corporate jet. 
The membership of a golf club, located far away from the headquarters increases the use of 
the corporate jet dramatically. Yermack’s research shows that the use of the corporate jet 
reflects personal characteristics. This research collects information on the use of the corporate 
jet as an objective variable that reflects the CEOs narcissistic personality.  
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4.2 Data collection: Quantitative Determinants 
 
The data collection starts with selecting companies for the period 1992 to 2008 which were 
listed in the S&P500, using the Compustat database. The year 1992 is the earliest year that 
most determinants are available in digital form and 2008 the last year. For each S&P500 
company, information concerning the top 5 executives are downloaded from the Execucomp 
database, including the name of the executive, the gender and the age. Missing data have been 
hand collected using the SEC Edgar database, BoardEx database and company websites.  
 
The companies in the dataset all have a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, which 
are translated into Fama and French industry codes. Appendix IV includes the SIC and Fama 
French codes. The distribution of companies across the Fama French industries varies. A 
higher frequency of companies is found in the sectors manufacturing (code 3), business 
equipment (code 6) and finance (code 11). A lower frequency of companies is found in the 
sectors consumer durables (code 2), energy (code 4), chemicals (code 5) and telecom (code 
7). Figure 4.1 depicts the Fama French Industry classification and the number of companies.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Frequency of Fama French industry codes 
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Two filters are imposed for selecting the S&P500 CEOs.  
The first filter selects only those CEOs with tenure starting as from 1992, because most data 
are available from 1992. This filter follows prior CEO research, such as the paper of Yermack 
(Yermack, 2006) and the paper of Chatterjee and Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).  
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The second filter selects only those CEOs with a tenure of more than 3 years. The underlying 
rational for imposing this second filter is the CEO life cycle (described below) as documented 
by Hambrick and Fukutomi (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). The new appointed CEO needs 
some time to develop his personal paradigm, being the personal assumptions about the way 
the organization ought to be managed. 
 
 
The CEO life cycle 
 
The life cycle theory argues that the behavior, attention, interest and power of the CEO varies 
during discernible periods, which will ultimately impact the organizational performance. 
When a CEO starts the complex job, the information overload is tremendous (Mintzberg, 
1983). Comprehending all relevant stimuli in a short period is impossible, leading to a 
beginning period in which the new appointed CEO still has to develop his personal paradigm. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) also state that there are many 
anomalies with the succession. As tenure increases: “each passing year in the job tends to 
bring the CEO a heightened sense of correctness in his or her established way of operating 
and viewing the world” (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). CEOs who are appointed from within 
the company also need some time to get used to the new role, because their position as CEO is 
new for them as well, facing other relations with directors, managers and stakeholders (Shen 
& Cannella Jr, 2002).  
 
The CEO life cycle begins with a response to mandate: the CEO starting a commitment in a 
particular model. A CEO in the first tenure year is in a vulnerable position, holding relatively 
low power and is less likely to pursue personal interests. In the first phase, the CEO holds 
little knowledge of, but high interest in, the tasks involved. The new appointed CEO faces 
significant changes for the tasks, the responsibilities and the skill requirements, while the 
board, shareholders and other stakeholders watch him closely (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002). 
These new appointed CEOs don’t have any guarantee that they will continue their job until 
they have convincingly proved their leadership qualities.  
The growing degree of power results into the second phase of experimentation in which the 
CEO has a moderate knowledge of the tasks while the interest in the tasks remains high.  
The selection of an enduring theme takes place during the third phase in which the CEO 
obtains a stronger commitment to the paradigm with high interests in tasks as well as high 
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knowledge of tasks. Gabarro (Gabarro, 1987) argues that the increased task knowledge and 
enhanced understanding of the environment takes place during the third year. This year is a 
starting point for CEOs to undertake major strategic actions (Gabarro, 1987).  
The fourth phase is one of convergence characterized by a high knowledge of tasks while the 
interest in the tasks is diminishing. This phase of routine and increasing power ultimately 
leads to the final stage in which the effectiveness of the CEO is diminished and the 
commitment to a certain paradigm is hardened. The CEO has fulfilled the expectations of the 
board and the shareholders and the CEO is now in the position to develop various sources of 
power. The board has increased its confidence in the CEO and may become less vigilant in 
monitoring. The board of directors has to understand the evolution of the leadership and the 
power of the CEO because of their influence on the CEO objectives and CEO behavior (Shen 
& Cannella Jr, 2002). The leadership of the CEO has become institutionalized within the 
company and the authority of the CEO is no longer questioned. In case of a negative 
performance the CEO uses extrinsic attribution by naming external factors and/or blaming 
scapegoats (Boeker, 1992). Speaking in the words of Weisbach (Weisbach, 1988), these 
CEOs have become entrenched.  
 
In order to be able to investigate individual CEO-effects, the tenure must be long enough for 
CEOs to implement their paradigm. This research imposes this second filter following the 
before mentioned research of Shen (2002), Gabarro (1987), Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) 
and Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). These two filters result into 953 CEOs, with only 16 
(1.68%) female CEOs. 
 
 
CEO age 
 
The CEOs have an average age of 50 when they start their tenure. The youngest CEO started 
his tenure when he was 30 years of age while the oldest CEO started his tenure when he was 
72 years of age. The figure below depicts the age distribution of the CEOs when they start 
their tenure. 
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Figure 4.2 CEO age distribution at starting tenure 
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The average tenure is 7 years. The minimum tenure is 3 years, because of the filter imposed 
on the dataset. There is one CEO with 17 tenure years. Figure 4.3 depicts the tenure 
distribution of the CEOs. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 CEO tenure distribution 
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4.2.1 Data-Collection Determinant Media Exposure 
 
Researchers mostly rely on data from databases that can be easily downloaded. There are 
however various forms of relevant and interesting data that are not easily downloaded from a 
database. Among these data fall the variables in the media determinant. The data collection 
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for four variables within the media exposure determinant is time consuming because the 
variables can only be hand-collected.  
 
 
1 Publications in Major Newspapers and Business Magazines 
 
To count the number of publications in which the CEO is mentioned by name, the Factiva 
database is used. The Dow Jones Factiva database is a joint venture of Dow Jones and 
Reuters. The number of times the CEO name is mentioned together with the company’s name 
in the major news and business publications is counted for each CEO. Hereto, the start date 
and the end date of the CEO tenure is taken as a basis for collecting the information. The total 
number of publications for each CEO is divided by the number of tenure years to obtain the 
average number of publications per CEO. The average number of publicity varies with a 
minimum of 0.5 and a maximum of 1453.78 publications per tenure year. Figure 4.4 depicts 
the descriptive statistics for the average number of publications during CEO tenure. 
 
Figure 4.4 Descriptive statistics publicity 
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2 Awards 
 
The award data is collected by counting the number of awards mentioned in the Marquis 
database. Most CEOs (707 CEOs) do not receive an award. Descriptive statistics for the 
number of awards are shown in figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Descriptive statistics awards 
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3 Lines Biography 
 
The Who’s Who database is used to collect the biographical information. The number of lines 
of the CEO biography is counted. The coverage in the Who’s Who database is 93.2% with 
888 CEOs bibliographies entered of the total of 953 CEOs.  
 
In case the CEO entered the database, the number of lines of the CEO entry was counted. The 
number of lines of the CEO entry is coded 0 if there is no entry (for 65 CEOs (6.8%)). One 
CEO even filled the Who’s Who database with 33 lines. Descriptive statistics of the number 
of lines are shown in figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 Descriptive statistics number of lines biography 
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4 Photograph(s) in the Annual Report 
 
The presence of an annual report with photographs implies that the CEO wants to have a 
showcase of the company he’s leading. The annual reports are downloaded from the 
Company.info database, the SDC/TOB database or directly from the company’s websites. 
 
The presence and size of the photographs in the annual reports are analyzed. In case there is 
only a 10K filing17 and no annual report present, the score is 0. The CEOs of these companies 
are not looking for grandiosity, applause, self-admiration or self-enhancement.  
In case there is an annual report, the photographs are studied by content and by size.  
The photographs in the annual report are first scored along the dimension CEO alone on the 
photograph versus CEO with the whole board. A low score is appointed in case there is only a 
photograph of the whole board in the annual report. On this photograph, the CEO is present 
but not prevalent. Higher scores are appointed for photographs of the CEO alone. 
The photographs in the annual report are further scored along the dimension of size. The size 
of the photographs differs from a small passport photograph to a full size A4-format. The 
points for the photograph in the annual report range from 0 to 12 as table 4.6 shows. 
                                                 
17 Form 10-K is a summary report of the company's financial performance which has to be submitted annually to 
the SEC. The 10-K is distinct from the glossy annual report, which serves as a marketing tool and as a financial 
document for investors. Public companies must disclose form 10-K and are free to release a hardcopy annual 
report. 
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Table 4.6 Photograph points 
POINTS PROPERTIES PHOTOGRAPH IN ANNUAL REPORT 
0 No annual report present 
1 No photographs in annual report 
2 Photograph of CEO with board in annual report 
3 Two photographs of CEO with board in annual report 
4 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/16 – 1/8  
5 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/16 – 1/8 + Photograph CEO with board 
6 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/4  – 1/3 or 2 size 1/16 – 1/8 
7 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/4  – 1/3 + Photograph CEO with board 
8 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/2 
9 Photograph of CEO alone size 1/2 + Photograph CEO with board 
10 Photograph of CEO alone size 3/4 - 1/1 
11 Photograph of CEO alone size 3/4 - 1/1 + Photograph CEO with board 
12 Photograph of CEO alone size 3/4 - 1/1 + Photograph of CEO size 1/16 – 1/8 
 
About 25 % of the CEOs and their companies (244) don’t have an annual report, but only 
submit 10K filings which scores 0. The other 75% of the CEOs and their companies (709) 
submit an annual report. The most frequent scores are 1 (no photographs in annual report), 
score 4 (photograph of CEO alone size 1/16 – 1/8) and score 6 (photograph of CEO alone size 
1/4  – 1/3 or 2 size 1/16 – 1/8). Descriptive statistics of the photograph are in figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7 Descriptive statistics photograph 
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4.2.2 Data-Collection Determinant Compensation 
 
Details about the executive compensation are obtained from the Execucomp database. The 
Execucomp database includes compensation data for CEOs and for minimal four other 
highest paid executives. These data are downloaded from this database. 
 
The absolute amount of CEO compensation changes over the years. Frydman and Saks 
(Frydman & Saks, 2010) have studied the executives’ compensation from 1936 to 2005 and 
find that the compensation follows a J shaped pattern with only a sharp decline during the 
Second World War and an increase afterwards. The executive compensation changes 
considerably since the 1950th, as both stock options and other forms of incentive 
compensation became more important.  
Four economic theories are able to explain the increase of executive compensation (Frydman 
& Saks, 2010). The first theory is based upon the so-called “managerial rent extraction” 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Executives are able to increase their compensation and thereby 
skim profits of the company due to poor corporate governance systems. The second theory 
states that executive compensation is related to the size of the company. Frydman and Saks 
(Frydman & Saks, 2010) conclude that there is a correlation between executive compensation 
and aggregate organizational growth in the past thirty years. The third theory is based upon 
the risk averse behavior of executives, which is described in chapter 2. The high executive 
compensation might be necessary in order to compensate the simultaneous rise in incentive 
compensation for the risk averse executives. Executives strive for a higher fixed 
compensation compared to incentive compensation, because the pay for performance is a 
riskier form of income. The fourth theory is based upon specific managerial skills which have 
become increasingly important (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004).  
 
In 1992 the average CEO of a S&P 500 company earns $2.7 million. In 2000, the average 
compensation increases to over $14 million: an increase of more than 400%. In 1992, CEOs 
are paid 82 times the average earning of an average employee and this relative compensation 
increases to 369 times in 2005 (Source: WRDS, M. Gine Associate Director of Research 
Services, 2007). 
The paper of Bebchuk and Grinstein (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005) examines the executive 
compensation during 1993-2003 and they find that the executive compensation has grown 
much more than can be explained by the increase in company’s size and performance. These 
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researchers find that the ratio of the executive compensation to company’s earnings increased 
from 5% in 1993 to 10% in 2003. The high narcissistic CEOs exert their influence on the 
compensation through their managerial power. The raw data with the absolute amount of 
CEO compensation can however not be used to identify the CEO narcissism due to the 
selected long time frame (1992-2008). CEOs with a tenure during 1998 to 2001 would 
automatically get a higher narcissism score, because the CEO compensation is at the highest 
level during these years. Therefore, the absolute amounts of compensation are corrected per 
year by taking the average compensation increase of S&P500 CEOs as the base.  
 
 
1 Cash Compensation 
 
The salary and bonus for the top five executives is extracted from the Execucomp database. 
The cash compensation is calculated by adding salary and bonus and correcting the absolute 
amounts with the yearly increases for S&P500 CEOs. The absolute amounts are corrected for 
the yearly average increases in cash compensation in order to be able to compare the 953 
CEOs throughout the time period. 
The mean cash compensation is ± $ 1.19 million, with a minimum of $ 0 and a maximum of $ 
11.1 million. The figure 4.8 depicts the cash compensation of the 953 CEOs showing a 
skewed distribution.  
 
Figure 4.8 Descriptive statistics cash compensation 
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2 Total Compensation 
 
The total compensation for the top five executive is extracted from the Execucomp database 
using the so called tdc1 (total direct compensation) field. The total compensation tdc1 before 
2006 consists of: Salary, Bonus, Total Value Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock 
Options Granted, Long Term Incentive Payouts and All Other Total. As from 2006, the SEC 
changed the disclosure rules and the tdc1 consists of Salary, Bonus, Non Equity Incentive 
Plan Compensation, Grant Date Fair Value Stock Awards, and Grant date fair Value of 
Option Awards, Deferred Compensation and Other Compensation. The changing disclosure 
rules do not change the value of total compensation, but only change the way how the total 
compensation should be reported.  
For 60 CEOs and the related other executives the tdc1 was missing. These missing values in 
the tdc1 column in Execucomp are collected by summing all individual items of tdc1.  
 
The mean total compensation is $ 3.28 million, with a minimum of $ 0 and a maximum of $ 
39.3 million. Note that the absolute amounts for tdc1 are corrected for the yearly increases in 
total compensation in order to be able to compare the 953 CEOs through the time period. 
Outliers were hand checked using the SEC Edgar database forms DEF 14a.  
Figure 4.9 depicts the total compensation of the 953 CEOs and shows a skewed distribution, 
similar to the cash compensation distribution. 
 
Figure 4.9 Descriptive statistics total compensation 
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3 Ratio of Cash Compensation 
 
The Execucomp database provides detailed compensation information of minimal five top 
executives of each company. With this information, the ratio of cash and total compensation 
of the CEO relative to the second highest paid executive can be calculated. In case the CEO is 
not the highest paid executive the CEO compensation is compared to the highest paid 
executive. 
 
A high ratio can be viewed as an indication of potential governance problems in which 
considerable CEO power is being used. Because the ratios are calculated using the 
compensation figures for second best paid executives in the same company, it directly 
controls for any company-specific characteristic that affects the average level of executive 
compensation in the company level. Figure 4.10 depicts the ratio of cash compensation 
distribution of the CEOs and shows that the mean cash compensation ratio is 1.66, implying 
that on average a CEO earns 1.66 times the cash compensation of the second best paid 
executive.  
  
Figure 4.10 Descriptive statistics cash compensation ratio 
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4 Ratio Total Compensation 
 
The ratio of the total compensation is calculated in the same way as the ratio of cash 
compensation. The total compensation (tdc1) of the CEO is compared to the total 
compensation of the second best paid executive.  
The mean ratio of the total compensation approximates 2.18, implying that on average a CEO 
earns 2.18 times the total compensation of the second best paid executive. The distribution of 
the ratio total compensation shows more variance compared to the ratio of cash compensation. 
Figure 4.11 depicts the ratio of total compensation distribution of the CEOs. 
 
Figure 4.11 Descriptive statistics total compensation ratio 
 
TDC1 ratio  
Series: TDC1_RATIO
Sample 1 953
Observations 953
Mean       2.185728
Median   1.961614
Maximum  18.15247
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   1.317954
Skewness   4.888270
Kurtosis   45.91136
Jarque-Bera  76752.27
Probability  0.000000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 13141618
62
115
195
257
188
300
10
Nr.
of 
CEO’s
o.
CEOs
 
 
 
5 Executive rank by salary and bonus 
 
In case the CEO is the highest paid, the CEO executive rank by salary and bonus is 1. In case 
the CEO is not the highest paid executive, the ratio is less than one and the CEO executive 
rank is 2 or higher. Most frequently, the CEO compensation rank is 1, but exceptions do exist 
as the maximum value of 8.5 elucidates. A high rank like 8 indicates that there are 7 other 
better paid executives in the company and this indicates a low CEO narcissism. Figure 4.12 
depicts the executive rank distribution of the CEOs and shows that nearly 60% of the CEOs 
are the first ranked.  
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Figure 4.12 Descriptive statistics compensation rank 
 
Series: EXECUTIVE_RANK
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4.2.3 Data-Collection Determinant Power 
 
The data for three power variables are collected and analyzed. These three variables are the 
CEO duality, the governance index and the role titles.  
 
 
1 CEO Duality 
 
A large part of the sample CEOs frequently also chair their boards, giving them a major say in 
important organizational decisions, like the appointment of new board members and 
remuneration. McKinsey conducted a survey for 2002 and concluded that 76% of S&P500 
companies had CEO duality. The Washington post states that 78% of the S&P500 CEOs have 
a dual role (Washington post, 2003). The data in this research are completely in line with the 
findings of McKinsey and the Washington Post. In this research sample, 77.75% of the 953 
CEOs also chair their board. 
 
 
2 Governance Index 
 
Gompers (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) uses a large set of governance provisions to 
construct a governance index. This governance index proxies the strength of shareholder 
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rights versus managerial rights. The Governance Index (GI) is constructed by adding one 
point for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. Companies in the highest deciles of 
the index are placed in the “Dictatorship Portfolio” and are referred to as having the “highest 
management power” or the “weakest shareholder rights”. Companies in the lowest deciles of 
the index are placed in the “Democracy Portfolio” and are described as having the “lowest 
management power” or the “strongest shareholder rights. The Governance Index is the proxy 
for the balance of power between shareholders and managers. The Governance Index is 
derived from publications of the Investor Responsibility Research Centre. These publications 
supply twenty-four distinct corporate-governance provisions for approximately 1500 
companies since 1990.  The WRDS gives the mean and standard deviation of the GI for the 
S&P1500 companies. The GI for this larger sample is included in table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 WRDS mean GI for S&P1500 companies 
GI year 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Mean 9.0 9.3 9.4 8.9 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.1 
Std 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 
Min 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Max 17 17 17 18 19 18 18 18 
 
 
The Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) submits updates in the years 1990, 1993, 
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.  The latest available value is used for the years 
where IRRC data is not updated, which is consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick and 
with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (Bebchuk,  Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Gompers Ishii, & 
Metrick, 2003). A linear trend analysis provides the data for 2007 and 2008. 
 
These S&P1500 companies are on average smaller compared to the S&P500 companies in 
this research sample. Figure 4.13 depicts the descriptive statistics for the governance index in 
this research sample. The companies in this sample have an average governance index of 
9.86, slightly higher than the mean governance index from S&P1500 companies as listed 
above.  
 
The higher governance index can be explained by the bigger size of S&P500 companies 
which will lead to more shareholding dispersion and ultimately less shareholders’ rights. 
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Figure 4.13 Descriptive statistics governance index 
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3 Number of role titles 
 
The number of role titles is an indication of the CEO feelings of superiority and self-
admiration. CEOs differ in the use of their role titles. There are 46 out of 953 CEOs (4.8%) 
with just one role title, calling themselves only “CEO”. A showcase of superiority and self-
admiration is the role title President, Chairman, CEO and Principal Executive. Table 4.8 
shows the 7 different role titles and the 11 categories (possible combinations of the 7 role 
titles). 
 
Table 4.8 Frequency of role titles 
Sample: 1 953 
Included observations: 953 
Number of categories: 11 
Category Count Percentage Legend 
C 46 4,83% C CEO 
C+CH 451 47,32% CH Chairman 
C+CH+P 229 24,03% COO Chief Operating Officer 
C+CH+P+PE 29 3,04% D Director 
C+CH+P+PE+F 1 0,10% F Founder 
C+CH+PE 31 3,25% P President 
C+P 143 15,01% PE Principal Executive 
C+P+COO 1 0,10% 
C+P+D 1 0,10% 
C+P+PE 17 1,78% 
C+PE 4 0,42% 
Total 953 100% 
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The table shows that nearly half of the sample CEOs have the combination of the CEO and 
Chairman titles, nearly 25 % have the titles CEO, Chairman and President and 15% have the 
titles CEO and President. Figure 4.14 shows the descriptive statistics of the number of role 
titles. 
 
Figure 4.14 Descriptive statistics role titles 
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4.2.4 Data-Collection Determinant Growth 
 
The SDC/TOB (Securities Data Company/Thompson One Banker) database is used to obtain 
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) information for completed deals. SDC/TOB M&A database 
covers financial data, containing information on M&A transactions from 1979 to present for 
public and private US companies. Data is disclosed according to the SEC disclosing rules.  
 
Following prior research of Malmendier and Tate (Malmendier & Tate, 2008), two 
requirements are imposed for including an acquisition. The first requirement includes deals in 
which the acquiring company acquires more than fifty percent of the target shares. Acquiring 
less than fifty percent means that the acquiring company doesn’t control the targeted company 
and is not a determinant of a high narcissistic CEO.  Acquiring fifty percent or more implies 
control over the targeted company. This will be the aim of a high narcissistic CEO. The 
second requirement excludes acquisitions with deal values less than ten million dollars. These 
small acquisitions are omitted, because they do not require the active involvement of the 
acquirer’s CEO (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990).  
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The M&A data have been extracted from the SDC database for the period 1992 to 2008, 
imposing the two before mentioned filters. The extracted M&A data is matched with the 953 
sample CEOs which result into 2653 deals.  
 
Two M&A variables proxy the CEOs narcissistic personality. The first variable is the number 
of acquisitions per CEO during his tenure. The second variable is the value of the 
acquisitions. 
 
 
1 Number of Acquisitions 
 
Most deals are closed during the third and fourth tenure year. This is in line with Gabarro18 
(Gabarro, 1987) who argues that CEOs start to undertake major strategic actions during the 
third tenure year due to increased task knowledge and enhanced understanding of the 
environment.  
Table 4.9 Number of acquisitions per tenure year 
Tenure Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >10 
Number of Acquisitions 166 359 387 411 358 267 225 161 111 208 
 
 
The 1.68% female CEOs account for 56 acquisitions (2%) with an average value of $ 959 
million. The female CEOs acquire during their tenure on average a bit more with a slightly 
lower deal value compared to male CEOs. 
 
Table 4.10 Acquisition activity for male and female CEOs 
 Female CEOs Male CEOs 
Number of acquisitions 56 2597 
Average number per CEO 3.5 2.77 
Average deal value $ 959 million $ 1,008 million 
Average share %  95.7% 97.08% 
 
                                                 
18 The research of Gabarro is described in chapter 4.2 
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Most of the CEOs (± 50%) don’t acquire other companies. There are however CEOs with 
many acquisitions, even one CEO (Chambers of Cisco Systems Inc) with an average number 
of acquisitions of 7.71 during his tenure. The figure 4.15 below shows the average number of 
acquisitions. 
 
Figure 4.15 Descriptive statistics number of acquisitions 
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2 Value of Acquisitions 
 
The value of acquisitions determines the growth of the acquiring company. The average deal 
value for M&A deals is $ 1 billion. The minimum deal value is $ 10 million because of the 
imposed filter. Acquisitions worth less than $ 10 million are omitted, because the CEO is not 
actively involved (Morck et al., 1990). The maximum deal value is nearly $ 60 billion (Pfizer 
Inc acquiring Pharmacia Corp in 2003). The 2653 deals have varying deal values as the figure 
below depicts. 
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Figure 4.16 Descriptive statistics deal value acquisitions 
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4.2.5 Data-Collection Determinant Perquisites 
 
Data for corporate jet use is included in the SEC EDGAR database, the central source for 
electronically filed proxies. The data collection for the corporate jet use can be found in cases 
where companies comply with itemization and fill the SEC’s Edgar database chapter 
229.402.b.2.iiiC form DEF14a. The total value of perquisites must be disclosed according to 
the SEC regulations if the total value exceeds a threshold. The companies ‘compliance with 
this itemization requirement provides the data used in this study. The disclosing regulations 
became effective at the end of 1992, and most companies started applying them to their proxy 
filings in 1993. Coverage in the SEC’s EDGAR database begins one year later in 1994. There 
are no missing values for the corporate jet use, since this research collects data on perquisites 
of the last tenure year and CEOs are filtered from 1992 with a minimum tenure of 3 years.  
 
The total value of perquisites must be disclosed based upon their ‘‘aggregate incremental 
cost’’ to the company, but only if the total exceeds a threshold. Perquisites below the 
threshold may not be observed directly, because some companies disclose the perquisite total 
only after aggregating it with other data items reportable in the same column of the table.  
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The corporate jet is used by 318 CEOs (33%). Most CEOs (67%) don’t use a corporate jet (or 
the perquisite is not disclosed, because the amount does not exceed the threshold). This 
finding is in line with the research of Yermack (Yermack, 2006) who finds that 30% of the 
Fortune 500 CEOs use the corporate jet for personal use. 
 
 
The Threshold 
 
The threshold is adjusted several times which complicates the data collection. From 15 
December 2006, companies are required to identify perquisites in case the aggregate amount 
is $10,000 or higher. Prior to this date, the threshold requirement was 10 percent of total 
salary and bonus or $50,000 in value. The individual perquisite had to exceed 25% of the total 
perquisites in order for an individual perquisite to be described in a footnote under the 
compensation table. Many companies were allowed to only disclose the total amount in the 
“Other Annual Compensation” column without itemization the individual perquisites. The 
lower threshold of $10,000 forces companies to disclose a majority of their perquisites. With 
2006 compensation being the first period subject to the new rules, year-over-year value 
comparisons show an explosion in disclosures which can be attributed to the differences in 
reporting requirements between these years.  
 
In order to compare the individual CEOs with a tenure between 1992 and 2008 with changing 
disclosure rules, the disclosure threshold is reset at 50,000 dollar. There are 93 disclosures 
that fall in the range between $ 10,000 and $ 50,000, which implies that 225 (318-93) CEOs 
have  personal jet use disclosures above $ 50,000, while 728 CEOs do not disclose corporate 
jet use. Figure 4.17 shows the descriptive statistics for the private use of the corporate jet. 
Appendix VII gives more information about the changing disclosure rules. 
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Figure 4.17 Descriptive statistics corporate jet use 
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Resetting the threshold back to $ 50,000 results into 225 (318-93) disclosures with a mean 
value of $ 180,319. These 225 disclosures are included in the final dataset and these 225 
disclosures reflect the CEO narcissistic personality. Figure 4.18 includes the value of these 
225 disclosures. 
 
Figure 4.18 Descriptive statistics value of 225 disclosures of corporate jet use 
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4.3 Data Analysis: Developing a CEO Narcissism Score 
 
The underlying premise of this research is the upper echelon theory which is based on a 
combination of executive demographic constructs and psychological characteristics to predict 
organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The upper echelon theory assumes that 
the variance in executives’ personal characteristics yields differences in executives’ behavior. 
Narcissism is a personality dimension, implying that CEOs can score from low to high. The 
narcissism score of the 953 CEOs in this research sample must thus have a variance in order 
to be a useful addition to the research on top executives. This chapter documents the 
construction of the CEO Narcissism Score (CNS) for the 953 CEOs.  
 
 
4.3.1 CNS development 
 
The before mentioned fifteen variables are used as a proxy for CEO narcissism. Appendix VI 
includes the correlation matrix for the fifteen variables. The highest correlation (0.64) is found 
between the ratios of cash compensation and the ratio of total compensation. 
 A Principal Components Analysis is performed on these fifteen variables (based on the 
correlation matrix). Principal Components Analysis (further PCA) is a mathematical 
procedure that transforms possible correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated 
variables called principal components. PCA has two main applications. The first application is 
to reduce the number of variables. The second application is to detect structure in the 
relationships between variables.  
 
There are a number of criteria to decide upon the number of components to extract. The first 
is the Kaiser criterion which retains only factors with Eigenvalues greater than one, implying 
that they have more explanatory power than any of the variables by itself. Principal 
components 1 through 4 have Eigenvalues greater than one (ranging from 1.26 to 2.81).  
The second criterion is the scree test which tries to find the place where the smooth decrease 
of Eigenvalues appears to level off to the right of the plot. The Scree test shows that the 
smooth decrease of Eigenvalues levels off after the fifth principal component. The fifth 
principal component however has a small Eigenvalue and small factor loadings for the 
variables which have already appeared in the first four principle components with higher 
factor loadings. The third criterion is to look at the cumulative variance explained. The fourth 
99 
 
criterion is the extent to which a solution is interpretable. The interpretation of the four 
principle components is described under “naming the four principle components” on the next 
page.  
 
Following the last important argument of an interpretable solution and the Kaiser criterion, 
four principal components are selected. The 15 variables return in the first four principal 
components and appear only once in case factor loadings above 0.20 are considered. Table 
4.11 lists the factor loadings (above 0.20) used in order to score the CEOs. 
 
Table 4.11 Factor loadings four principal components (unrotated) 
Eigenvectors (loadings):      
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   
Publicity 0.406    
Awards 0.361    
Lines Biography 0.325    
Corporate Jet Use Corrected 0.251    
Cash Compensation 0.402    
Total Compensation 0.474    
Ratio Cash Compensation  0.608   
Ratio Total Compensation  0.479   
Rank Compensation  -0.432   
CEO Duality   0.617  
Role Titles   0.509  
Governance Index   0.261  
Photograph    0.408 
Value of Acquisitions    0.604 
Number of Acquisitions    0.514 
Eigenvalues 2.81 1.95 1.46 1.26 
 
 
The exploratory PCA on the fifteen variables shows satisfying results. The principal 
components have the expected signs and factor loadings which can be explained.  
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Naming the Four Principal Components 
 
The work of Emmons and his four components are used to name the 4 principal components. 
The first principal component shows high factor loadings for 3 media exposure determinants 
(publicity, awards and lines biography), the corporate jet use and the absolute amounts of 
compensation (cash compensation and total compensation). Most corresponding NPI items for 
the media exposure and the perquisite determinant are found in the self-admiration component 
of Emmons. For this reason, the first principal component is named “Self-admiration”.  
The second principal component shows high factor loadings for the compensation ratio’s 
(ratio of cash compensation and the ratio of total compensation) and the rank compensation. 
The rank compensation variable is supposed to have a negative sign19. Most corresponding 
NPI items for the compensation determinant are found in the entitlement component of 
Emmons. For this reason, the second principal component is named “Entitlement”.  
The third principal component shows factor loadings for CEO duality, role titles and the 
governance index of Gompers. Most corresponding NPI items for the power determinant are 
found in the authority component of Emmons. For this reason, the third principal component 
is named “Authority”.  
The fourth principal component shows factor loadings for the photo and the acquisitions in 
value and number. Most corresponding NPI items for the growth determinant are found in the 
superiority component of Emmons. For this reason, the fourth principal component is named 
“Superiority”.  
The fifteen variables are used as narcissism indicators, based on the four components of 
Emmons and the same four principle components are retrieved with a PCA on the 15 
variables.  
 
 
Narcissism Score Development 
 
In order to develop the CEO Narcissism Score, the factor loadings of the four principal 
components are used.  The factor loadings are multiplied by every variable for every 
individual CEO observation, resulting into four scores (one score per principal component) 
                                                 
19 A high rank implies that the CEO is not the best paid executive, which is a sign for low narcissism. The high 
narcissistic CEO will probably have a low rank (1), meaning that he is the best paid executive. A high ratio and a 
low rank imply that the CEO is the best paid executive. 
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for every CEO. These four scores are each normalized by subtracting the mean of the 
principal component and dividing it by the standard deviation of the principal component. The 
four standardized scores are added per CEO which results into one score. 
 
The CEO Narcissism Score (CNS) ranges from 0 to 20, with a mean of approximately 7. The 
score shows that CEOs differ in their narcissistic tendencies (standard deviation is 2.1). Figure 
4.19 depicts the descriptive statistics of the CEO Narcissism Score. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Descriptive statistics CNS 
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The 953 S&P500 CEOs differ in their narcissistic personal characteristics. The necessary 
condition of variance is fulfilled.  
The CEO narcissism score is in line with the estimate of psychologists that about 0.7% to 1%  
score extremely high on the narcissistic personality disorder (described in chapter 3.2). There 
are 11 CEOs (1.1%) with an extreme score that causes the skewness on the right hand sight.  
 
 
4.3.2 CNS and Fama French Industry Code  
 
The Fama French (FF) industry codes (included in Appendix IV) show varying narcissistic 
scores. Some industries have higher narcissistic scores, like FF code 6 (Business Equipment -- 
Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment) and 9 (Shops Wholesale, Retail, and Some 
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Services). FF Industries codes with lower narcissism scores are 4 (Energy, Oil, Gas, and Coal 
Extraction and Products), 5 (Chemicals and Allied Products) and 8 (Utilities).  Figure 4.20 
depicts the score per FF industry code. 
The lower and higher narcissism scores per industry can be explained by the research of 
Hambrick and Finkelstein. These researchers argue that executives do not always have 
latitude over their actions. The CEO actions and characteristics are more predictive in high 
discretion environments as the computer industry (FF code 9). In cases of low discretion, like 
gas (FF code 4), managerial actions become less important, because organizational and 
environmental factors influence the organizational outcome significantly. 
 
Figure 4.20 CNS and FF 
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4.3.3 CNS and Gender 
 
The research sample contains 16 female CEOs (1.68%), compared to 937 male CEOs. The 
narcissistic scores of female CEOs can be compared to male CEOs.  
 
Table 4.12 Male and Female CEO Narcissism Score 
 Range Mean St.dev 
MALE 0 - 20 7.1 2.1 
FEMALE 3.4 – 10.3  6.7 1.8 
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Female CEOs have a slightly lower narcissism scores compared to male CEOs. The results of 
a t-test show no significant difference in narcissism between male and female CEOs based on 
the relatively small number of female CEOs (16) in this research sample. 
 
 
4.3.4 CNS and Age 
 
The narcissistic scores can be detailed per age20 category. The age of the CEO starting the 
tenure is divided into 6 categories. The scores vary among the age categories as the figure 
4.21 depicts. 
 
Figure 4.21 CNS and CEO age 
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The age categories 3 and 4 (45 to 55 years) show the highest scores, while the first and last 
categories (younger than 40 or older than 60) show the lowest scores.  
 
 
4.3.5 CNS and Tenure 
 
The tenure21 varies for CEOs from 3 years to 17 years (mean 7.1 years). The theory of CEOs 
life cycle, which argues that CEOs need time to incorporate their paradigm, holds here as 
well. The score increases for CEOs with more than four tenure years. CEOs with a tenure 
                                                 
20 Descriptive statistics of age in chapter 4.2 
21 Descriptive statistics of tenure in chapter 4.2 
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longer than 12 years have a lower score. The underlying rationale might be that these CEOs 
are entrenched with the company (Weisbach, 1988). Another reason might be that CEOs with 
a very long tenure might have different personalities compared to CEOs with short tenures. 
The narcissistic scores vary with regard to the length of the tenure as figure 4.22 depicts. 
 
Figure 4.22 CNS and tenure 
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4.3.6 Scores for CEOs Serving Two Companies 
 
The research sample contains 18 CEOs who served two companies. These 18 CEOs have two 
narcissism scores which can be compared.  If narcissism is a stable construct, depending on 
the CEO only, the scores should remain the same. Figure 4.23 below shows that the 
narcissism scores of the 18 CEOs (serving at the first (1) and the second (2) company) are not 
stable when CEOs change companies.  
 
The fundaments for personal characteristics are established in early adulthood according to 
the DSM, but experiences may exert influence on the level of the personal characteristics. 
Narcissism scores fluctuate if external factors have influence. The narcissism level increases 
with every success which reinforces the sense of self-admiration (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). 
If the CEOs successfully incorporate their paradigm and the financial performance increases, 
the self-admiration is further bolstered. Being nominated in a second S&P500 company 
reflects the CEOs success. This success bolsters the sense of self-admiration which should 
results into increasing narcissism scores. Figure 4.23 shows the CNS for 18 CEOs during the 
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first (1) and the second (2) S&P500 company. For 13 CEOs, the CNS is increasing, while the 
CNS decreases for 5 CEOs.  
 
Figure 4.23 CNS for CEOs serving two companies 
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The narcissism increases with the success of 13 CEOs (72%). Alternative explanations are 
investigated for the 5 CEOs with a decreasing narcissism score. Table 4.13 lists the 5 CEOs 
with a decreasing CNS.  
 
Table 4.13 shows changing FF industry codes22 for two CEOs. For the other three CEOs, the 
FF industry code remains the same. The CNS does not show large variance across the FF 
industry types 6 and 7. Although the sample size is small, the type of industry has probably no 
influence on the decreasing narcissism scores. 
                                                 
22 FF industry codes and scores described in chapters 4.2 and 4.3.2 
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Table 4.13 Investigation decreasing CNS for 5 CEOs 
CEO FF industry Tenure ROA Tobin’s Q 
Capellas FF 6 Æ 7 T=3Æ3 50% lower 25% lower 
Lee FF same: 7 T=8Æ3 25% lower 17% lower 
Lockhart FF same: 3 T=3Æ6 82% lower 38% lower 
Myers FF same: 12 T=4Æ6 23% higher 42% higher 
Syron FF 6 Æ 11 T=4Æ5 same 27% lower 
 
 
The narcissism scores can decrease because of a shorter tenure or a very long tenure at the 
second company23.  The tenure only decreases in one case which makes the influence of 
tenure length as an explanation for the decreasing narcissism scores unlikely. 
 
In case the CEO is the founder of a company or the holder of substantial shares, the 
narcissism score might be lower. None of the five double CEOs are a founder or a substantial 
shareholder.  
 
The CEO narcissism scores might diminish under conditions of economic adversity. The five 
CEOs switch jobs in complete different years, so that economic adversity can be excluded as 
a possible explanation for the decreasing narcissism scores. 
 
Severe financial performance problems can reduce the narcissism level. This hypothesis can 
be tested by looking at the narcissism score for the CEO in the two different settings and 
investigating the financial performance of these companies. The ROA is lower for three CEOs 
in the second company, equals for one CEO and increases for one CEO in the second 
company. The Tobin’s Q is lower in four out of five cases.  
The low financial performance could be the underlying reason for the lower narcissism score. 
The decreasing narcissism score for CEO Meyers (with the exception of a higher Tobin’s Q at 
the second company) can alternatively be explained by the fact that CEO Meyers entered the 
second company (Waste Management Inc) after it faced an accounting scandal in 1998. It 
could be that this accounting scandal  influenced the compensation ratio’s, resulting in a CEO 
compensation that does not differ substantial from the second best paid and thus Meyers 
                                                 
23 FF tenure and scores described in chapters 4.2 and 4.3.5 
107 
 
scoring lower on principle component 2. The same line of reasoning applies to the power 
determinant: accounting scandals may lead to a lower governance index and the absence of 
CEO duality and thus Meyers scoring lower on principle component 3. 
 
The narcissism score increases for 13 out of 18 CEOs (72%) who served two companies 
during the sample period. The narcissism scores go together with lower financial performance 
(4 out of five cases have substantial lower Tobin’s Q). Further investigation with a larger 
sample is necessary.  
 
 
4.3.7 CNS and the NPI 
 
Leading psychologists (Maccoby, Kets de Vries) have identified a number of narcissists 
through interviews and inventories, like the NPI24. These well-known cases are compared to 
the narcissistic score developed in this research. These CEOs are also mentioned in chapter 2. 
Rosenthal and Pittinskey (2006) identify many narcissistic business leaders, including Steve 
Jobs, Michael Eisner, David Geffen and Kenneth Lay. Maccoby identifies Mike Armstrong, 
Joseph Nacchio, Carly Fiorina, Jack Welch, Sandy Weil and Conrad Black. The research 
sample contains Mike Armstrong, Carly Fiorina, Steve Jobs, Joseph Nacchio and Sandy 
Weil25. Four of these five CEOs have a top CEO narcissism score.  
 
Table 4.14 Identified narcissistic CEOs and the CNS 
CEO Name Narcissism Score Number Top 
Mike Armstrong  20 953 (highest score)  1% 
Carly Fiorina  8.9 827 15% 
Steve Jobs 13.1 934  2% 
Joseph Nacchio 14.3 943  1% 
Sandy Weil 15.9 947  1% 
 
 
                                                 
24 Narcissistic Personality Inventory  
25 The other 5 mentioned narcissistic business leaders are not included in this research sample because of the 
focus on S&P500 companies and the imposed filter of a tenure starting from 1992. 
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Although the test sample size is small, it confirms the theory that personal characteristics can 
be measured with objective variables. Construct validity can be further evidenced by later 
psychological inventory investigation or collecting the objective variables for narcissistic 
CEOs not included in the sample as Michael Eisner, David Geffen and Kenneth Lay. 
 
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion CEO Narcissism Score 
 
This part of the research empirically examines the construction of a CEO narcissism score.  
The first objective of this chapter is to collect variables which reflect CEO narcissism (4.1). 
Chapter 4.1 lists and analyses the fifteen variables for the narcissistic personality dimension 
of CEOs based on the 4 components of Emmons: I authority / leadership (I like to be the 
center of attention); II superiority / arrogance (I am better than others); III self-admiration (I 
am preoccupied with how extraordinary and special I am) and IV exploitativeness / 
entitlement (I insist upon getting the respect due to me).  
The second objective of this chapter is to describe the data collection and descriptive statistics 
of the fifteen variables (4.2).  
The third objective of this chapter is to score the CEOs according to their narcissistic 
personality dimension. An exploratory principal components analysis first reduces the fifteen 
variables into four principal components. The factor loadings have the expected signs and the 
15 variables return in four principal components. The four components are extracted based on 
the Kaiser criterion and on the base of an interpretable solution. The four components of 
Emmons are retrieved in the extracted four principal components and are named accordingly.  
The factor loadings are multiplied by the original individual CEO variables to obtain four 
scores per CEO. These scores are further normalized and summed in order to construct one 
narcissism score. The CEO narcissism score has the required variance.  
The scores are analyzed per Fama French Industry group, per CEO age category, per tenure 
and per gender.  
 
The research sample contains 18 CEOs who served two companies. These 18 CEOs have two 
narcissism scores for their first and second S&P500 company which can be compared. CEO 
narcissism is not stable, but rather dynamic as psychological literature suggests. The CNS for 
these 18 CEOs in their first and second S&P500 company differs. For 13 CEOs the CNS 
increases which can be explained by their success and the inherent reinforcement of self-
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admiration (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). For 5 CEOs, the CNS decreases which might be due 
to a low financial performance in their second S&P500 company which prevents a further 
bolstering of self-admiration. 
 
Leading psychologists have identified narcissists through interviews and inventories. It is 
reassuring to conclude that these narcissistic CEOs have a top score in this research as well. 
This finding provides evidence for the construct validity of the narcissism score established 
with objective variables.  
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Chapter 5 CEO Narcissism and Financial Performance 
 
The upper echelon theory argues that the top executives affect the organizational 
performance. The CEO is the most powerful member of the top executive team and can 
therefore have a profound influence on the organizational performance (Daily & Johnson, 
1997; Harrison et al., 1988; Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Daily and Johnson (Daily & Johnson, 
1997) regard the CEO as “THE corporate leader” who will impact organizational 
performance. This chapter investigates whether the CEOs narcissistic personality influences 
the financial performance. 
 
 
5.1 Positive or Negative Influence of CEO Narcissism on Financial Performance 
 
High narcissistic CEOs use their organizations as tools for achieving the highest possible 
narcissistic needs, being grandiosity, attention and applause. The narcissism construct is 
described in chapter 3 and Appendix I lists the narcissism criteria according to DSM-IV. High 
narcissistic CEOs initiate more changes, are looking for grandiosity and undertake bold 
actions which attract the attention the CEO needs (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). The 
question arises whether the net effect of CEO narcissism influence the financial performance 
positively or negatively. 
 
The actions of narcissistic CEOs result into positive financial outcomes if the productive 
narcissist theory of Maccoby (Maccoby, 2001; Maccoby, 2003) is taken as a basis (Higgs, 
2009). According to this productive theory, high narcissistic CEOs will show positive 
organizational outcomes. However, the presence of narcissistic CEOs and their subsequent 
decline suggests that there must be negative aspects of narcissism as well.  
Several researchers elaborate on these positive and negative elements of narcissism. Chapter 
3.2 includes the literature review regarding these positive and negative aspects. The positive 
aspects have been labeled productive (Maccoby, 2003), healthy (Lubit, 2002) or constructive 
(Kets de Vries, 1997; Kets de Vries, 1994). The negative aspects have been labeled 
destructive or reactive. According to Kets de Vries, narcissism is the real problem for many 
CEOs, because narcissism is a necessary ingredient for effective leadership but also an 
addictive drug with the potential danger of a destructive overdose. 
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The bold actions of the high narcissistic CEOs affect the financial performance, although the 
direction is not a priori clear. This chapter investigates the hypothesis whether a high 
narcissistic CEO shows a diverging financial performance compared to a low narcissistic 
CEO. This first research question explains the overall average effect of CEO narcissism on 
the financial performance. The second research question investigates the productive versus 
destructive forms of narcissism. The performance measures are first described. 
 
 
Two Performance Measures 
 
The Tobin’s Q and the Return on Assets are two performance measures that have been widely 
used to investigate the CEO-effects (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
The Tobin’s Q is a market based measure which is used to proxy the organizational 
performance. Tobin’s Q is used by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1990), Yermack (Yermack, 1997), Kaplan and Zingales (S. N. Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) and various other researchers. 
Tobin’s Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
(Compustat item 6). Market value is defined as the book value of assets (Compustat item 6) + 
market value of common equity (Compustat item 24 * Compustat item 25) - sum of book 
value of common equity (Compustat item 60). 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) is an accounting based measure which gives an indication of the 
efficiency of generating income with the available assets. The ROA is calculated by dividing 
the net income (Compustat item 172) by the total assets (Compustat item 6).  
ROA is together with Return on Equity (ROE) the most explanatory criterion with respect to 
financial performance (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). The ROE is used to 
check the robustness of the results. Paul (Paul, 1992) argues that ROA is the best informative 
performance measure for executives’ value addition.  
 
The Tobin’s Q and ROA are two different measures. The Tobin’s Q is a measure of the 
market expectation and is therefore by definition forward looking. Due to the fluctuation of 
the market capitalization, the Tobin’s Q is a very hybrid performance measure.  
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The accounting measures ROA, ROE and ROS provide a view of the actual managerial 
achievements and is by definition backward looking (Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2010; 
Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). 
 
The two measures, Tobin’s Q and ROA, are used in order to test the relationship between 
CEO narcissism and the financial performance. All financial data are downloaded from 
Compustat. 
 
 
The long term impact of CEO narcissism 
 
Leadership research is often too static (Hunt & Dodge, 2000) while performance linkages to 
leadership should be based on a long-term view (Lord & Maher, 1994). 
Most studies measure certain managerial characteristics and focus on the following year’s 
financial performance. However, the important question regarding CEO-effects is the 
persistence of profits. The CEO-effect of the narcissistic personality on the financial 
performance has a long term impact. The financial performance is averaged per CEO over the 
tenure. 
 
 
Financial Performance for Low and High Narcissistic CEOs 
 
The CEO is the most powerful member of the top executive team and impacts the 
organizational performance (Daily & Johnson, 1997). The direction to which CEO narcissism 
affects financial performance is not a priori clear due to the positive as well as negative 
aspects of CEO narcissism. The question arises whether narcissistic CEOs show on average a 
higher or lower financial performance. The CEO Narcissism Score (CNS) developed in 
chapter 4 is used as a degree of CEO narcissism and the scores of the 953 CEOs are divided 
into deciles. CEOs are categorized as high narcissistic if their scores fall into the top deciles. 
CEOs are categorized as low narcissistic if their scores fall into the bottom deciles. Figure 5.1 
shows the average performance measured in Tobin’s Q and ROA for low and high narcissistic 
CEOs. 
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Figure 5.1 Average Tobin’s Q and ROA for top/bottom deciles 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
low high
Average Tobin's Q
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
low high
Average ROA
 
 
 
The top deciles CEOs score on average lower than the CEOs in the bottom deciles when 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are used as performance measures. The average Tobin’s Q for low and 
high narcissistic CEOs is 2.04 and 1.51 respectively. The average ROA for low and high 
narcissistic CEOs is 0.027 and 0.019 respectively. The figures show that low narcissistic 
CEOs perform on average better (measured in Tobin’s Q as well as in ROA). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a  
 
The average financial performance indicates a negative relation between CEO narcissism and 
financial performance. Therefore, this research tests the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  high narcissistic CEOs show lower financial performances than low 
narcissistic CEOs. 
 
 
5.2 Methodology CEO Narcissism and Financial Performance 
 
The CEO Narcissism Score (CNS), developed in chapter 4, proxies the CEO narcissism and is 
used as an independent variable. The performance measures ROA and Tobin’s Q are averaged 
over the tenure for each CEO and used as dependent variables. The underlying reason for 
averaging the performance variables over the tenure is the fact that narcissistic leadership has 
a long term impact on the financial results.  
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Control Variables 
 
There are four control variables included in the model, because these variables are potentially 
able to influence the financial performance measures. 
The first control variable is CEO tenure, because financial performance can be affected by 
life-cycle learning.  
The second control variable is the CEO age, because the bold and strategic actions of CEOs 
vary with age.  
The third control variable is the company size, proxied by the log of sales. The log of sales is 
preferred above the log of assets to control for company size for two reasons. First, the log of 
sales is a better indicator of organizational size in case the human capital provides the 
turnover. In these companies, e.g. service companies, few assets are activated on the balance 
sheets while a substantial turnover is possible through the utilization of human capital. 
Second, the dependent variable Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of total assets and book 
value of total assets. Tobin’s Q already contains the total assets variable. A mechanical 
relation arises if the book value of total assets is used in the dependent variable on the left 
hand side of the equation and as a control variable on the right hand side of the equation 
(Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). 
The fourth control variable includes the 12 Fama French industry groups. The industry control 
variables take specific economic environments into account. Companies operating in the same 
industry have the same production technologies and market conditions.  
 
 
Model 
 
The financial performance measures are regressed using OLS on the following equations. 
 
Tobin’s Q =  D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO AGE] + J [SALESLOG] + G [FF-Ind] + C 
ROA =   D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO AGE] + J [SALESLOG] + G [FF-Ind] + C 
 
Where CNS is the CEO Narcissism Score developed in chapter 4, TENURE is the number of 
years the CEO serves on the job, CEO AGE is the age of the CEO starting the tenure, 
SALESLOG is the average log of sales during the CEO tenure and FF-Ind represents the 12 
Fama French industries as outlined in appendix IV.  
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Results 
 
The regressions are performed for the Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The results are listed 
in table 5.1 on page 117. 
 
 
Tobin’s Q:  
The CEO narcissism score has the hypothesized negative effect (D=-0.027) on financial 
performance measured in Tobin’s Q. This effect is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 
0.2751.  The hypothesized negative effect of CEO narcissism is present but statistically 
insignificant. Hence, the hypothesis is not be accepted using Tobin’s Q.  
 
ROA: 
The CEO narcissism score has again the hypothesized negative effect (D=-0.0041) on 
financial performance measured in ROA. This effect is statistically significant with a p-value 
of 0.0217. CEO narcissism has a negative effect of on performance measured in ROA. The 
hypothesis is accepted using ROA as performance measure.  
 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
A number of additional tests are performed in order to validate the robustness of the results.  
The first robustness check includes two additional financial performance measures: Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Return on Sales (ROS). The ROE and the ROS are commonly applied 
measures in the evaluation of firm performance (Waldman, Javidan, & Varella, 2004). 
ROE is a measure of the profitability of the shareholders’ invested capital and is derived by 
dividing net income (Compustat item 172) by shareholders’ equity (Compustat item 60). The 
ROE is an indicator of the effective use of shareholders’ wealth. The ROS is a measure of the 
profitability of sales and is derived by dividing net income (Compustat item 172) by sales 
(Compustat item 12).  
The ROS and the ROE are related measures, but have varying results. A high capital intensive 
company can have a low ROE and a high ROS at the same time, while a service provider with 
low capital requirements can show a high ROE and a low ROS simultaneously.  
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The accounting based measures ROA, ROE and ROS are widely used in prior research on 
CEO-effects (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). 
  
The regression of the CNS on financial performance measures are iterated with the two other 
performance measures using OLS on the following equations. 
 
 
ROE =   D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO AGE] + J [SALESLOG] + G [FF-Ind] + C 
ROS =   D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO AGE] + J [SALESLOG] + G [FF-Ind] + C 
 
 
The results of the regression analysis are included in table 5.1 on page 117.  
The CEO narcissism score has the hypothesized negative effect on financial performance 
measured in ROE with a negative parameter of D=-0.0017. This effect is statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.0335.  
For ROS, the results are similar. CNS is again negatively related with financial performance 
with a parameter D=-0.0306 and a p-value of 0.  
 
The significant effect of CEO narcissism on the financial performance is robust when the 
performance measure ROA is substituted with ROE or ROS.  
The second robustness check is performed by adding additional control variables, such as the 
calendar year or omitting control variables such as CEO age and CEO tenure. The adding or 
omitting of control variables does not change the statistically significant negative relationship 
between the CNS and the financial accounting performance measures. 
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Table 5.1 Linear regressions on ROA, Tobin’s Q, ROS and ROE 
Variable ROA Tobin's Q Variable ROS ROE 
                
CNS -0.0041**   -0.0270 CNS -0.0306***   -0.0017** 
  (0.0018)   (0.0248)   (0.0079)   (0.0008) 
CEO Tenure 0.0031**   0.0588*** CEO Tenure 0.0088   0.0017*** 
  (0.0013)   (0.0176)   (0.0056)   (0.0006 
CEO Age -0.0002   -0.0133 CEO Age -0.0021   0.0001 
  (0.0006)   (0.0085)   (0.0027)   (0.0003) 
SalesLog 0.0072**   -0.2093*** SalesLog 0.0419***   0.0029** 
  (0.0031)   (0.0438)   (0.0140)   (0.0014) 
FF1 0.0383**   0.2667 FF1 0.0169   0.0201** 
  (0.0174)   (0.2450)   (0.0782)   (0.0079) 
FF2 -0.0071   -0.2845 FF2 -0.0188   0.0010 
  (0.022)   (0.3089)   (0.0986)   (0.0099) 
FF3 0.0086   -0.3149 FF3 0.0095   0.0145** 
  (0.0152)   (0.2134)   (0.0682)   (0.0068) 
FF4 0.0112   -0.2836 FF4 0.0131   0.0206** 
  (0.0211)   (0.2963)   (0.0946)   (0.0095) 
FF5 0.0366   0.0390 FF5 0.0372   0.0251*** 
  (0.0215)   (0.3021)   (0.0965)   (0.0097) 
FF6 -0.0311**   1.0677*** FF6 -0.1712**   -0.0113* 
  (0.0151)   (0.2121)   (0.0677)   (0.0068) 
FF7 -0.0024   0.0918 FF7 -0.0609   0.0034 
  (0.0234)   (0.3291)   (0.1051)   (0.0105) 
FF8 -0.0132   -0.6849*** FF8 0.0034   0.0087 
  (0.0176)   (0.2478)   (0.0791)   (0.0079) 
FF9 0.0126   0.1799 FF9 -0.0433   0.0114 
  (0.0162)   (0.2277)   (0.0727)   (0.0073) 
FF10 0.0384**   1.0672*** FF10 0.0876   0.0141* 
  (0.0176)   (0.2477)   (0.0791)   (0.0079) 
FF11 -0.0137   -0.5944*** FF11 0.0735   0.0042 
  (0.0152)   (0.2138)   (0.0683)   (0.0069) 
C -0.0087   4.2374*** C -0.0492   -0.0198 
  (0.0423)   (0.5937)   (0.1896)   (0.0190) 
                
R2 0.0541   0.2019 R2 0.0474   0.0608 
              
Standard Errors in Parentheses, n=953, *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Concluding Remarks Concerning the Linear Relation  
 
The first research question tests the hypothesis whether high narcissistic CEOs show on 
average lower financial performances compared to low narcissistic CEOs. The results indicate 
that CEO narcissism is negatively related to all financial performance measures. This effect is 
statistically significant for the accounting performance measure ROA. The additional analyses 
using ROE and ROS and other sensitivity checks show that the results are robust. The 
negative effect of CEO narcissism on the Tobin’s Q is statistically insignificant, which may 
be due to the hybrid character (due to fluctuation of the market capitalization) of this 
performance measure. The hypothesis is accepted using the accounting performance 
measures. CEOs with a high narcissistic personality show a lower financial performance.   
 
 
5.3 Productive versus Reactive Narcissism 
 
The presence of narcissistic CEOs and their subsequent decline elucidates the existence of 
positive as well as negative aspects of CEO narcissism. Researchers (Kets de Vries, 1997; 
Kets de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003) acknowledge that the positive aspects of 
narcissism can be outweighed by the negative aspects of narcissism. These productive and 
destructive aspects of narcissism are described in chapter 3.2.3.  
Productive narcissism might result into higher performance (Maccoby, 2003) whereas non-
productive (destructive) narcissism might result into lower performance (Rosenthal and 
Pittinsky, 2006).  
According to Kets de Vries, narcissism is a real problem for many CEOs, because narcissism 
is a necessary ingredient for effective leadership but also an addictive drug with the potential 
danger of an overdose. Without some level of narcissism, leadership will remain ineffective or 
even impossible. A high level of narcissism can become a real problem in case leaders loose 
contact with reality, start living in their own lives, and cultivate hubris and an obsession for 
greed.  
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5.4 Methodology Productive/Destructive CEO Narcissism and Financial Performance 
 
The results of the first research question indicate a negative linear relationship between CEO 
narcissism and financial performance without considering the potential positive outcomes of 
CEO narcissism. A positive influence on the financial performance is to be expected because 
narcissism is a requisite for effective leadership as outlined in chapter 3. In addition hereto, 
the second research question concerns the psychological perspective whether some level of 
narcissism indeed forms a necessary ingredient for effective CEO leadership. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  moderate levels of CEO narcissism will be positively related to the 
financial performance, whereas very low or very high levels of CEO 
narcissism will be negatively related to the financial performance. 
 
The linear regression equation documented in chapter 5.3 is therefore changed into a 
quadratic regression. 
 
ROA =   D1 [CNS^2] + D2 [(CNS)] +  E [TENURE] + I [CEO AGE] + J [SALESLOG] 
+ G [FF-Ind] + C 
  
Table 5.2 on page 121 shows the results of this regression. Included in table 5.2 are the 
sequential regressions on the accounting performance measures: first the regression with 
control variables only (model 1); second the linear regression with CNS (model 2) and third 
the quadratic regression with CNS^2 (model 3). 
 
The results of the quadratic regression show a negative sign for D1 (-0.0011) and a positive 
sign for D2 (0.0156). The p-values are 0.0008 and 0.0104 respectively. The sign for D1 is 
negative and the sign for D2 is positive, which indicates a concave parabola. The quadratic 
regression gives a better fit than the linear regression: the R2 increases from 5.4 to 6.6%.  
The R2 change = .01, F (1,936) = 11.42, p = .001. 
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ROS and ROE 
 
The quadratic regression is also performed for the Tobin’s Q and the other two accounting 
performance measures ROE and ROS. The results for the Tobin’s Q are not displayed because 
the fit of the model and the significance decrease substantial. Again, the hybrid character (due 
to fluctuation of the market capitalization) of this performance measure might be the 
underlying reason. The results for the two accounting performance measures ROE and ROS 
are included in table 5.2. The quadratic regressions for ROE and ROS give a better fit than the 
linear regression: the  R2  increases and the results are statistically significant. For ROS: R2 
change = .01, F (1,936) = 10.95, p = .001. For ROE: R2 change = .01, F (1,936) = 12.04, p = .001. 
For ROE, the parameter D1 is negative and statistically significant (p-value is 0.0005) and the 
parameter D2 is positive and statistically significant (p-value is 0.007). 
For ROS, the parameter D1 is negative and statistically significant (p-value is 0.001) and the 
parameter D2 is positive and statistically significant (p-value is 0.041). 
 
 
CNS Optimum 
 
The parabola gives information about the saturation point up to where narcissism is 
productive and thereafter reactive. The saturation point is at the optimum of the parabola. The 
optimum can be derived by differentiating the parabola and setting the derivative to zero. 
For ROA, the optimal CNS will be at [2*-0.0011 (CNS)]= -0.0156 Æ CNS=7.0909 which is 
slightly above the mean CNS. On average, companies know well how to estimate CEO 
narcissism. There are 508 CEOs (53%) scoring below the optimum and 445 CEOs (47%) 
scoring above the optimum. The turning point of 7.09 for ROA is close to the mean CNS 
which is an indication of the reliability of the findings (Meyer, 2009).  
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Table 5.2 Linear and Quadratic Regressions on ROA, ROE and ROS 
ROA ROE ROS
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
CNS^2 -0.0011*** -0.0005*** -0.0049***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0015)
CNS -0.0041** 0.0156*** -0.0017** 0.0074*** -0.0306*** 0.0557**
(0.0018) (0.0061) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0079) (0.0272)
CEO Tenure 0.0029** 0.0031** 0.0033*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0071 0.0088 0.0095*
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056)
CEO  Age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0018
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
SalesLog 0.0054* 0.0072** 0.0069** 0.0021 0.0029** 0.0028** 0.0286** 0.0419*** 0.0407***
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0139)
FF1 0.0397** 0.0383** 0.0383** 0.0207*** 0.0201** 0.0201** 0.0273 0.0169 0.0168
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0788) (0.0782) (0.0778)
FF2 -0.0063 -0.0071 -0.0085 0.0013 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0103 -0.0188 -0.0249
(0.0220) (0.022) (0.0219) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0994) (0.0986) (0.0981)
FF3 0.0070 0.0086 0.0050 0.0138** 0.0145** 0.0128* -0.0030 0.0095 0.0116
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0686) (0.0682) (0.0941)
FF4 0.0103 0.0112 0.0109 0.0202** 0.0206** 0.0205** 0.0061 0.0131 -0.0067
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0953) (0.0946) (0.0680)
FF5 0.0352 0.0366 0.0345 0.0246** 0.0251*** 0.0242** 0.0270 0.0372 0.0282
(0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0971) (0.0965) (0.0960)
FF6 -0.0317** -0.0311** -0.0288* -0.0115* -0.0113* -0.0102 -0.1754** -0.1712** -0.1612**
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0682) (0.0677) (0.0674)
FF7 -0.0064 -0.0024 0.0026 0.0017 0.0034 0.0057 -0.0912 -0.0609 -0.0388
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.1056) (0.1051) (0.1048)
FF8 -0.0116 -0.0132 -0.0137 0.0094 0.0087 0.0084 0.0151 0.0034 0.0009
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0796) (0.0791) (0.0787)
FF9 0.0143 0.0126 0.0146 0.0121* 0.0114 0.0123* -0.0300 -0.0433 -0.0343
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0732) (0.0727) (0.0724)
FF10 0.0354** 0.0384** 0.0359** 0.0129 0.0141* 0.0130 0.0651 0.0876 0.0765
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0795) (0.0791) (0.0788)
FF11 -0.0138 -0.0137 -0.0141 0.0042 0.0042 0.0040 0.0730 0.0735 0.0718
(0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0688) (0.0683) (0.0679)
C -0.0183 -0.0087 -0.0887* -0.0238 -0.0198 -0.0567*** -0.1218 -0.0492 -0.4006*
(0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0483) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.1901) (0.1896) (0.2164)
R^2 0.0488 0.0541 0.066 0.0563 0.0608 0.0728 0.0321 0.0474 0.0584
n=953 Standard Errors in Parentheses * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01  
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5.5 Summary and Conclusion CEO Narcissism and Financial Performance 
 
This chapter first performs a linear regression analysis of the CEO narcissism score on the 
financial performance in order to test the hypothesis whether high narcissistic CEOs show 
lower financial performances compared to low narcissistic CEOs. The results show a negative 
relationship between CEO narcissism and the financial performance measures. The effect is 
statistically insignificant for the Tobin’s Q, which may be due to the hybrid character (due to 
fluctuation of the market capitalization) of this market performance measure. The effect is 
statistically significant for the three used accounting measures ROA, ROE and ROS. 
 
CEOs with a high narcissistic personality affect the financial performance positively if the 
productive narcissist school of Maccoby is taken as a basis. However, the presence of 
narcissistic CEOs and their subsequent decline suggests the existence of positive as well as 
negative aspects of CEO narcissism. Several researchers advert to the potential productive and 
destructive aspects of narcissism. Narcissism is a necessary element for effective leadership 
but also an addictive drug with the potential danger of an addictive overdose which may result 
into destructive behavior. This intricate connection between narcissistic leadership and 
performance is analyzed by performing a quadratic regression. The results show that a 
concave parabola forms a better fit than the linear model.  
The saturation point up to where narcissism is productive and thereafter destructive is slightly 
above the mean CNS which is an indication of the reliability of the findings (Meyer, 2009).  
The CEO narcissism and its productive influence on the financial performance are on average 
well estimated by the S&P500 companies in the CEO selection.  
 
The conclusion can be drawn that moderate levels of CEO narcissism show higher financial 
performances while very low or very high levels of CEO narcissism show lower financial 
performances. An intricate connection between leadership and narcissism exists: having too 
little narcissism can destruct the CEO effectiveness; having too much may destroy the CEO 
ability as well.  
The empirical results are in line with the psychological perspective, stating that some 
narcissism is required for effective leadership, while high levels of narcissism can become 
destructive. The equilibrium must be found and constantly monitored. The next chapter 
explores whether this equilibrium is monitored by the board of directors. 
123 
 
Chapter 6 CEO Narcissism and Countervailing Power 
 
The board size and the board composition determine the board structure and affect the 
monitoring capabilities of the board. The board’s monitoring capabilities influence the extent 
to which the board is able to exercise power and to control the managerial actions. The board 
structure reflects the countervailing power26 of the board.  
The board structure varies per company, because the board has to accommodate to the 
organizational size, the monitoring and managerial characteristics (Daily & Johnson, 1997). 
The research about optimal board structures remains inconclusive, because unexplained 
determinants or idiosyncratic factors affecting board structures have not been investigated 
(Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). 
 
The variance of managerial characteristics can be an unexplained determinant or idiosyncratic 
factor affecting the board structure. This chapter focuses on whether the managerial 
characteristics, in particular the CEOs narcissistic personality, affect the board structure and 
therewith the countervailing power of the board. The following first elaborates on the power 
balance between the CEO and the board and the relevance of managerial characteristics on 
board composition.  
 
 
6.1 The Power Balance between the Board and the CEO 
 
The board of directors has various functions. The board has to select, evaluate and replace (if 
necessary) the CEO, approve the financial statements and advice, determine executive 
compensation and take care of succession planning. All these functions of the board can be 
divided into monitoring and advising functions (Adams, & Ferreira, 2007). The monitoring 
function includes all activities aimed at preventing managerial harmful behavior. The advising 
function includes all activities aimed at improving managerial decision making. The board 
has, in theory, the ability to hire and fire executives and is therefore a powerful actor. In 
practice however, CEOs exert considerable influence over the boards, for example by limiting 
specific information to the board (Mace, 1971). This influence may prevent effective board 
monitoring.  
                                                 
26 Countervailing power is defined as the power of one individual/group to check or restrain the actions made by 
another individual/group.  
124 
 
The extent to which CEOs can exert their influence depends on the power balance between 
the CEO and the board.  
 
CEOs might strive to maximize their personal benefits in case they have the ability to exert 
their influence and to pack their boards. A principal-agent dilemma lies in wait.  
Powerful boards are a necessary ingredient for effective performance because of four reasons 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1991). First, a powerful board provides business contacts which can be 
useful. Second, a powerful board determines the organizational mission. Third, a powerful 
board provides the “checks and balances”. Fourth, a powerful board create a corporate 
identity by being the “brain and soul” of the organization.  
Pearce and Zahra developed a typology of CEO power (vertical y-as) versus board power 
(horizontal x-as), resulting into a 2x2 matrix as depicted in figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1 CEO/Board Power 
Statutory Participative
ProactiveCaretaker
High CEO
power
High board
power
Low CEO
power
Low board
power
 
 
Source: Pearce et al. (1991) amended 
 
 
If neither the CEO nor the board have power, the board is merely a legal necessity and 
incapable of decision making power. In these caretaker boards, the process of decision 
making can be viewed as a formality and these boards will therefore not contribute to 
effective performance.  
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High board power combined with low CEO power is the proactive situation. The power of the 
board surpasses the power of the CEO. The proactive board type is a basis for good corporate 
governance.  
Participative boards are characterized by high power of CEO and board, which will lead to 
debate, disagreement and many discussions.  
In the statutory typology, the CEO holds all the power and the board functions as “rubber 
stamps”. The board’s monitoring of executives serves merely a ceremonial function which 
will keep up the false appearance of legitimate managerial decisions. 
 
Although four types of CEO versus board power exist that have been empirically validated, 
the CEO is the real power broker (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). The CEO is able to influence the 
board structure and a high narcissistic CEO will direct towards the statutory type.  
 
 
Towards the Statutory Type 
 
Narcissistic CEOs have the drive to attain power and prestige (Lubit, 2002; Rosenthal & 
Pittinsky, 2006). The power of the CEO with its board members influences the board structure 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) and is defined as the negotiation hypothesis by Boone 
(Boone et al., 2007). The power gives high narcissistic CEOs a pivotal role to move towards 
the statutory type.  
 
A high narcissistic CEO starting in a caretaker board with low board power, will directly get a 
hold on the power and move towards a statutory situation.  
The proactive situation is difficult for a high narcissistic CEO, because the power of the board 
surpasses the power of the CEO. The proactive board will probably not select a high 
narcissistic CEO in the first place. In rare cases, the CEO can develop a star status because of 
good financial performance which is attributed to the CEO combined with good publicity and 
awards. After a few tenure years, the CEO has fulfilled the expectations of the board and the 
shareholders and the CEO is now in the position to develop various power competences. The 
board has increased its confidence in the CEO and may become less vigilant in monitoring, 
while the CEO gains more influence in selecting directors. The selected board members may 
be sympathetic to the CEO or passive in monitoring (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). The selection 
process will in turn again strengthen the power of the CEO. The CEO will be capable of 
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ultimately reducing the relative power of the board, opening the way to become a high 
narcissistic CEO and directing towards a statutory typology.  
Participative boards will lead to debate, disagreement and many discussions. The high 
narcissistic CEO, attributing the success to himself (internal attribution) is inclined to replace 
the powerful board by board directors who follow him in the debate and discussions. The 
CEO will hereby undermine the power position of the board and direct towards the statutory 
type.  
 
The biggest problem for high narcissistic CEOs is not their tendency for glory and honor, but 
rather the fact they will not tolerate contradiction. The checks and balances hereby disappear 
and the power of the CEO is no longer monitored. The high narcissistic CEO will have more 
power than the board. The board will have less monitoring power and will fail to function as a 
critical instrument of corporate governance.  
The board and the high narcissistic CEO tend to have the statutory typology, since the CEO 
has all the power, leaving the board to function as “rubber stamps” of his decisions. The 
board’s monitoring of executives serves merely a ceremonial function which will keep up the 
false appearance of legitimate managerial decisions.  
 
 
6.2 CEO Narcissism and Countervailing Power 
 
The framework27 of the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism hypothesized that 
countervailing power is a necessary ingredient for CEOs to restrain their narcissistic 
tendencies. The absence of countervailing power enables CEOs to act in their own self-
interest, from shirking to fraud.  
 
The high narcissistic CEO can be compared with Icarus who had his father warning him not 
to fly too high when he was still on the ground. Unfortunately, Icarus didn’t listen. High in the 
sky, Icarus had no one left to warn him. Likewise, high narcissistic CEOs do not listen to their 
board members and try to reduce the countervailing power by appointing board members who 
will not thwart them in any way. In time, the countervailing power will be minimized, 
because the high narcissistic CEOs are surrounded by followers and sycophants.  
                                                 
27 The framework of the causes and consequences of CEO narcissism is developed in chapter 3 and visualized in 
figure 3.3 on page 56 
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Hypothesis 
 
This chapter tests the relationship between the CEO narcissism score and countervailing 
power. The narcissistic personality dimension of 953 S&P500 CEOs is scored in chapter 4 
and this score is used as a proxy for the CEOs narcissistic tendencies. In case the narcissistic 
tendencies of CEOs are potentially able to influence the board structure, a significant 
difference in board size and board composition is to be expected. The following hypothesis is 
formulated. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: High narcissistic CEOs have substantial less countervailing power in their 
boards compared to low narcissistic CEOs. 
 
 
Various interviews with (former) board members confirm the hypothesis that CEOs develop a 
star status in case the CEOs exhibit a certain level of narcissistic personality traits combined 
with the failure of self-reflection and the absence of countervailing power. The absence of 
reality checks could be disastrous. The countervailing power is often suboptimal since the 
“very psychology of the board is tilted towards supporting the chief executive” (Marnet, 2008, 
page 134). High narcissistic CEOs take advantage of this situation by increasing their power. 
 
The board size and the board composition is investigated in order to test the hypothesis that 
high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing power in their boards. The board size and the 
board compositions of high narcissistic CEOs must have distinctive patterns compared to the 
board size and the board compositions of low narcissistic CEOs. 
 
 
6.2.1 Board Size 
 
Effective board monitoring is reduced in case of many board members, because individual 
board members are less likely to be held accountable (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; 
Yermack, 1996). A large board increases the agency problems like free riding. Jensen (Jensen, 
1993) argues that larger boards are less effective compared to smaller boards because of the 
coordination costs and free-rider problems. A large board also leads to extra compensation 
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costs. Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983) suggests that board members of large boards are more 
likely to be manipulated by top management. Smaller boards are more cohesive, more 
productive and more capable in monitoring (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). 
 
These considerations do not explain the presence of large boards in practice. Speaking in the 
words of Hermalin and Weisbach (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003): economic Darwinism has 
not eliminated large boards as unfit organization forms. The underlying reason for the 
presence of large boards can be found in the increased information requirements of large 
organizations (Dalton et al., 1999; Fama & Jensen, 1983). This implies the need to include the 
organizational size as a control variable in the analysis which will described later. 
 
A board with 8 or fewer members has greater focus and participation, genuine interaction and 
debate (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994). Lipton and Lorsch (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) suggest 
that a board size of 8 or 9 members is most effective, giving all board members enough time 
to express their opinions during board meetings. Jensen (Jensen, 1993) comes to 
approximately the same conclusion when he suggests a board size of 7 or 8 to be effective. 
Jensen argues that a larger board size is easier to control by the CEO.  The countervailing 
power is thus reduced when the board size increases. Therefore the following hypothesis is 
formulated. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  High narcissistic CEOs have larger board sizes than low narcissistic 
CEOs.  
6.2.2 Board Composition 
 
The extent to which the board members are independent of the CEO determines the 
composition of the board (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). According to agency 
theorists, boards can only be able of effective in monitoring in case board members are 
independent (Fama, 1980). Research concerning board independency is mostly based on the 
number of outside directors versus inside directors. The functions of inside and outside 
directors vary; outside directors monitor management and advice the CEO, inside directors 
are supposed to inform the outside directors (Mace, 1971). Outside directors are assumed to 
be more independent compared to inside directors.  
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The appointment of directors is voted upon by the shareholders in a general meeting. The 
available directors to vote on are largely selected by either the whole board or a nominating 
committee. Directors are in practice not selected by the shareholders, but by the top 
executives they are supposed to monitor. The existence of a nominating committee does not 
change the CEO influence in the selection process, because the nominating committee 
receives their input from the CEO (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Mace (Mace, 1991) 
provides anecdotal evidence of CEOs who select board candidates. Similarly, Lorsch and 
MacIver (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) and Shivdasani and Yermack (Shivdasani & Yermack, 
1999)  provide survey evidence of CEO influence in the selection of new board members.  
 
High narcissistic CEOs select followers on their boards. These followers might be inside as 
well as outside directors, e.g. acquaintances or former college friends of the CEO. The 
independency of outside directors hereby disappears. This research therefore uses another 
distinction of independent versus interdependent directors.  
 
 
Board Interdependency 
 
Interdependent directors are appointed by the current CEO and independent directors are not 
appointed by the current CEO (Daily & Dalton, 1994). CEOs have an important role in 
appointing individual board members (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). These board directors are 
assumed to be more sympathetic to the CEO. The interdependent directors feel loyal to their 
CEO because of their appointment (Boeker, 1992).  
 
The feelings of loyalty can be explained by the norm of reciprocity as explained by Gouldner    
(Gouldner, 1960). The norm of reciprocity implies that interdependent board members feel a 
reciprocal obligation to the CEO which will reduce overt criticism towards the CEO. As a 
consequence, these interdependent board members fail to monitor the CEO effectively and 
become followers. 
 
The loyalty of interdependent board members towards the CEO affects the critical monitoring, 
because the interdependent board members are more likely to tolerate managerial 
opportunism at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. The power of the CEO increases as board 
members feel loyal to their CEO (Boeker, 1992). The countervailing power of the board 
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decreases and the likelihood of CEO dismissal diminishes in case the board consists of many 
interdependent board members. 
 
Several papers document the importance of interdependency. Mace (Mace, 1971) argues that 
the selection of board members by the CEO affects the independence of the board. Wade, 
O’Reilly and Chandratat (Wade, O'Reilly III, & Chandratat, 1990) state that CEOs feel 
comfortable with interdependent board members, enabling the CEOs to (further) increase 
their power over the board. It is in this line of reasoning that critics of corporate boards have 
strong doubts about the value of board directors, because the web of personal and business 
connections with the CEO reduces the board’s independence (Yermack, 2006). Shivdasani 
and Yermack (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999) conclude that interdependent directors are less 
likely to monitor the CEO which gives the CEO more power. 
 
This research tests whether high narcissistic CEOs have significantly more interdependent 
directors on their boards than low narcissistic CEOs. The number of board changes during the 
tenure of the CEO is counted in order to measure how many directors have been replaced by 
the CEO. Many board changes imply that board members are less likely to monitor the CEO 
due to their feelings of reciprocity and the time needed to get acquainted with the board and 
the company. The more board changes, the more interdependent directors constitute the 
board.  
Hypothesis 1b:  High narcissistic CEOs have more board changes than low narcissistic 
CEOs.  
6.3 Data Collection 
 
The RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) director database is used to collect data about board sizes. 
RiskMetrics covers the period 1996 to 2006. The companies of the research sample are 
matched with the RiskMetrics database which results into a match of 723 CEOs (76% of the 
CEOs are included in the RiskMetrics database). For these 723 CEOs the board size is 
averaged over the tenure. 
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The research sample contains CEOs with a tenure of more than three year, which assures that 
this sample reviews every board directors’ candidacy at least once28. This way of reasoning is 
in line with the research of Shivdasani and Yermack (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).  
 
The start and end dates of the board members are included in the RiskMetrics database as 
well. The start dates of the board members are compared to the start dates of the CEO tenure. 
In several cases CEOs and directors start approximately at the same time. The board director 
change can therefore not be attributed to all CEOs. Excluding these cases, the number of 
board changes amounts 689 CEOs. 
 
 
6.4 Results for High and Low Narcissistic CEOs 
 
The bottom deciles CEOs score on average 4.18 on the narcissistic scale and the top deciles 
CEOs score on average 11.10 on the narcissistic scale.  
The top deciles high narcissistic CEOs have on average larger boards than the CEOs in the 
bottom deciles. The average board size for low and high narcissistic CEOs is 9.79 and 11.24 
respectively.  
The average board change for low and high narcissistic CEOs is 1.96 and 3.02 respectively. 
Figure 6.2 shows the board size and board change for low and high narcissistic CEOs. 
 
The results of a t-test of the board size show statistically significant larger boards for high 
narcissistic CEOs (p-value 0.0007).  
The results of a t-test of the number of board changes also show statistically significant more 
board changes for high narcissistic CEOs (p-value 0). 
High narcissistic CEOs have a larger board size and more board changes, resulting into 
differing board structures with less countervailing power. The analysis is extended with 
control variables in chapter 6.5, because several control variables are potentially able to 
influence the board size and the number of board changes.  
                                                 
28 Board directors of classified boards usually serve a three year period (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).  
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Figure 6.2 Top and Bottom Deciles of Average Board Size and Average Board Changes 
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6.5 Methodology  
 
The presence of large boards can be explained by the increased information requirements of 
large complex organizations. Boone et al. (Boone et al., 2007) argue that an increasing 
organizational size results into larger boards with more independent board members. The log 
of sales is included to control for the organizational size.  
 
Specific industries can have diverging board structures. Financial and utility companies are 
for example excluded in the research of Shivdasani and Yermack (Shivdasani & Yermack, 
1999). The authors argue that the boards of these financial and utility companies are typically 
larger.  
 
The average board size is calculated per Fama French industry classification to test the 
hypothesis of Shivdasani and Yermack that boards of financial and utility companies are 
larger. The average board size per Fama French industry is included table 6.1. 
 
The results show indeed larger average boards sizes for the Fama French Industry codes 8 
(utility) and 11 (finance) which is in line with Shivdasani and Yermack (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999). The Fama French Industry codes 7 (telephone) also show larger average 
boards sizes. In order to assure that board size and board composition is not driven by a 
specific industry type, the Fama French industry classification is taken as a control variable.  
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Table 6.1 Average Board Size Per Fama French Industry Code 
 
 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) show that the CEO has more influence 
over the board as the tenure years increase. In case the influence of the CEO on the board 
increases, the board structure will be more likely set up according to the CEO personal 
requirements. The CEO tenure is included as a control variable.  
 
The CEO influence over the board also increases in case the CEO chairs the board. The CEO 
duality is included as a control variable. 
 
The number of board changes depends on the board size. Therefore, the board size is included 
as a control variable in the regression of the narcissism scale on the number of board changes.  
 
The CEO narcissism is included in the model because it affects the board size and the number 
of board changes positively as hypothesized. The CEO narcissism score (CNS) developed in 
chapter 4 is used as an independent variable. The board size and the number of board changes 
are used as dependent variables. Control variables are included in the model to test the 
hypothesis 1a and 1b, using the following regression equations. 
 
 
FF  Description Average 
1 Consumer Non Durables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Toys 10.8915 
2 Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 10.3333 
3 Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Paper, Com Printing 10.7471 
4 Energy  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 10.9477 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 10.8151 
6 Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 9.04912 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 12.1758 
8 Utilities 11.8013 
9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 10.6503 
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 10.0496 
11 Money  Finance 12.8490 
12 Other -- Mines, Construction, Trans, Hotels, Bus Service, Entertainment 10.4667 
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Board Size =    D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO DUALITY] + J [SALESLOG] +  
G [FF-Ind] + C 
Board Changes=  D [CNS] + E [TENURE] + I [CEO DUALITY] + J [SALESLOG] +  
G [FF-Ind] + μ [BOARD SIZE] + C 
 
 
 
Results Including Control Variables 
 
A statistically significant positive relationship (D = 0.0958 with p-value =0.0236) exists 
between the CEO Narcissism Score (CNS) and the board size. The results are listed in table 
6.2 and hypothesis 1a is accepted.  
 
A statistically significant relationship (D = 0.1269 with p-value 0) exists between the CNS 
and the number of board changes. The results are listed in table 6.2 and hypothesis 1b is also 
accepted. 
 
The robustness of the relationship is tested by excluding the control variables one by one and 
including additional control variables as CEO age. The statistically significant positive 
relationships do not change. High levels of CEO narcissism result into larger boards and more 
frequent board changes, reducing the countervailing power for high narcissistic CEOs.  
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Table 6.2 Regression Analysis Board Size and Board Changes 
Variable Board Size Board Changes 
CNS 0.0958** 0.1269*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0269) 
CEO Duality 0.4401** -0.1913 
 (0.2004) (0.1296) 
CEO Tenure -0.0630** -0.1074*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0174) 
SalesLog 0.0029*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Board Size  0.1306*** 
  (0.0245) 
FF1 0.6478* -0.1136 
 (0.3682) (0.2319) 
FF2 -0.5045 -0.8954*** 
 (0.4961) (0.3152) 
FF3 0.1827 -0.3963** 
 (0.3371) (0.2143) 
FF4 -0.0444 -0.2718 
 (0.4635) (0.2971) 
FF5 0.1035 -0.1176 
 (0.4627) (0.3008) 
FF6 -1,291*** -0.2975 
 (0.3284) (0.2114) 
FF7 0.9019* 0.2334 
 (0.5366) (0.3502) 
FF8 1.4028*** 0.1584 
 (0.3835) (0.2445) 
FF9 -0.0124 -0.1957 
 (0.3586) (0.2268) 
FF10 -0.5032 -0.3358 
 (0.4060) (0.2582) 
FF11 2.0878*** 0.1678 
 (0.3430) (0.2270) 
C 9,5872*** 1.0720*** 
 (0.4260) (0.3583) 
   
R2 0,2856 0.2343 
 
 n=723 n=689 
* p<0.10    **p<0.05    *** p<0.01 
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6.6 Summary and Conclusion CEO Narcissism and Countervailing Power 
 
This chapter tests whether the CEOs narcissistic personality is an unexplained determinant 
affecting the board structure. The board structure is determined by the board size and the 
board composition and influences the board’s countervailing power. 
The board size and the board structure are investigated in order to test the hypothesis if high 
narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing power from their boards. The statistically 
significant results of the analyses show that high narcissistic CEOs have a larger board size 
and have more frequent board changes compared to low narcissistic CEOs. A large board size 
and frequent board changes result into less countervailing power. High narcissistic CEOs have 
substantial less countervailing power compared to low narcissistic CEOs. The effectiveness of 
the board mechanism (the third described mechanism in chapter 2.2) decreases as CEO 
narcissism increases.  
These results show that high narcissistic CEOs are indeed real power brokers who will move 
towards the statutory type. One of the unexplained determinants affecting board structures and 
hereby reducing the board’s countervailing power is the CEOs narcissistic personality.  
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Chapter 7 CEO Narcissism and Fraud Propensity 
 
The firm’s ethical climate is to a large extent defined by the actions of top executives, 
especially the CEO (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). The fraud propensity increases as top 
executives lack ethical norms and values. The framework29 of the causes and consequences of 
CEO narcissism hypothesizes that high narcissistic CEOs engage in fraudulent behavior to 
keep up appearances and retain their status. This chapter documents whether high narcissistic 
CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud.  
 
 
7.1 Relation between CEO Narcissism and Fraud Propensity 
 
High narcissistic CEOs are reluctant to report disappointing financial performances, because 
this will jeopardize their status. The role of the CEO in the fraud propensity also increases 
with the CEO charisma (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Charisma leads to a greater identification 
and reflexive obedience of followers. The hypothesized relationship between narcissism and 
fraud propensity will be positive, since narcissism is related to charismatic leadership (House 
& Howell, 1992; Howell, 1992; Maccoby, 2001; Humphreys, Zhao, Ingram, Gladstone, & 
Basham, 2010). 
In case the financial performances do not coincide with the expectations, there still remains 
the possibility to pretend that business prospers by committing fraud, which will secure the 
CEO status as long as the fraud remains undetected.  The following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis: High narcissistic CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud than low 
narcissistic CEOs. 
 
The fraud concept is first explained in order to test the above hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between CEO narcissism and fraud propensity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The framework is documented in chapter 3.3 and visualized in figure 3.3 on page 56 
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7.2 The Fraud Concept  
 
This chapter focuses on the occurrence of managerial fraud, which is also called white-collar 
crime or corporate wrongdoing. Intentionality is the keyword for managerial fraud whereby 
top executives willfully deceive or manipulate the financial figures with the risk of losing 
everything when the fraud is revealed. Managerial fraud is characterized by the absence of 
physical violence and has far reaching consequences for shareholders, employees, and other 
stakeholders. The individuals involved in the fraud are considered to be respectable members 
of the society, which makes the fraud even more repelling. 
 
There are various forms of managerial fraud whereby executives intentionally manipulate the 
financial figures. The managerial fraud consists mainly of financial reporting fraud, bribery 
and backdating stock options. These three forms of managerial fraud are described below. 
 
Financial reporting fraud is intentionally misstating financial statements or financial 
disclosures, which often starts with minor earnings management and is most likely to remain 
undetected. Earnings management is a strategy to deliberately manipulate the company’s 
earnings in order to match the figures with the expected figures or a prior defined target. The 
most common form of earnings management is improper revenue recognition. If performance 
does not improve in the next period, the executives can choose to manage earnings in an 
increasing amount or to confess the prior period earnings management. The last option will 
destroy the executives’ reputation which is disastrous for a high narcissistic CEO. The high 
narcissistic CEO will choose to manage the earnings in an increasing amount which will 
eventually escalate. The escalation of continuing earnings management represents managerial 
fraud (Schrand & Zechman, 2009). 
 
Another form of managerial fraud is bribing foreign officials, often occurring in Asia and 
Africa. The bribery falls under the Foreign Corrupt Policy Act (FCPA) of 1977 which makes 
it illegal for entities to make payments to foreign government officials in order to obtain or 
retain business.  
 
Backdating stock options for personal gain is also a form of managerial fraud.   
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7.3 Literature on Fraud Propensity 
 
The research on corporate fraud concentrates on finding relationships with corporate 
governance structures or compensation plans. There is less research investigating 
relationships with executives’ personal characteristics. The following summarizes relevant 
literature regarding unethical behavior, earnings management and fraud.  
 
 
Unethical behavior 
 
The literature about unethical behavior argues that individuals engage in unethical and 
illegitimate behavior if they fall short on their goals (Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). 
Jensen (Jensen, 2001) states that breaking the link between goal setting and incentives will 
reduce the likelihood of immoral behavior. The likelihood of immoral behavior increases as 
rewards depend on reaching the goals. High narcissistic CEOs have however also non-
pecuniary incentives, like their need for success, glory, honor and affirmation. Breaking the 
link between goal setting and incentives will therefore not reduce the likelihood of immoral 
behavior for high narcissistic CEOs.  
 
 
Earnings Management 
 
The literature about earnings management argues that firms are more likely to manipulate 
earnings if there is a weak corporate governance system (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010), a 
less independent board (Klein, 2002) or if CEO compensation is more closely tied to the value 
of stock and option holdings (Barton, 2001; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). The last 
mentioned researchers also find that CEOs exercise unusual large amounts of stock options 
during periods of high accruals. Earnings management is motivated by executives’ desire to 
disguise a disappointing financial performance (Dechow et al., 2010). Earnings management 
increases in order to cover up the prior period reversals and escalates in case the future 
financial performance continues to decline. 
 
 
140 
 
Fraud 
 
The scarce research investigating relationships between executives’ personalities and fraud 
elucidates the key role of personal characteristics in the likelihood of financial reporting fraud 
(COSO30 report, 1999). COSO recommends the monitoring of individual executives’ 
behavior. The Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 suggests that “attitudes” are a 
potential risk factor for fraud.  
 
The individual characteristic of low self-control induces risk taking behavior and increases the 
likelihood of conducting fraud (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). 
  
Overconfident executives are more likely to commit fraud, because of their unrealistic beliefs 
in positive future financial performances which in turn will compensate the earnings 
management and avoid detection (Schrand & Zechman, 2009). The future financial 
performance is however frequently insufficient to cover up the prior earnings management 
which forces the overconfident executives to engage in even more serious earnings 
management. Earnings management starts with overconfidence and proceeds with more 
serious earnings management if overconfident executives are faced with continuing ex post 
negative financial performances. This aggravating earnings management leads to a slippery 
slope of fraud which is likely to be discovered and prosecuted by the SEC.  
 
Schrand and Zechman (Schrand & Zechman, 2009) measure overconfidence by using the 
narcissism proxies of Chatterjee and Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007): the CEO 
photograph in the annual report and compensation ratios. These indicators are also included in 
the narcissism score of this research. 
Schrand and Zechman find evidence of a positive relation between overconfidence and fraud 
propensity. The cash and total compensation ratio’s are significant at the 1% and 10% level 
respectively. This finding is in line with the conclusion of Cools (Cools, 2005) who finds an 
exorbitant variable compensation for CEOs who served a fraudulent company. 
This research measures the narcissism construct with 15 indicators, including the CEO 
photograph and the compensation ratios. Taking the above research into perspective, a 
positive relationship between CEO narcissism and fraud occurrence is to be expected.  
                                                 
30 Committee Of Sponsoring Organizations is a private-sector organization formed in 1985 to sponsor the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
141 
 
Narcissistic CEOs have the skill to silence critical and dissent behavior and are able to build a 
coalition of followers and sycophants. The before mentioned empirical results and several 
practical examples of corporate fraud committed by narcissistic CEOs, like the cases of 
Enron, Tyco and Ahold, suggest a positive relation between the fraud propensity and CEO 
narcissism. 
 
 
7.4 Fraud Proxies 
 
Three external indicators of managerial fraud exist. These are the restatements of financial 
figures, the internal controls and the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(Dechow et al., 2010).   
 
 
Restatements 
 
Restatements of financial figures can be found in the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) restatement database. The GAO restatement database contains information of 
approximately 2300 restatements from 1997 to 2005, but cannot be used as a proxy for 
managerial fraud in this research, because of the following four reasons. 
First, the time period does not overlap the research sample period 1992-2008. There are 8 
years of missing data. Second, the GAO database contains information about the year in 
which the restatement was published and not the specific accounting period which a 
restatement refers to. The restatement cannot be matched with the responsible CEO. Third, 
the GAO database contains restatements which are materially insignificant and therefore have 
little economic relevance. Fourth, the GAO database contains all restatements, regardless of 
the executives’ intent. The database does not give any information on the nature and intend of 
the restatement. The restatements of financial figures are often earnings restatements that are 
mostly due to accounting errors, whether intentional or unintentional. The unintentional 
accounting errors are not included in the managerial fraud concept.   
These four arguments clarify the inapplicability of the GAO restatement database as a proxy 
for the managerial fraud concept.  
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Internal Controls 
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires that executives certify the effectiveness of the 
internal control procedures. The internal control deficiencies measure the propensity for 
misstatements. These SOX requirements became effective as from 2002 which again cause 
conflicting timing problems with the research sample period 1992-2008.  Moreover, the use of 
this proxy is based on the assumption that disclosures of internal control weaknesses are 
correlated with the managerial incentives to discover and disclose internal control deficiencies 
(C. E. Hogan & Wilkins, 2008). A high narcissistic CEO will never disclose internal control 
weaknesses. Hence, the disclosure of internal control deficiencies cannot be used in this 
research as a proxy for managerial fraud.  
 
 
The AAER as Proxy of Fraud 
 
The SEC reports fraud in an AAER: Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release. The 
AAERs provide details on the nature of the alleged misconduct and can involve multiple 
accounting periods. The AAER website of the SEC was established in 1995. The alleged 
fraud in the AAERs relate to previous periods with a time lag of approximately three years. 
Starting in 1995 therefore does not cause problems for the sample period.  
 
The AAERs only include intentional misstating and give detailed information about the fraud, 
the executives involved and the period in which the fraud took place. This detailed 
information provides the necessary elements to collect specific information regarding the 
executives’ intention and involvement. The AAERs are a good proxy for managerial fraud. 
 
 
7.5 Fraud Frequency 
 
The laws and regulations are extensive and complex which results into sophisticated 
managerial fraud which is hard to reveal. Berenson (Berenson, 2003) even argues that the 
complex laws en regulations, implemented to protect the shareholders’ wealth, even 
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contribute to the growing incidence of managerial fraud. Table 7.1 shows that the number of 
AAERs increases to 2003 and decreases thereafter31.  
 
Table 7.1 The number of AAERs per year 
RELEASE YEAR NUMBER OF AAERs Percentage 
1994 120 4.48 
1995 107 3.99 
1996 120 4.48 
1997 132 4.93 
1998 99 3.69 
1999 119 4.44 
2000 144 5.37 
2001 126 4.70 
2002 213 7.95 
2003 240 8.96 
2004 220 8.21 
2005 201 7.50 
2006 172 6.42 
2007 232 8.66 
2008 150 5.60 
2009 179 6.68 
2010 106 3.96 
TOTAL 2680 100% 
 
 
 
Misstatements in AAERs occur more often in larger companies for two reasons. First, the 
SEC is more inclined to review large companies. Second, large companies are closely 
watched by the press, public and investors. Therefore, potential more signals can trigger the 
SEC to start an investigation.  
 
                                                 
31 The decreasing number of AAERs after 2003 could be an effect of the SOX implementation 
144 
 
Misstatements in AAERs are rare events. Dechow et al. (Dechow et al., 2010) find 0.5 percent 
of Compustat companies misstating. This research sample contains the S&P500 companies, 
which are larger than an average Compustat company. Therefore, the percentage of misstating 
companies is expected to be larger than 0.5 percent.  
 
 
Fraud Bias 
 
The data regarding the financial restatement fraud might be biased because of the constrained 
resources of the SEC. The SEC selects companies for enforcement investigation if there is 
sufficient manipulation evidence. This evidence can be an accounting restatement or 
substantial depreciations, like in the case of Enron and Xerox. The SEC can also be informed 
by insider whistleblowers. Whistleblowers can provide the SEC with original information 
about a violation of federal laws which will lead to a successful enforcement. The SEC 
recently proposed a rule to award whistleblowers with 10 to 30% of the financial penalty 
charged by the SEC, which may increase the number of fraud allegations.  
It is often difficult to reveal and prove the sophisticated managerial fraud. The enforcement 
procedure of the SEC might lead to selection biases, which is however a general concern 
when analyzing managerial fraud (Dechow et al., 2010). The AAERs are the best available 
source to investigate financial fraud.  
 
 
7.6 Data Collection and Sampling 
 
The AAERs of the SEC are the basis of the data collection. The AAERs are downloaded from 
the SEC website starting 1995 and ending November 2010. The 2680 AAERs are listed per 
year in table 7.1. The years 2002 to 2007 show the largest number of AAERs.   
 
The period during which the fraud takes place shows a wide variance: from one single 
incidence to a fraud period persisting more than a decade as in the Enron and Worldcom case. 
Most alleged frauds overlap at least two fiscal periods with an average of 23.7 months (The 
COSO report, 1999).  
The SEC issues another AAER in case of additional information on the fraud case and/or if 
the allegations are settled. This implies that there may be multiple AAERs for the same fraud 
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case. AAERs can relate to individuals, particular business units, the whole organization and 
third parties.  
 
All 2680 AAERs are examined to document whether companies within this research sample 
are involved. In case a S&P500 company appears in an AAER, the AAER is reviewed to 
identify the period in which the fraud took place. This information is compared with the 
tenure years of the CEO in the research sample. In case of a match, the individual AAER is 
further studied in order to identify the cause of the alleged fraud.  
For several matches, the AAER clearly states that a certain person (e.g. a division president) 
committed the fraud and acted on his own account, without involving top executives. These 
AAERs are not included in the analysis, since the CEO is by no means involved. In most of 
these cases, the CEO has taken immediate actions to prevent these shortcomings in internal 
control. 
 
 
Sampling 
 
The 2680 AAERs are studied in order to identify if the alleged fraud concerns a sample 
S&P500 company. It turns out that 189 AAERs relate to companies in the research sample. 
The 189 AAERs are further examined to identify the period of the fraud and the CEO 
involvement. Table 7.2 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 7.2 Matched AAERs 
AAERs in SEC Database Number of AAERs Number of CEOs 
AAERs found  189  
AAERs other period -66  
AAERs where CEO is not involved -10  
Relevant AAERs 113 5432 
AAERs where CEO is accused 37 8 
AAERs where CEO is involved 44 29 
AAERs where CEO is likely involved 32 20 
                                                 
32 The number of CEOs (54) is not the sum of 8+29+20, because there are 3 CEOs with multiple AAERs in 
which the CEO involvement differs. These CEOs are James Rohr (PNC), David Komansky (Merrill Lynch) and 
Sanford Weil (Citigroup). 
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For 66 AAERs the fraud period does not coincide with the CEO tenure. For example when the 
fraud period is 1992 and the CEO starts his tenure in 1993. These 66 AAERs are excluded. 
An additional 10 AAERs are excluded, because there is no link between the allegation and the 
CEO. The AAER reports for example the overstatement of revenue with (only) $70,000 
within a specific division by a Brazilian director. There are 10 AAERs in which the CEO is 
clearly not involved and these AAERs are excluded as well. This results into 113 relevant 
AAERs relating to 54 CEOs. 
 
 
Fraud Causes 
 
The details about the fraud causes for the 113 AAERs are investigated. Table 7.3 summarizes 
the fraud causes. Earnings management is the largest category (63.7%). The other six 
categories all have low frequencies (3.5% to 8.9%).  
 
Table 7.3 Fraud Categories 
Category Description Description Frequency 
1 FCPA Foreign Corrupt Policy Act 8  (7.1%) 
2 Earnings Management 
Deliberate manipulation of earnings to match a 
pre-determined target. 72 (63,7%) 
3 Round Trips Selling and at the same time agreeing to buy back at approximately the same price 10 (8.9%) 
4 Backdating Stock Options 
Option dating prior to the date that the company 
gave the option, so that the exercise price is set 
lower 
4 (3.5%) 
5 Criminal Charges Like private loan with zero interest 7 (6.2%) 
6 Accounting Procedures 
Change of accounting procedures without 
disclosing 5 (4.4%) 
7 Other For example improper health reimbursements  7 (6.2%) 
 Total  113(100%) 
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CEO involvement 
 
Fraud is obvious in case the CEO is personally accused. CEOs who are not personally 
accused can be involved by rewarding, ignoring or condoning the fraud (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003; Baucus, 1994). These CEOs have played a substantial role in the fraud. Companies 
appearing in an AAER without CEO personal allegations are included in the analysis.  
 
The 32 AAERs in which the CEO is likely involved includes for example an AAER in which 
a sales director is alleged for inflating revenues by signing a site letter with another company 
in order to overcome low sales during a specific period. This improper revenue recognition 
might be the responsibility of the sales director alone, but the magnitude of the improper 
transaction makes the CEO vulnerable to suspicion. Another example concerns not disclosing 
the change of accounting procedures which resulted into an inflation of earnings and a higher 
share price. These practices are very convenient for a CEO with stock options. The CEOs in 
the above two examples authorize the fraud by informal encouraging or tacitly condoning the 
fraud (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). 
 
The percentage of misstating research companies is [54/953]*100 = 5.67 percent. The 
percentage of misstating where the CEO is accused or involved is [(29+8)/953]*100 = 3.88 
percent. The percentage of accused CEOs is [8/953]*100 = 0.84 percent which is larger than 
the expected 0.5% that Dechow et al. (Dechow et al., 2010) find in their sample of Compustat 
companies. The percentage is higher due to the use of larger companies in this research 
sample which are more likely to be investigated by the SEC.  
 
There are 8 CEOs personally accused and convicted. These 8 CEOs have served S&P500 
companies in varying industries; have different tenure lengths and have various ages.  
An investigation of director interlocks found one remarkable combination: Kozlowski serves 
as supervisory director at Raytheon from 1997 to 2002 taking a seat in the audit committee at 
the same time as Burnham serves as CEO.  
The 8 accused CEOs are listed in table 7.4 below with the company name, industry code, 
tenure length, age and description of the AAER allegation. 
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Table 7.4 CEOs accused and convicted 
CEO / Company FF  Tenure Age AAER Allegation 
Battenberg 2 8 56 Fraudulent accounting, net income inflating 
Delphi Corp    of $300 million for personal gain 
Burnham 6 6 52 Fraudulent revenue recognition of $200 million  
Raytheon Co    & undisclosed risks with $77 million operating  
   income impact 
Fisher 8 11 51 Earnings Management by LIFO layers inventory  
Nicor Inc    liquidation without disclosure for $50 million 
Hoaglin 11 8 52 Fraudulent earnings overstatements to meet  
Huntington 
Bancshares 
   analyst expectations and internal targets of $25 
million 
Kozlowski 12 11 46 Loans and loans forgiveness’s not disclosed &  
Tyco 
International 
   undisclosed perquisites (apartment NYC), worth  
$400 million 
Kumar 6 5 39 Fraudulent revenue recognition of $3.3 billion for  
CA Inc    personal gain 
Nacchio 7 6 48 Fraudulent revenue recognition of $3 billion  
Qwest 
Communication  
   resulting into a personal gain of $52 million 
insider stock trading 
Inc.     
Ustian 2 6 53 Fraudulent accounting: undisclosed vendor  
Navistar Int. Corp    rebates, manipulation of reserves and deferred  
   expenses of $137 million 
 
 
 
7.7 Methodology 
 
The CEO Narcissism Score (CNS) of chapter 4 is used to identify whether high narcissistic 
CEOs are more inclined to engage in unethical behavior. The dependent variable is binary, 
with a value of 0 in case fraud is absent and 1 in case fraud is present.  
 
The logit and the probit model are the two most commonly used alternatives of the Limited 
probability model. The logit and probit model give similar characterizations of the data, 
except in cases where the split between 0 and 1 is very unbalanced. In the latter case, non-
negligible differences may occur (Brooks, 2008, page 518). The split for the limited 
dependent variable AAER between 0 and 1 is unbalanced in this research sample. Therefore, 
both the logit model and the probit model are used to test the hypothesis if high narcissistic 
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CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud. The logit and probit model are not linear and cannot 
be estimated using OLS. Instead, maximum likelihood (ML) is used.  
  
Two analyses are performed.  
First, the logit and probit analyses are tested using the number of accused (n=8) and involved 
(n=29) CEOs. The split for the limited dependent variable AAER between 0 and 1 is therefore 
916 versus 37.  
Second, the logit and probit analyses are performed using the 54 CEOs appearing in an 
AAER. The split for the limited dependent variable AAER between 0 and 1 is therefore 899 
versus 54.  
 
 
Control Variables 
 
There are several variables potentially able to influence managerial fraud. 
 
The CEO tenure length can affect the fraud propensity. CEOs with a long tenure are 
entrenched with the company (Weisbach, 1988) and become stale in the saddle (Miller, 1991) 
and therefore less likely to actively or passively acquiesce to fraud (Zahra et al., 2005).  The 
CEO tenure is taken as a control variable. 
 
Age influences an individual’s degree of risk seeking and the ability to evaluate the long term 
consequences of fraudulent behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Maturity is associated 
with moral development, accurate decision making and increased willingness for 
reconsideration (Child, 1972). Older CEOs are supposed to dampen the fraud propensity, 
which necessitates the inclusion of the CEO age as a control variable. 
 
ROA is also taken as a control variable because low returns might increase the fraud 
propensity. 
 
Specific industries might create conditions that potentially encourage managerial fraud. The 
Fama French Industry codes are therefore taken as control variables. 
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7.8 Results 
 
The two analyses are performed to test the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs are more 
inclined to commit fraud. 
 
The first analysis (model 1) uses the 37 CEOs who are accused of fraud or are involved in the 
allegations. The results of the logit and probit analysis are enclosed in table 7.5. The 
narcissism score is positively related to the occurrence of fraud (the parameter for the logit 
model is 0.164 with a p-value of 0.0081; the parameter for the probit model is 0.0765 with a 
p-value of 0.0117).  
 
The second analysis (model 2) uses the 54 CEOs with a company appearing in an AAER. The 
results of the probit analysis are enclosed in table 7.5. The narcissism score is positively 
related to the occurrence of fraud (the parameter for the logit model is 0.165 with a p-value of 
0.0009; the parameter for the probit model is 0.0847 with a p-value of 0.0012). 
 
The logit and probit model give similar results, although the split between 0 and 1 is 
unbalanced. Both results indicate a statistically positive relation between CEO narcissism and 
fraud propensity. The hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table 7.5 Logit and Probit Analyses Fraud Propensity 
    Model 1   Model 2 
    Logit   Probit   Logit   Probit 
CNS   0.1641***   0.0765***   0.1650***   0.0847*** 
    (0.0619)   (0.0303)   (0.0498)   (0.0262) 
CEO Tenure   -0.0307   -0.0082   -0.0222   -0.0084 
    (0.0623)   (0.0264)   (0.0452)   (0.0213) 
CEO Age   -0.0245   -0.0107   -0.0210   -0.0098 
    (0.0290)   (0.0124)   (0.0229)   (0.0106) 
ROA   -0.2273   -0.1808   0.2852   0.1178 
    (0.6469)   (0.3784)   (0.5856)   (0.3443) 
FF1   0.2373   0.0651   0.2166   0.0739 
    (1.0297)   (0.4283)   (0.8440)   (0.3724) 
FF2   1.7002*   0.7696*   1.2892   0.6029 
    (0.8989)   (0.4104)   (0.7986)   (0.3827) 
FF3   -0.0765   -0.0599   0.0217   -0.0076 
    (0.9345)   (0.3870)   (0.7474)   (0.3302) 
FF4   -0.0149   0.0207   0.2724   0.1322 
    (1.2840)   (0.5431)   (0.9649)   (0.4407) 
FF5   0.1120   0.0428   -0.3272   -0.1458 
    (1.2467)   (0.5221)   (1.1789)   (0.5024) 
FF6   0.9345   0.3924   1.1952*   0.5548* 
    (0.8149)   (0.3486)   (0.6632)   (0.3013) 
FF7   -0.0320   -0.0892   -0.4400   -0.2719 
    (1.1885)   (0.5044)   (1.1482)   (0.4966) 
FF8   -0.4324   -0.1824   0.2837   0.1217 
    (1.2527)   (0.5008)   (0.8468)   (0.3786) 
FF9   0.7629   0.3027   0.3370   0.1299 
    (0.8572)   (0.3656)   (0.7528)   (0.3360) 
FF10   -0.6282   -0.2503   0.0700   0.0244 
    (1.2480)   (0.4957)   (0.8448)   (0.3743) 
FF11   0.8004   0.3248   0.5306   0.2242 
    (0.8188)   (0.3491)   (0.6966)   (0.3130) 
C   -3.4322**   -1.9004**   -3.2773**   -1.8478*** 
    (1.8092)   (0.7821)   (1.4685)   (0.6712) 
McFadden R2   0.0585   0.0573   0.0498   0.0500 
  
n=953  Standard Errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01 
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7.9 Summary and Conclusion CEO Narcissism and Fraud Propensity 
 
High narcissistic CEOs engage in fraudulent behavior to keep up appearances and retain their 
status. This chapter investigates whether a statistically significant positive relationship exists 
between CEO narcissism and fraud propensity.  
The hypothesis is tested whether high narcissistic CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud 
than low narcissistic CEOs.  
 
The managerial fraud is measured by investigating the AAERs on the SEC’s website. The 
SEC has issued 2680 AAERs from 1995 to November 2010 and all these AAERs of the SEC 
are examined. A match exists with this research sample S&P500 companies/CEOs for 113 
AAERs. The SEC allegations in the 113 AAERs are investigated to document whether the 
CEO is accused and/or involved. The 113 AAERs relate to 54 CEOs of the total 953 CEOs. 
 
The binary dependent models show that there is indeed a positive statistically significant 
relationship between CEO narcissism and the occurrence of fraud. The results hold for all 54 
CEO/Company combinations appearing in an AAER as well as for the 37 CEOs who are 
accused or involved in the fraud.  
 
The conclusion can be drawn that high narcissistic CEOs have an increased fraud propensity. 
The results of these empirical analyses confirm that the firm’s ethical climate is indeed 
defined by the actions of top executives, especially the CEO (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 
2005). 
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Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The individual chapters already contain a summary. The emphasis in this chapter will be on 
the main findings of this research (8.1), the practical implications of this research (8.2), the 
contributions to the existing research (8.3) and the directions for future research (8.4).   
 
 
8.1 Main Findings of this Research 
 
The findings of this research document the influence of the CEOs narcissistic personality on 
organizational outcomes and confirm the strategic choice perspective by finding individual 
CEO-effects. The empirical results indicate an extension of the upper echelon theory with 
personal characteristics, in particular the CEOs narcissistic personality.  
 
The first finding is that CEO narcissism can be measured by looking at five determinants, 
comprising media exposure, compensation, power, growth and perquisites. These five 
determinants consist of 15 variables which can be collected objectively. The narcissism score 
of the CEOs is constructed based on these 15 variables. A principal components analysis 
shows that these 15 variables can be reduced to four principal components which are in line 
with the four extracted narcissism components of Emmons. The CEO narcissism score is 
computed by multiplying the factor loadings of the four principle components with the 
original variables and adding the four normalized component scores into one score per CEO. 
The CEO narcissism score has the required variance and the CEOs who have been identified 
as narcissists by leading psychologists have a top score in this research. 
 
The second finding confirms the psychological perspective of narcissism as a two-edged 
sword. Several researchers (Kets de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003; Rosenthal & 
Pittinsky, 2006) document the upside (productive) and the downside (destructive) potential of 
narcissism. The distinction between productive and destructive narcissism is confirmed by the 
empirical results of the quadratic regressions. The relationship between the CEO narcissism 
score and the financial accounting measures is intricate and can be visualized by a concave 
parabola. The turning point is close to the mean CNS which is an indication of the reliability 
of the findings (Meyer, 2009). Generally, the narcissism construct has a negative connotation. 
This research however confirms the psychological perspective of productive narcissism and 
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its inherent upside potential. CEO narcissism is a requisite for effective leadership and can be 
value-adding to the shareholders’ wealth, but high levels of narcissism become destructive. 
 
The third finding confirms the negative relationship between CEO narcissism and 
countervailing power of the board. The countervailing power of the board is proxied by 
looking at the board size and the board changes. A large board is easier to control by the CEO 
and more board changes imply that board members are less likely to monitor the CEO due to 
their feelings of reciprocity and the time needed to get acquainted with the board and the 
company. The statistically significant results show larger board sizes and more frequent board 
changes for high narcissistic CEOs. The board has less monitoring power and fails to function 
as a critical instrument of corporate governance. The high narcissistic CEOs have less 
countervailing power. 
 
The fourth finding relates to the fraud propensity of high narcissistic CEOs. The managerial 
fraud is measured with the Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases (AAER) of the SEC. 
Of the total sample of 953 CEOs, 54 CEOs (5.7%) are involved in an AAER. The binary 
dependent model tests whether high narcissistic CEOs are more inclined to commit fraud. The 
results of the logit and probit analyses confirm the increased fraud propensity for high 
narcissistic CEOs. 
 
The findings relate to the corporate governance theories described in chapter 2.  
The lower financial performance, the reduced countervailing power and the higher fraud 
propensity for high narcissistic CEOs elucidates the severe principal-agent problems for high 
narcissistic CEOs.  
Donaldson and Davis argue that CEO duality will enhance effectiveness and will produce 
superior performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), because CEO duality empowers CEOs to 
take autonomous actions. This line of reasoning supports the stewardship theory as outlined in 
chapter 2.3. The dataset used in this research provides information whether CEO duality 
results into higher financial performances. The 741 CEOs who serve a dual role show lower 
financial performances, compared to the 212 CEOs not having a dual role. The ROA is 0.039 
versus 0.045 and the Tobin’s Q is 2.079 versus 2.275. This finding does not support the 
theoretical lens of the stewardship theory that financial performance increases by combining 
the two roles of CEO and chairman, but provides some evidence of a severe principal-agent 
dilemma. 
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8.2 Practical Implications of this Research 
 
This empirical research shows that moderate levels of CEO narcissism can be productive and 
value adding to the company. Narcissism is an essential element for effective leadership, but 
all parties should be aware of the potential destructive behavior of high levels of CEO 
narcissism. The individual CEOs narcissistic personality should be carefully monitored and 
incorporated into corporate governance codes. The findings are relevant for shareholders, 
executive and non-executive board members, accountants and society in general. 
 
This research has to create awareness among shareholders that moderate levels of narcissism 
can be value adding while very low or very high levels of narcissism can become destructive. 
Assertiveness and immediate actions are required in case shareholders suspect an increasing 
level of CEO narcissism. These suspicions can be instigated by looking at the 5 determinants 
and 15 variables used in this research in order to establish the CEO narcissism score.  
Placing the CEO under greater control of the board as a mechanism to align managerial 
interests with shareholders’ interests (described in chapter 2.2 and summarized in table 2.1) 
can be effective as long as the CEO narcissism is restraint. In case the CEO possesses a  
narcissism overdose, the statutory type will be applicable in which the power of the CEO 
surpasses the power of the board. The board’s monitoring of the CEO in this statutory 
typology serves merely a ceremonial function in which the high narcissistic CEO holds all the 
power, leaving the board to function as “rubber stamps”.  
 
The executive and non-executive board members should be informed about the productive 
and destructive narcissism impact. The board is a group and faces the dynamics of a group by 
promoting consensus decisions, striving for unanimous majorities and supporting the CEO. 
The boards’ emphasis on teamwork and conflict avoidance can be evidence of CEO capture, 
which makes the board more susceptible to groupthink. Staying committed to the groups’ 
decisions and to a specific course of action is the easiest way to obtain unanimity. The 
executive and non-executive directors are susceptible to the biases which are described in 
chapter 2, such as groupthink, escalation of commitment and the status quo bias. The 
individual board member does not feel comfortable being the sole dissentient in the board, but 
should always be aware that the ideal board is supposed to be skeptical, independent and loyal 
to the shareholders. 
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The empirical results of chapter 6 show that high narcissistic CEOs have less countervailing 
power. The non-executive board members should be aware that the board mechanism doesn’t 
function properly. Other ways of appointing board members, external advisors with no link to 
the CEO, could alleviate the board mechanism problems and reinforce the countervailing 
power.  
 
Accountants should be aware of the increased fraud propensity of high narcissistic CEOs. 
Suspicious contracts and large income fluctuations must be monitored carefully. The 
suspicions about destructive forms of CEO narcissism can also be checked at social media 
sites. The expropriating behavior of Enron’s directors and the creative bookkeeping was a hot 
topic on several forums in the late 1990th, long before the SEC initiated the allegations. 
Internal accountants are potential whistleblowers to provide the SEC with original 
information about a violation of GAAP.  The recent proposal to award whistleblowers with 10 
to 30% of the financial penalty charged by the SEC may increase the willingness of internal 
accountants to report improper accounting procedures.  
 
 
8.3 Contributions of this Research 
 
The first contribution is that this research shows how CEO narcissism can be measured with 
one overall measure which reflects the four main conceptual dimensions of narcissism 
(Emmons, 1987) by focusing on fifteen objective variables within five determinants of CEO 
behavior, comprising media exposure, compensation, power, growth and perquisites. The 
existing literature documents the importance of CEO narcissism for organizational outcomes 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984), but little empirical research 
exists about the impact of narcissistic CEOs, mainly due to the fact that CEO narcissism is 
difficult to measure on a large scale. One empirical study exists, written by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) who measure CEO narcissism for the computer 
industry only, which yields 111 CEOs. The computer industry is selected because it is a high 
discretion industry in which executives have latitude over their actions.  
This research includes all low and high discretion industries and finds some variance in CEO 
narcissism across the industry types, as outlined in chapter 4.3.2.  Higher narcissistic scores 
are indeed found in the Business Equipment industry with Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment (FF code 6), but also in Shops Wholesale and Retail (FF code 9).  
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This research extends the work by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) in two ways: by 
measuring narcissism with fifteen instead of only five indicators and by broadening the 
sample to 953 CEOs of the S&P500 companies from all different types of industries instead 
of 111 CEOs from the computer industry only. This large sample size increases the 
generalizability of the findings.  
The measure shows strong content validity and overlap with the narcissism scale developed 
by Emmons (1987). The principal components analysis shows that four principal components 
underlie these fifteen variables, which are comparable to the four narcissism components of 
Emmons (1987). The CEOs who have been identified as narcissists by leading psychologists 
also have a top score in this research, which is another confirmation of its construct validity.  
 
The second theoretical contribution is that this study is the first to confirm empirically within 
organizations the psychological perspective of narcissism as a double-edged sword. Several 
researchers (Kets de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006) 
document the upside (productive) and the downside (destructive) potential of narcissism. This 
essential distinction was missing in the Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) study. The distinction 
between productive and destructive narcissism is confirmed by the empirical results of the 
quadratic regressions. The relationship between the CEO narcissism score and the financial 
accounting measures is intricate and can be visualized by a concave parabola. Intriguingly, 
and adding to the reliability of our findings, is that the ideal level of narcissism is around the 
mean. Although the narcissism construct has a negative connotation, this research confirms 
the psychological perspective of productive narcissism and its inherent upside potential. A 
balanced level of CEO narcissism could well be a requisite for effective leadership and can 
add value to the shareholders’ wealth. Too low as well as too high levels of narcissism can 
become counterproductive.  
 
The third contribution is to the Upper Echelon Theory. The impact of the CEOs narcissistic 
personality on the organizational outcomes confirms the strategic choice perspective by 
finding individual CEO-effects. The results confirm the view of various researchers (Boal & 
Hooijberg, 2000; Finkelstein, 1992; Priem, Lyon, & Dess, 1999) that personal characteristics 
should be taken into account for a complete test of the upper echelon theory. The 
demographic variables as proxies are too indirect measures for the executive’s values, beliefs 
and perceptions. The findings indicate that the upper echelon theory must be expanded with 
narcissistic personal characteristics as shown in figure 3.2. 
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8.4 Directions for Future Research 
 
Suggestions for future research include aspects as an extension of the dataset, the construct 
validity, other samples, other dependent variables which can be influenced by CEO 
narcissism, the productive versus destructive influences and the measurement of a tipping 
point. 
 
 
Extensions of the Dataset  
 
The dataset can be extended with a number of additional variables. The following variables 
are mentioned without aiming to be limited. 
 
The first variable is related to the countervailing power in the family situation. It is commonly 
known that the first wife has more potential to contradict the CEO, which leads to an 
increased countervailing power and an increased propensity for self-reflection. The CEO will 
remain businesslike and level-headed. The countervailing power from the family situation 
will be lower in case the CEO is divorced and engaged in a second relationship. This second 
wife is often called a “trophy wife” (Cools, 2005) who is mostly younger and probably 
looking in awe at her hero and glorify him. The “trophy wife” variable can extend the dataset.  
A variable related to the family situation includes the adolescents who can give their father a 
reality check. The CEO of Philips Lightning already wrote in 1966 that “the best and most 
rough critic is given at home by the family and the family is therefore the ultimate correcting 
force regarding vanity” (own translation).  
 
The second variable is related to the growth determinant. The growth determinant in this 
research includes the number and the value of the acquisitions. Besides acquisitions, 
companies can also grow autonomously by increasing sales and market share. The 
“Autonomous growth” variable can extend the dataset. 
 
Other relevant variables are related to the perquisites. High narcissistic CEOs will build new 
headquarters and spend huge amounts on the interior and decoration of the building. The 
perquisite determinant can be extended with these variables.  
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The dataset can also be extended with variables related to the CEOs prior job(s). This research 
studies 18 double CEOs with different tenures at different companies, as outlined in chapter 
4.3.6. Most CEOs have a higher narcissistic personality dimension during the second tenure. 
The narcissism level increases with every success which reinforces the sense of self-
admiration (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Subsequently being nominated as CEO in a company 
can further bolster the self-admiration. A larger sample of CEOs serving multiple companies 
could result in more information on the dynamic narcissism construct and could test the 
hypothesis whether CEO narcissism increases with subsequent successions.  
 
 
The Construct Validity  
 
Future research should compare the CEO narcissism score of this research with different  
CEO narcissism measures in order to further assess the construct validity. The construct 
validity of the narcissism score using objective variables can be tested in two ways.  
 
The first test of the construct validity is to compare the CEO narcissism score with extensive 
survey research of (former) CEOs. Chapter 4.3.7 documents top scores for 5 S&P500 CEOs 
who have been identified as narcissists by psychologists. These results provide some evidence 
for the construct validity, but the small test sample requires further investigation. The 
construct validity can be further evidenced by collecting the objective variables and 
constructing the CEO narcissism score for identified narcissistic CEOs who are not included 
in the current sample, such as Michael Eisner, David Geffen and Kenneth Lay. 
 
The second test of the construct validity is to compare the narcissism score with a more 
psychological inner narcissism measure which is used in psychology, being the number of 
times the CEO uses the words “me, myself and I” in publications instead of “us, ourselves and 
we”. Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (Aktas et al., 2009) use this measure as the only input variable 
for their narcissism score. Using the first person singular pronouns in speech is correlated 
with direct measures of narcissism (Raskin & Shaw, 1988). The narcissism score constructed 
with the fifteen variables can be further validated by a comparison with this psychological 
narcissism measure.  
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Other Samples 
 
Future research can compare the narcissism score of the S&P500 CEOs with CEOs from 
other countries. Comparing the US CEOs with CEOs from other countries provides the 
opportunity to study cultural differences.  
The CEO narcissism score for Asian CEOs might differ from the S&P500 CEOs due to the 
large family controlled businesses in Asia. The comparison can elucidate whether large 
shareholders (one of the five mechanisms to align managerial interest with shareholders’ 
interests which have been described in chapter 2 and summarized in table 2.1) can restrain the 
CEO narcissism. Moreover, a study that compares the S&P500 CEOs with Dutch CEOs 
provides insight into the influence of operating in the one tier or a two tier model. 
 
 
Other Dependent Variables  
 
The CEOs narcissistic personality may affect other organizational outcomes as the sales 
growth or the strategic dynamism. Strategic dynamism can be measured by investigating the 
changes in key resource allocation indicators (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Westphal, 
Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). These indicators are advertising intensity (Advertising/Sales), 
research and development intensity (R&D/Sales), Selling General and Administrative 
expenses (SGA/Sales) and financial leverage (Debt/Equity). Chatterjee and Hambrick base 
their findings on a limited sample and find a positive relationship between CEO narcissism 
and these four indicators.  
 
 
Distinction between productive versus destructive influences 
 
Several psychologists identified the productive versus the destructive influences of 
narcissism. The answer concerning the origin of destructive behavior are however 
inconclusive. A lack of empathy, interpersonal exploitative behavior and a fragile self esteem 
are frequently mentioned in psychological research as underlying elements of destructive 
narcissism. Maccoby (Maccoby, 2003) focuses on the positives aspects of narcissism and 
argues that strategic intelligence forms the basis for productive narcissists. Strategic 
intelligence consists of foresight, system thinking, visioning, motivating and partnering. This 
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strategic intelligence of productive narcissists can be further analyzed and compared to the 
group of destructive narcissists. This research measures narcissism with 15 variables on a 
continuous scale and finds productive and destructive influences of CEO narcissism. Future 
research should further investigate this continuous scale and the distinguishing elements of 
productive and reactive narcissism.  
 
 
Tipping Point  
 
Chapter 4 shows that CEOs with a tenure between 5 and 10 years have higher narcissism 
scores compared to CEOs having less than 5 or more than 10 tenure years. It could be that low 
narcissistic CEOs prefer short (<5 years) or long (>10 years) tenures. Another explanation is 
an increasing level of narcissism throughout the tenure. This last option provokes the question 
whether there is a certain tipping point where narcissism becomes destructive. The time 
dependent variables in this research sample are analyzed to identify a potential tipping point. 
The time series show a steady increase during tenure years and do not give an indication for a 
global tipping point at which narcissism becomes destructive. The preliminary results of these 
first analyses provide indications that narcissism growth is dependent on the context and the 
individual CEO.  
 
 
The empirical findings highlight various opportunities for future research and provide 
shareholders, directors and other stakeholders new insights into the importance of 
incorporating the CEOs narcissistic personality within corporate governance.  
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Appendix I: Diagnostic Criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
 
 
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of 
empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by 
five (or more) of the following: 
 
 
(1) has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, 
expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements) 
 
(2) is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal 
love 
 
(3) believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or 
should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions) 
 
(4) requires excessive admiration 
 
(5) has a sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable 
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations 
 
(6) is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own 
ends 
 
(7) lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of 
others 
 
(8) is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her 
 
(9) shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes 
 
 
 
Source: DSM IV, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, 1994  
  p. 717 
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Appendix II: NPI and the four components of Emmons 
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Appendix III: IRRC Definitions of the Twenty-Four Provisions 
 
 
1.Antigreenmail provision: a provision that prevents an entity from acquiring a block of stock in 
a company and selling it back to the company at an above-market price. 
2 Blank check preferred stock: this is stock that, when authorized, gives the board broad discretion 
in establishing the stock’s voting, dividend, and other rights when issued. 
3. Business combination law: a law that limits the ability of an acquirer to conduct certain transactions 
with the acquired company post acquisition. 
4. Cash-out law: a provision that enables shareholders to sell to a controlling shareholder, usually 
at the highest price recently paid by the controlling shareholder. 
5. Compensation plan: a plan that accelerates benefits in the event of a change in control. 
6. Director duties: a provision that permits the board to consider non shareholder interests in 
evaluating a possible change in control. 
7. Director indemnification: a charter or bylaw provision indemnifying the officers and 
directors against certain legal expenses and judgments as a result of their conduct. 
8. Director indemnification contract: a contract with individual officers and directors promising 
indemnification against certain legal expenses and judgments as a result of their conduct. 
9. Elimination of cumulative voting: a provision eliminating shareholders’ ability to apportion 
their votes in an election. 
10. Fair price requirements: a requirement that a bidder pays all shareholders a “fair price,” typically 
the highest price paid by a bidder prior to a tender offer being made. 
11. Golden parachute: a severance agreement that provides benefits to management/board members 
in the event of firing, demotion, or resignation following a change in control. 
12. Limitation on amending bylaws: a provision limiting shareholders’ ability through majority vote 
to amend the corporate bylaws. 
13. Limitation on amending the charter: a provision limiting shareholders’ ability through majority 
vote to amend the corporate charter. 
14. Limitation on special meeting: a provision limiting shareholders’ ability to act by calling a 
special meeting (as opposed to waiting for the regularly scheduled shareholders’ meeting). 
15. Limitation on written consent: a provision limiting shareholders’ ability to act via written 
consent (as opposed to acting through a vote at the shareholders’ meeting). 
16. Limited director liability: a provision that limits the personal liability of its directors  
17. Pension parachute: provisions that limit the ability of an acquirer from using surplus money in 
a pension plan to fund the acquisition. 
18. Poison pill: a shareholder right that is triggered in the event of an unauthorized change in control 
that typically renders the target company financially unattractive or dilutes the voting power of the 
acquirer. 
19. Secret ballot: a system of voting that ensures management does not look at individual proxy 
cards. 
20. Severance agreement: a contract which ensures executives some income protection in the event 
of losing their positions. 
21. Silver parachute: a severance agreement that provides benefits to a large number of employees in 
the event of firing, demotion, or resignation following a change in control  
22. Staggered board: a board in which directors are divided into separate classes (typically three) 
with each class being elected to overlapping terms 
23. Supermajority to approve a merger: a requirement that requires more than a majority of 
shareholders to approve a merger 
24. Unequal voting rights: a provision by which voting power changes based on certain conditions. 
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Appendix IV: Classification of 12 Fama French Industry Codes 
 
1 NoDur  Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 
          0100-0999 
          2000-2399 
          2700-2749 
          2770-2799 
          3100-3199 
          3940-3989 
 2 Durbl  Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 
          2500-2519 
          2590-2599 
          3630-3659 
          3710-3711 
          3714-3714 
          3716-3716 
          3750-3751 
          3792-3792 
          3900-3939 
          3990-3999 
 3 Manuf  Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing 
          2520-2589 
          2600-2699 
          2750-2769 
          3000-3099 
          3200-3569 
          3580-3629 
          3700-3709 
          3712-3713 
          3715-3715 
          3717-3749 
          3752-3791 
          3793-3799 
          3830-3839 
          3860-3899 
 4 Enrgy  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 
          1200-1399 
          2900-2999 
 5 Chems  Chemicals and Allied Products 
          2800-2829 
          2840-2899 
 6 BusEq  Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 
          3570-3579 
          3660-3692 
          3694-3699 
          3810-3829 
          7370-7379 
 7 Telcm  Telephone and Television Transmission 
          4800-4899 
 8 Utils  Utilities 
          4900-4949 
 9 Shops  Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 
          5000-5999 
          7200-7299 
          7600-7699 
10 Hlth   Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 
          2830-2839 
          3693-3693 
          3840-3859 
          8000-8099 
11 Money  Finance 
          6000-6999 
12 Other  Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 
 
   Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html 
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Appendix V: Variable Description 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE 
AAER Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (of SEC) 
AWARDS Number of awards received 
BOARD_CHANGES Number of board changes during the CEO tenure 
BOARD_SIZE Number of board members 
CASH Cash compensation, consisting of salary and bonus 
CASH RATIO The ratio of CEO cash compensation versus the second best paid 
executive in the company 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CEO AGE The age of the CEO at starting tenure 
COMPUSTAT Database with financial, statistical and market information 
COSO Committee Of Sponsoring Organizations 
CNS CEO Narcissism Score 
CORP_JET Use of the corporate jet, data collected during the last tenure year 
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
DUALITY CEO also holds the position of chairman 
EXECUCOMP Database with information on executive compensation 
FF Fama French industry codes, ranging from1 to 12 
GI Governance Index, measures management rights versus shareholder 
rights, consisting of 24 provisions which are included in appendix III 
LINES_BIO Number of lines in the marquis Who’s Who database 
MV The market value of the acquirer 
NPI Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
NUMBER M&A The number of acquisitions made, averages per tenure year 
PHOTO The presence, size and content of a photograph in the annual report 
PUBLICITY Number of times the CEO has been in major news and business 
publications, averaged per tenure year 
RANK The rank of the CEO compensation relative to the other top 
executives 
ROLE TITLES Number of role titles the CEO holds 
SALESLOG The log of sales, averaged per tenure year 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEC EDGAR Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval System 
TDC1 Total compensation, consisting of salary, bonus, incentive plan 
compensation, stock swards, option awards, deferred compensation 
and all other compensation 
TDC1 RATIO The ratio of CEO total compensation versus the second best paid 
executive in the company 
TENURE The number of years the CEO serves on the job 
VALUE M&A The value of the acquisitions, calculated as the ratio of deal value 
versus the market value of the acquirer 
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Appendix VII: Changing disclosure rules for private use of the corporate jet 
 
The SEC changed the disclosure rules for the corporate jet in December 2006. The sample is 
split in two periods to compare the disclosures of the CEO personal use of the corporate jet. 
The first half of the sample (prior to 2006) contains all measures before the new disclosure 
rules of 2006, leading to 483 CEO observations with 106 disclosures (22%) and a mean 
disclosure of $ 20,096. The second half (after 2006) contains 470 CEO observations with 212 
disclosures (45%) with a mean of $ 71,402. The disclosures increases in numbers and in value 
as the following two figures depict. 
Disclosures before 2006 
 
Series: SER01
Sample 1 953 IF SER02<2006
Observations 483
Mean       20096.20
Median   0.000000
Maximum  467142.0
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   54970.85
Skewness   3.947155
Kurtosis   21.72174
Jarque-Bera  8308.077
Probability  0.000000
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 >1
Corporate jet use before 2006
in $ mio. 
Nr.
of 
CEO’s
395
400
o.
CEO
 
 
Disclosures as from 2006 
 
Series: SER01
Sample 1 953 IF SER02>2005
Observations 470
Mean       71402.93
Median   0.000000
Maximum  1115484.
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   129951.8
Skewness   3.379504
Kurtosis   20.66248
Jarque-Bera  7003.926
Probability  0.000000
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 >1
275
65
400
300
Corporate jet use as from 2006
in $ mio. 
Nr.
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No.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting van CEO Narcisme: meting en impact  
 
 
Introductie 
 
In dit onderzoek wordt de meting en impact van de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van 
bestuursvoorzitters33 beschreven. Een zekere mate van narcisme is noodzakelijk om de top 
van een organisatie te bereiken. In deze zin heeft narcisme geen negatieve bijklank. Een leider 
zal immers moeten beschikken over zelfwaardering en de capaciteit om anderen te motiveren. 
Een narcistische inslag onder bestuursvoorzitters is dan ook eerder regel dan uitzondering. 
Aangezien narcisme een persoonlijkheidsdimensie is, kunnen bestuursvoorzitters worden 
ingedeeld van laag tot hoog narcistisch. De bestuursvoorzitters die op deze schaal hoog scoren 
vertonen het gedrag van een “Zonnekoning”34. 
De narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van bestuursvoorzitters kan door de zucht naar 
macht en erkenning verstrekkende invloeden bewerkstelligen. Deze invloeden worden in de 
literatuur “CEO-effects”35 genoemd.  
 
 
Doelstellingen 
 
Dit onderzoek heeft drie doelstellingen. Ten eerste worden de oorzaken en gevolgen van CEO 
narcisme beschreven en gevisualiseerd in een specifiek ontwikkeld raamwerk. Ten tweede 
wordt de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van bestuursvoorzitters van S&P500 
bedrijven in de periode 1992 tot en met 2008 objectief gemeten. Ten derde wordt gekeken 
naar de impact van de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van bestuursvoorzitters op de 
financiële resultaten, de tegenmacht en de fraudegevoeligheid.  
 
                                                 
33De bestuursvoorzitter/CEO wordt in dit onderzoek mannelijk aangeduid, maar kan ook vrouwelijk zijn. 
34 Het legendarische voorbeeld van een Zonnekoning is koning Lodewijk XIV die regeerde over Frankrijk van 
1643 tot aan zijn dood in 1715. Hij kende zichzelf de ”droit divin” toe, hetgeen impliceert dat God de troon aan 
hem zou hebben toevertrouwd. Hij accepteerde geen tegenmacht en daarom was er geen premier benoemd. 
Onder zijn regime werden vele oorlogen gevoerd waardoor Frankrijk een leidende macht binnen Europa werd. 
Lodewijk XIV liet Frankrijk na zijn dood achter in een deplorabele staat met vele schulden, een onredelijk 
belastingsysteem en corruptie.  
35 Crossland and Hambrick (2007) definiëren het CEO-effect als “the proportion of variance in a level outcome 
variable that is statistically associated with, or can be attributed to, the presence of individual CEOs”. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 
 
Om deze doelstellingen te onderbouwen, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de problematiek betreffende 
corporate governance behandeld. Met de term corporate governance wordt goed 
ondernemingsbestuur bedoeld, waarbij de onderneming efficiënt moet worden geleid en zorg 
gedragen wordt voor de rechten van alle belanghebbenden. De aandeelhouders zijn in het 
Anglo-Amerikaanse systeem de belangrijkste belanghebbenden.  
 
De scheiding tussen eigendom en leiding heeft sinds de introductie van het 
aandeelhoudersformaat in 1602, de oprichting van de VOC, problemen veroorzaakt. Het 
management heeft niet altijd de belangen van de aandeelhouders op het oog, zodat de 
maximalisatie van de aandeelhouderswaarde in het geding is. De corporate governance 
theorieën zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op rationeel economisch gedrag. Het verklaren van 
menselijk gedrag vereist echter de incorporatie van irrationaliteit in de rationele corporate 
governance theorieën. Hiernaast is binnen het onderzoek naar corporate governance de CEO 
als variabele onderbelicht gebleven. Dit onderzoek richt zich op de CEO en zijn 
persoonlijkheid als corporate governance variabele. 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de persoonlijkheid van de CEO en de invloed op de effectiviteit van 
leiderschap uitgewerkt. De CEO als belangrijke corporate governance variabele is 
onderbelicht gebleven, terwijl de CEO als hoofd van de organisatie juist een overwegende rol 
speelt. Dat de persoonlijkheid van bestuurders invloed heeft op organisatorische uitkomsten is 
door Hambrick en Mason vastgelegd in de “upper echelon” theorie (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). In deze theorie spelen de bestuurders een belangrijke centrale rol. De bestuurders met 
hun persoonlijke percepties, cognities en waarden, beïnvloeden de organisatorische strategie 
en resultaten. Volgens de “upper echelon” theorie wordt de organisatie een afspiegeling van 
haar bestuursleden. De bestuursvoorzitter speelt als hoofd van de organisatie een belangrijke 
rol en heeft in deze hoedanigheid een dominante machtspositie.  
 
De “upper echelon” theorie neemt demografische indicatoren als proxy voor de persoonlijke 
karakteristieken. Al vanaf de introductie van de “upper echelon” theorie hebben Hambrick en 
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Mason erkend dat demografische indicatoren minder goed in staat zijn om de persoonlijke 
percepties, cognities en waarden te benaderen in vergelijking met psychologische constructen. 
De onderliggende reden om demografische indicatoren te gebruiken, wordt verklaard door de 
beschikbaarheid van deze demografische indicatoren. In dit onderzoek worden de “CEO-
effects” van het psychologische construct narcisme onderzocht.  
 
Narcisme wordt door de DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) 
geclassificeerd als “een pervasief patroon van grootsheid (in fantasie of gedrag), behoefte 
aan bewondering en gebrek aan inlevingsgevoel, meestal beginnend in de vroege 
volwassenheid en aanwezig in verschillende situaties” (cursivering is eigen vertaling).  
 
Narcisme vertegenwoordigt de karaktereigenschap zelfliefde, met de daarbij behorende 
persoonlijkheidskarakteristieken als ijdelheid, hybris36, egoïsme, zelfachting, zelfvertrouwen, 
dominantie, ambitie en gebrek aan empathie. Zelfachting en zelfvertrouwen aan de 
buitenkant, want diep van binnen is het tegenovergestelde aan de orde. Het innerlijk van 
narcisten wordt over het algemeen juist gekenmerkt door een gebrek aan zelfachting en 
zelfvertrouwen. Narcisten trachten deze tekortkomingen te compenseren door zichzelf als zeer 
belangrijk te presenteren. Hierdoor zijn narcisten continue op zoek naar bevestiging van hun 
superioriteit. Dit wordt de narcistische paradox genoemd.  
 
Om zichzelf tegen kritiek te beschermen hebben narcisten de neiging om de gevoelens en het 
gedrag van anderen te negeren, waardoor hun empathische vermogens onderontwikkeld zijn. 
Narcisten worden zodoende gedreven door hun eigen persoonlijke egoïstische behoeften naar 
macht en erkenning (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). 
 
Op basis van DSM ontwikkelden Raskin and Hall (Raskin & Hall, 1979) de “Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory” (NPI) met 54 items. Emmons (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987) heeft 
deze 54 items met behulp van factoranalyse gereduceerd tot de volgende 4 componenten: 
I  autoriteit/leiderschap (Ik ben het middelpunt van de aandacht), 
II  superioriteit/arrogantie (Ik ben beter dan anderen), 
III  zelfbewondering (Ik ben geweldig, fenomenaal en speciaal), 
IV  rechthebbend (Ik eis het respect waar ik recht op heb). 
                                                 
36 Hybris kan worden gedefinieerd als overmatig optimisme, arrogantie en trots 
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Een belangrijke persoonlijke karakteristiek voor effectief leiderschap is narcisme, vanwege de 
inherente capaciteit om macht uit te oefenen, om anderen aan te sturen en vanwege het 
streven naar maatschappelijk prestige (Lubit, 2002). Maccoby beargumenteert dat de 
informele macht, de visie en de aantrekkingskracht op volgers noodzakelijke voorwaarden 
zijn voor effectief leiderschap en daarom wenselijk voor bestuursvoorzitters (Maccoby, 
2001). Narcistische bestuursvoorzitters zijn hierdoor in staat om de organisatie naar een 
succesvolle toekomst te leiden (Maccoby, 2003). In deze betekenis heeft narcisme geen 
negatieve bijklank. Een leider zal immers moeten beschikken over zelfwaardering, een drang 
om gezag uit te oefenen en de capaciteit om anderen te motiveren. Bestuursvoorzitters hebben 
invloedrijke en machtige posities binnen organisaties hetgeen kan resulteren in een 
hoogdravende zelfachting (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991).  
 
 
Het Raamwerk 
 
De figuur op de volgende bladzijde visualiseert het raamwerk van een hoog narcistische 
bestuursvoorzitter als Zonnekoning. De narcistische inslag van de bestuursvoorzitter kan 
worden gemeten door te kijken naar 5 determinanten, zijnde media aandacht, beloning, macht, 
groei en emolumenten. Deze determinanten reflecteren de vier componenten van Emmons en 
worden in hoofdstuk 4 beschreven.   
 
Door de continue behoefte aan bevestiging van hun eigen ego ondernemen hoog narcistische 
bestuursvoorzitters opzienbarende acties die voor zijn toeschouwers duidelijk waarneembaar 
zijn (Buss & Chiodo, 1991). De narcistische persoonlijkheid van de bestuursvoorzitter zal 
invloed uitoefenen op de financiële resultaten, de tegenmacht van de bestuursleden en de 
fraudegevoeligheid. Deze impact is in de figuur op de volgende bladzijde weegegeven en zal 
in de hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 worden behandeld. 
 
Goede financiële resultaten bevestigen de Zonnekoning in zijn superioriteit en kunnen leiden 
tot hybris. Zelfreflectie en tegenmacht van raadsleden kunnen het Zonnekoninggedrag in 
toom houden. Teleurstellende financiële resultaten kunnen door fraude worden verhuld, zodat 
de Zonnekoningstatus intact blijft. Ingeval de teleurstellende financiële resultaten worden 
onthuld of de fraude wordt ontdekt, valt de Zonnekoning van zijn troon.  
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FIGUUR: OORZAKEN EN GEVOLGEN VAN CEO NARCISSISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chatterjee en Hambrick (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) noemen drie bezwaren waarom er 
weinig empirisch onderzoek is verricht naar narcistische leiders.  
Ten eerste is narcisme in het verleden beschouwd als een persoonlijkheidsstoornis in plaats 
van een persoonlijkheidsdimensie. Ten tweede wordt verondersteld dat narcisme slechts 
incidenteel voorkomt. Ten derde is narcisme moeilijk te meten.  
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De eerste twee bezwaren, stoornis en incidenteel, zijn door de voortschrijdende 
psychologische kennis achterhaald en verworpen. Onderzoekers (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & 
Terry, 1988) hebben namelijk aangetoond dat narcisme een persoonlijkheidsdimensie is 
waarop individuen van laag tot hoog kunnen scoren. Narcisme is een essentieel onderdeel van 
ons aller persoonlijkheid (Freud, 1914) en een hoge mate van narcisme (Narcistische 
Persoonlijkheid Stoornis) komt bij 0,7% tot 1% van de wereldbevolking voor.  
Het derde en laatste bezwaar, de meetbaarheid, kan worden overkomen door narcisme te 
meten met objectieve indicatoren. Een grootschalige inventarisering naar de persoonlijke 
narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie bij bestuursvoorzitters is tot op het moment van dit 
onderzoek niet uitgevoerd.  
 
De opzienbarende acties van de Zonnekoning laten sporen na die een indicatie vormen voor 
de narcistische inslag en die objectief kunnen worden gemeten. Deze indicatoren kunnen 
worden onderverdeeld in vijf determinanten: Media, Beloning, Macht, Groei en 
Emolumenten. Binnen deze vijf determinanten worden vijftien indicatoren geïdentificeerd die 
het narcisme construct meten. Deze vijf determinanten en vijftien indicatoren reflecteren de 
vier componenten van Emmons. De vijftien indicatoren kunnen objectief gemeten worden 
door gebruik te maken van verschillende databases. Een aantal indicatoren kunnen op 
eenvoudige wijze gedownload worden, zoals de indicatoren binnen de beloning determinant 
(met de Execucomp database). De meeste indicatoren moeten echter met de hand verzameld 
worden. De determinanten en indicatoren zijn opgenomen in de tabel op de volgende 
bladzijde. 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt in het eerste deel de 5 determinanten en de 15 indicatoren waarop de 
narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van bestuursvoorzitters is gebaseerd. Het tweede deel 
van hoofdstuk 4 bevat een beschrijving van de data  en het derde deel van het hoofdstuk de 
constructie van de narcisme schaal voor bestuursvoorzitters.  
 
De datacollectie is gebaseerd op Amerikaanse S&P500 bedrijven en hun bestuursvoorzitters 
die uit de Compustat Execucomp database worden geselecteerd. Er worden aan 
bestuursvoorzitters twee filters opgelegd om in de dataverzameling te worden opgenomen.  
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Determinant Objectieve indicator 
Media  1. Aantal perspublicaties 
2. Aantal prijzen  
3. Aantal lijnen in de Who’s Who  
4. Aanwezigheid en grootte van foto(s) in het jaarverslag 
Beloning  1. Cash beloning (Salaris & Bonus) 
2. Totale beloning 
3. Ratio Cash beloning bestuursvoorzitter/tweede best betaald bestuurslid 
4. Ratio Totale beloning bestuursvoorzitter/ tweede best betaald bestuurslid 
5. Compensatie rang 
Macht 1. Dualiteit 
2. Governance Index van Gompers 
3. Aantal roltitels van de bestuursvoorzitter 
Groei 1. Aantal acquisities 
2. Omvang van de acquisities 
Emolumenten 1.Gebruik van het bedrijfsvliegtuig 
  
 
Ten eerste worden alleen bestuursvoorzitters geselecteerd die hun ambtsperiode na 1 januari 
1992 beginnen. Deze filter wordt opgelegd, vanwege het feit dat data voor 1992 slechts in 
geringe mate digitaal beschikbaar is. Een tweede filter selecteert alleen die bestuursvoorzitters 
die een ambtsperiode van meer dan drie jaren hebben vervuld om de effecten van een 
individuele bestuursvoorzitter op de bedrijfsprestaties gefundeerd te kunnen meten. Deze 
tweede filter is gebaseerd op de “life-cycle” theorie van Hambrick en Fukutomi (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991). De “life-cycle” theory impliceert dat een bestuursvoorzitter drie jaren nodig 
heeft om een eigen inbreng te implementeren. De periode van drie jaren wordt empirisch 
bevestigd door Gabarro (Gabarro, 1987) en tevens door dit onderzoek waarin narcisme 
herkenbaar wordt bij ambtsperiodes vanaf het vierde jaar. Deze twee filters resulteren in een 
sample van 953 bestuursvoorzitters die gedurende de jaren 1992 tot en met 2008 een S&P 500 
bedrijf leiden. 
 
De 953 bestuursvoorzitters worden cross-sectioneel geanalyseerd, zodat alle tijdsafhankelijke 
indicatoren over de gehele ambtstermijn worden gemiddeld. De achterliggende reden voor het 
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middelen over de gehele ambtstermijn is het feit dat narcisme geen statisch, maar een 
dynamisch construct is. Dit resulteert in een cross-sectionele database van 953 observaties en 
15 narcisme indicatoren.  
 
Om eventuele problemen van multicollineariteit en dimensionaliteit te reduceren, wordt over 
deze 15 indicatoren een principale componenten analyse toegepast. De resultaten van de 
principale componenten analyse zijn opmerkelijk, omdat de 15 indicatoren terugkomen in 4 
principale componenten die de 4 factoren van Emmons weerspiegelen. De factorladingen van 
deze 4 principale componenten worden gebruikt om bestuursvoorzitters een narcisme score 
toe te kennen. De score heeft de vereiste variantie voor het dimensioneel narcisme construct.  
Van de 953 CEO’s scoort 1% uitzonderlijk hoog, hetgeen in lijn is met de bevinding dat een 
Narcistische Persoonlijkheid Stoornis bij ongeveer 0,7% tot 1% van de bevolking voorkomt.  
 
De narcisme score wordt gebruikt om de invloed van Zonnekoninggedrag op de financiële 
resultaten (hoofdstuk 5), de tegenmacht (hoofdstuk 6) en fraudegevoeligheid (hoofdstuk 7) te 
analyseren.  
  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de invloed van de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie van 
bestuursvoorzitters op de financiële resultaten. Veel onderzoek concentreert zich op de 
financiële resultaten van een specifiek jaar, meestal het daaropvolgende jaar. Een 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk als narcisme heeft echter een lange termijn impact, zodat de 
gemiddelde financiële resultaten gedurende de ambtstermijn als afhankelijke indicator in 
beschouwing worden genomen. De financiële prestaties worden gemeten met de accounting 
maatstaf ROA37 en de markt gerelateerde maatstaf Tobin’s Q38. De waardecreatie door 
bestuursleden kan het beste door ROA worden verklaard (Paul, 1992). 
 
                                                 
37 ROA staat voor “Return On Assets” en is een financieel kengetal van winstgevendheid. Bij de berekening van 
ROA wordt de netto winst gerelateerd aan de waarde van de totale activa.  
38 De Tobin’s Q is een kengetal waarbij de marktwaarde van de totale activa gerelateerd wordt aan de 
boekwaarde van de totale activa. 
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Narcisme is gerelateerd aan leiderschapsposities, maar garandeert geen effectiviteit 
(Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). De mate van narcisme bij bestuursvoorzitters kan productieve 
of destructieve invloeden hebben op de financiële resultaten.  
 
De opzienbarende acties kunnen al dan niet resulteren in succes. Indien de opzienbarende 
acties succes opleveren, gaan hoog narcistische bestuursvoorzitters nog meer geloven in hun 
superioriteit. De hoog narcistische bestuursvoorzitters worden bewonderd en blindelings 
gevolgd. Een bestuursvoorzitter die hoog scoort op de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie 
zal het succes aan zichzelf toeschrijven, de zogenoemde interne attributie. Hoe groter het 
succes, des te groter de macht en des te kleiner de tegenmacht. Er ontstaat overmoedigheid en 
hybris. De narcistische inslag heeft in dit geval de potentie zich verder te ontwikkelen. 
  
Zonnekoningen gebruiken hun organisaties als hulpmiddel om zodoende het hoogst mogelijke 
narcistisch niveau te bereiken, zijnde grandeur, aandacht en applaus. Zonnekoningen initiëren 
meer veranderingen, zijn continue op zoek naar grandeur en ondernemen opzienbarende 
acties die het publiek duidelijk kan waarnemen (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
Het is van belang te weten of deze opzienbarende acties resulteren in een hoger of lager 
financieel resultaat.  
 
Een lineair regressie toont aan dat er een negatief verband bestaat tussen de mate van 
narcisme en de financiële resultaten. Bij de accounting maatstaven ROA is deze relatie 
statistisch significant. Sensitiviteittesten bevestigen de statistisch significante negatieve relatie 
voor twee andere accounting maatstaven ROE en ROS39.  
 
Een zekere mate van narcisme is noodzakelijk voor effectief leiderschap. Het veelvuldig 
voorkomen van narcisme onder bestuursvoorzitters en hun mogelijke val geeft aan dat er ook 
negatieve aspecten verbonden zijn aan het narcisme construct. Volgens de theorievorming van 
Kets de Vries (de Vries, 1997; Kets de Vries, 1998) zal een lage dosis narcisme resulteren in 
hogere financiële resultaten, terwijl een overdosis narcisme destructief wordt.  
 
                                                 
39 ROE en ROS staan voor “Return On Equity” en ”Return on Sales” en zijn financiële kengetallen van 
winstgevendheid. Bij de berekening van ROE/ROS wordt de netto winst gerelateerd aan de waarde van het eigen 
vermogen/omzet. 
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Om onderscheid te kunnen maken tussen productief versus destructief narcisme, wordt een 
curvilineaire regressie uitgevoerd van de narcistische score op de financiële maatstaven.  
De resultaten wijzen op een concaaf verband tussen de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie 
van bestuursvoorzitters en de financiële accounting maatstaven. Deze resultaten zijn 
statistisch significant voor de accounting maatstaven ROA, ROE en ROS. De hogere  geeft 
aan dat het kwadratisch model meer verklarende kracht heeft dan het lineaire model.  
 
Dit empirisch onderzoek bevestigt het psychologische perspectief dat narcisme een essentieel 
element is voor effectief leiderschap, maar tevens een potentieel gevaar vormt wanneer een 
overdosis narcisme resulteert in destructief gedrag. Een zekere mate van narcisme leidt 
derhalve tot een hogere financiële prestatie, terwijl een hoge mate van narcisme bij 
bestuursvoorzitters afnemende financiële prestaties tot gevolg heeft. 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de relatie tussen de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie bij 
bestuursvoorzitters en de tegenmacht van de leden van de RvB en RvC. Succes leidt tot winst 
en stijgende aandelenwaarde, maar succes leidt ook tot macht en status bij de 
bestuursvoorzitter die een voortdurende bewaking vereisen. Deze bewaking kan de resultante 
zijn van zelfreflectie bij de bestuursvoorzitter of voortvloeien uit de tegenmacht van de leden 
van de RvB en RvC. Zonnekoningen dulden geen tegenmacht en omgeven zich met 
jaknikkers en volgers en stellen nieuwe bestuursleden voor. Deze door de bestuursvoorzitter 
aangestelde bestuursleden ervaren een reciprociteit waardoor de tegenmacht zal verminderen. 
De Zonnekoning heeft minder tegenmacht en zal uiteindelijk een alleenheerser worden.  
 
Er zijn twee proxies voor de tegenmacht van bestuursleden. De eerste betreft het aantal 
bestuursleden. Des te groter het aantal bestuursleden, des te kleiner de tegenmacht. Dit 
vanwege het feit dat een groot bestuur eenvoudiger is aan te sturen door de bestuursvoorzitter 
(Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). De tweede proxy kijkt naar het aantal wisselingen binnen het 
bestuur. Hoe meer wisselingen binnen het bestuur, des te minder tegenmacht, doordat de 
nieuwe bestuursleden tijd nodig hebben om zich in te werken en doordat de reciprociteit 
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gevoelens weinig tegenmacht zullen geven (Boeker, 1992; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; 
Wade, O'Reilly III, & Chandratat, 1990).  
 
De resultaten van het onderzoek geven aan dat er een statistisch significant positief verband 
bestaat tussen de mate van narcisme en de omvang van het bestuur evenals een statistisch 
significant positief verband tussen de mate van narcisme en het aantal wisselingen binnen het  
bestuur. Zonnekoningen hebben, mede door hun eigen besluiten in een eerder stadium, 
minder tegenmacht van de bestuursleden.  
 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 kijkt naar de relatie tussen de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie bij 
bestuursvoorzitters en de fraudegevoeligheid. Indien de opzienbarende acties geen succes 
(meer) opleveren, zal de status van de bestuursvoorzitter afnemen. Om de afnemende 
resultaten te verhullen kan de financiële rapportage worden gemanipuleerd. De Zonnekoning 
zal tot het uiterste gaan om zijn status te behouden en te pretenderen dat het bedrijf floreert, 
ook als de financiële resultaten teleurstellend zijn. Fraude behoort tot de mogelijkheid om zijn 
status te behouden. De Zonnekoning zal van zijn troon vallen wanneer de negatieve resultaten 
en de fraude aan het licht komen. De fraudegevoeligheid zal bij Zonnekoningen hoger zijn 
dan bij bestuursvoorzitters die laag scoren op de narcistische persoonlijkheidsdimensie. 
 
 De fraude wordt gemeten met behulp van de “Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases 
(AAER’s) van de SEC. Deze AAER’s worden door de SEC uitgevaardigd wanneer er een 
zekere verdenking van fraude bestaat en op de SEC’s website gepubliceerd. De SEC wordt 
voornamelijk door klokkenluiders geïnformeerd over mogelijke fraude en initieert pas een 
onderzoek indien er voldoende onderbouwing van de aanklacht is. 
 
Uit de 2680 AAER’s blijkt dat er 54 van de 953 sample bestuursvoorzitters zijn betrokken in 
een fraudezaak van de SEC. De 54 bestuursvoorzitters die voorkomen in een AAER worden 
gesteld tegenover de 899 overige bestuursvoorzitters die niet voorkomen in een AAER. 
Fraude wordt in het statistisch model behandeld als een binaire indicator, waarbij de 
narcistische score van de bestuursvoorzitters wordt opgenomen als verklarende indicator.  
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De resultaten van de logit en probit analyses zijn statistisch significant en laten zien dat de 
hoog narcistische bestuursvoorzitters een grotere kans hebben om fraude te plegen.  
 
 
Hoofdstuk 8 
 
Hoofdstuk 8 bespreekt de belangrijkste conclusies, de beperkingen van het onderzoek, de 
praktische implicaties en de mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek.  
De resultaten liggen in lijn met de psychologische theorievorming en het theoretische 
raamwerk: een zekere mate van narcisme is productief voor de financiële resultaten terwijl 
een hoge mate van narcisme destructief is voor de financiële resultaten. Daarnaast is een hoge 
narcistische persoonlijkheid van bestuursvoorzitters negatief gerelateerd aan de mate van 
tegenmacht van het bestuur en positief gerelateerd aan de fraudegevoeligheid.  
 
Dit onderzoek is praktisch relevant voor meerdere redenen. Zonder uitputtend te zijn, worden 
de volgende vier redenen beschreven. Ten eerste kan het narcisme construct objectief gemeten 
worden door de sporen te onderzoeken die de bestuursvoorzitters achterlaten. Ten tweede is 
het voor alle stakeholders van belang te weten dat narcisme een essentieel onderdeel is voor 
effectief leidershap. Narcisme moet echter goed worden gecontroleerd en in bedwang worden 
gehouden, omdat een hoge dosis narcisme resulteert in afnemende financiële prestaties, 
minder tegenmacht en een hogere fraudegevoeligheid. Deze bevindingen zijn cruciaal voor 
alle stakeholders. Ten derde is het initiëren van bewustzijn essentieel. Een bestuursvoorzitter 
met een hoog narcistische inslag tolereert geen tegenmacht, waardoor de bestuursvoorzitter 
vrij spel heeft om zijn opzienbare acties uit te voeren. Deze opzienbarende acties zijn voor het 
publiek duidelijk waarneembaar en bevredigen de behoefte van de Zonnekoning naar 
aandacht en bevestiging van zijn grandeur. De acties zijn echter potentieel destructief voor het 
bedrijf. De bestuursleden die zich bewust zijn van het narcisme construct en dit nauwlettend 
volgen, zullen sneller geneigd zijn om in te grijpen, zodat de tegenmacht van de raadsleden 
intact blijft. Ten slotte resteren de praktische implicaties voor de financiële afdeling. De 
jaarrekening dient een getrouwe weergave van de financiën te zijn. Boekhoudfraude om de 
status van de Zonnekoning te behouden dient te allen tijde te worden vermeden. Accountants 
moeten zich bewust zijn van de fraudegevoeligheid van een hoog narcistische 
bestuursvoorzitter.  
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MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT
This research describes the objective measurement of CEO narcissism and its impact on
organizational outcomes. Narcissism forms an essential element for effective leadership
and is as such an important personal characteristic for CEOs.
CEO narcissism can be measured by investigating five determinants of CEO behavior,
comprising media exposure, compensation, power, growth and perquisites. The CEO
narcissism score is based on these five determinants by a massive data collection of fifteen
objective variables for 953 S&P500 CEOs. The composed CEO narcissism score reflects the
psycho logically validated factor solution of narcissism. CEOs who have been identified as
narcissists by leading psychologists have a top score in this research.
The results of the first empirical impact study show an intricate relationship between
CEO narcissism and financial accounting performance measures which can be visualized by
a concave parabola. This relationship confirms the view that narcissism is an essential
element for effective CEO leadership, but is however not without its pitfalls for either too
low or too high levels of narcissism.
The results of the second empirical impact study indicate a negative relationship
between CEO narcissism and countervailing power of the board. High narcissistic CEOs do
not tolerate contradiction and surround themselves with followers.
The third impact study examines the relationship between CEO narcissism and fraud
propensity as alleged in AAERs by the SEC. The results show that high narcissistic CEOs are
more inclined to commit managerial fraud to keep up appearances and retain their status.
The empirical results theoretically contribute to the psychological perspective of narcissism
as a double edged sword and provide an indication to expand the upper echelon theory
with the CEOs narcissistic personality.
The practical contribution of this research enables stakeholders to monitor CEO narcissism
by applying objective measures and trying to retain productive CEO narcissism levels.
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